Reading Material On Nonproliferation

• Nuclear Policies in Transition
• Problems Facing the IAEA
  • Insufficient material accounting measures

II. David Kay: Iraq and Beyond: Future Nonproliferation Inspection Challenges

III. George MacLean: New Directions for Fissile Material Cutoff

IV. Center for Nonproliferation Studies:

1. The Nonproliferation Briefing Book
2. Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea
3. more ...

V. Leonard S. Spector:

1. Nuclear Proliferation Today 1984
   1. Pakistan
   2. Iraq
2. The New Nuclear Nations 1985
   1. Nuclear Netherworlds
   2. Asia
      • India
      • Pakistan

Reale und vorgeschobene Interessen der zivilen Kerntechnik

VII. Selected Data
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

For more than a quarter of a century the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has had a leading responsibility in national and international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent the misuse of facilities and materials intended for civil nuclear purposes. The singular importance of the IAEA was demonstrated when the agency served as a forum for the international assessment of the causes and consequences of the 1986 nuclear accident at Chernobyl. This volume critically assesses the structure and functions of the IAEA, identifies key issues confronting the agency today, and offers recommendations for dealing with the challenges it faces. The author identifies four ways through which the agency could be strengthened:
 

• More effective leadership roles for its most important members, particularly the United States
• increased political, financial, technical, and human support for the safeguard functions of the agency
• greater efforts to prevent the agency from becoming suffused with extraneous and polarizing political issues
• balancing of advanced country interests in safeguards and developing country interests in enhanced availability of technical assistance

Policymakers and professionals in the nuclear energy arena; students of international relations; and all who are concerned about nuclear safety, the spread of nuclear weapons, and the continuing growth of nuclear energy will find this book of great interest.

Dr. Lawrence Scheinman is a Distinguished Professor of the CNS office in Washington, D.C. Most recently, Dr. Scheinman was the Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Prior to that, Dr. Scheinman served as Counselor for Nonproliferation in the Department of Energy, on leave from his position as Professor of Government (International Law and Relations), and Associate Director, Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. He has previously been a tenured member of the faculties of political science at UCLA and the University of Michigan from which he earned his M.A. and Ph.D. He also holds a J.D. from New York University School of Law and is a member of the Bar of the State of New York.
Dr. Scheinman specializes in international law and relations.

Dr. Scheinman has published extensively in the fields of nonproliferation, arms control and international nuclear cooperation. His books and monographs include

• Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton University Press, 1965);
• EURATOM: Nuclear Integration in Europe (Carnegie Endowment, 1967);
• The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency: A Critical Assessment (Resources for the Future, 1985);
• The IAEA and World Nuclear Order (Resources for the Future, 1987);
• Non-Proliferation and the IAEA: A US-Soviet Agenda (Atlantic Council of the United States, 1985);
• Assuring the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Safeguards System (Atlantic Council of the United States, 1992);
• Publications with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Montery Institute of International Studies.

Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology to the Third World

Unlike the Indian case, there was no question about restrictions on the use or application of safeguards in these countries. The intended supplier, France, had included clear limitations on use and imposed rigorous safeguards. Rather, the issue was whether such facilities should be exported in the first place, and whether the safeguards would be sufficient not only to detect, but to prevent, any diversion that might be attempted. These reasonable concerns signaled the first of many occasions when differences would arise over the capability of safeguards to provide adequate protection against the risk of diversion, and when confusion would emerge, the scope and purpose of in ternational safeguards (7).

By 1976, U.S. diplomatic effort had brought about the cancellation of Taiwanese and South Korean plans to acquire reprocessing facilities. Similar efforts in Pakistan were less successful, even in the face of the U.S. cancellation of military and economic assistance to Pakistan for several years (which was, however, partly neutralized by new assistance from other Western states). Moreover, neither Canadian cancellation of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, affecting Pakistan's only nuclear power reactor, nor eventual French suspension of assistance to Pakistan on the reprocessing plant, was sufficient to deter Pakistan from continuing efforts to acquire a reprocessing, and later an enrichment, capability (8). Nor was the United States able to influence the proposed transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology under very rigorous safeguards by the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil, a non NPT state (9). All of the events only served to deepen concerns about nonproliferation, the adequacy of the, regime, and international security.
 

Proposed U.S. Reactor Sales to Egypt and Israel

Coming as it did in the wake of Vietnam and the midst of the Watergate crisis, both of which had severely shaken confidence in the executive branch of government, President Nixon's nuclear initiative impelled Congress to seek to strengthen its role in the nuclear decision making process. Accordingly, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require that any pro~ international agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation involving reactors larger than five megawatts be submitted to Congress for sixty days of continuous session during which time Congress could disapprove the agreement by concurrent resolution. The measure was signed into law by President Gerald Ford in October 1974 (11). This was to be only the first of several steps designed by Congress to strengthen its role in nuclear nonproliferation policy (12). The important point for our purpose is that Congress became restive with routine negotiation of  agreements and despite the existence of the joint Committee on Atomic Energy sought  to open these to broader scrutiny. (13).
 

THE DANGER OF HIGH RISK EXPORTS

This is not to say that an eventual broad dissemination of nuclear power related activity was not anticipated. Quite the contrary. In 1973, the IAEA had conducted a market survey of nuclear power estimates in fourteen developing countries. That survey suggested that between 52,000 and 62,000 MW(e) of nuclear plant capacity might be put into operation in those countries by1990 (14).

Though excessively optimistic, and subsequently challenged by other analyses on economic, technological, and industrial infrastructure grounds,` the IAEA survey nevertheless reflected the accepted view that a number of developing countries would soon begin to enter the nuclear power age, if only modestly. What was not contemplated was that some of these countries would be able to use the emerging liberal trade market to acquire the means to produce weapons usable material without regard to the logic of that effort to their plans for nuclear power development.

The partial unraveling of what had been up to then a rather disciplined and well controlled system of international nuclear cooperation was due to several factors.

1. One was the change in the structure of the nuclear marketplace that was marked by the appearance of other nuclear suppliers competing with the United States; these suppliers, while not indifferent to nonproliferation, nevertheless had different views on what constituted necessary and adequate controls. They were sometimes guided more by commercial considerations than by hypotheses on long term risk of nuclear technology dissemination. Some tended to take as sufficient the safeguarded peaceful assurances that they received regarding intended use of transferred technologies or facilities, whereas in similar circumstances, the United States might be less prepared to settle for such assurances. This factor was only partly subject to U.S. control (16).
2. A second and related factor that was very much subject to U.S. control was the decline of U.S. predominance in enriched uranium supply. The United States enjoyed a virtual monopoly in furnishing power reactor fuel as of the early 1970s. But a decision by the Nixon administration to put enrichment services on a commercial footing and to turn enrichment production over to the private sector undercut the ability of the United States to maintain its market position. In 1972, the United States changed its conditions for contracting enrichment services from a system of "requirements" to one of "fixed commitments," which also involved substantial prepayment by customers. This had a very unsettling effect on the market and also generated inordinate demand as domestic and foreign customers sought to ensure themselves adequate supplies. The U.S. enrichment capacity remained constant and became progressively saturated as the internal battle to achieve privatization proceeded. Under law, it was prohibited to undertake enrichment contract services beyond a stipulated capacity. As a result, the United States no longer was in a position to enter new contracts for enrichment by 1974.
3. In July 1974, the United States announced that it was suspending the signing of any new enrichment contracts and was closing its order books. Among other things, this left a large number of potential customers in limbo, created a crisis of confidence in the reliability of the United States as a nuclear fuel supplier, and served to affirm and consolidate plans elsewhere to develop enrichment capacity. The net result was that the United States lost the predominance it had enjoyed in the nuclear fuel market, and faced the spread of technologies that it had labored hard to keep limited. Further, important elements of the structure, upon which nonproliferation was based had been weakened. It was a matter of domestic political priorities getting in the way of international interests and, in retrospect, a classic case of shooting oneself in the foot."

Contrary to some of the views expressed during the course of the nonproliferation debate of the last ten years, U.S. export and cooperation policy always had dealt circumspectly with the issue of dangerous fuel cycle technologies. The United States has never supplied uranium enrichment technology, although it did propose sharing it with an appropriate multinational venture in the early 1970s when confronted with the reality that some of its European allies were planning to proceed with their own enrichment plans (18). When the members of the URENCO gas centrifuge enrichment consortium (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany) first began discussing a joint arrangement in the early 1960s, however, the United States had prevailed on them to place their activities under strict secrecy to avoid the risk of unnecessary dissemination of a technology bearing high risk for nuclear proliferation.

As for reprocessing and plutonium fabrication technology, U.S. bilateral agreements for cooperation had provisions contemplating eventual reprocessing under specified terms, conditions, and limitations. It was France, not the United States, that first published technical information on reprocessing technology. U.S. information sharing was in a real sense provoked by the French initiative at the 1955 Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, after which the United States began to publish technical reprocessing information. It did not, however, share industrial know how or transfer hardware or facilities. The only instance of actual sharing related to the joint EUROCHEMIC venture (a creation of the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the nuclear arm of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), which was modestly assisted in the hope that any commercial reprocessing activity that might develop on the European continent would be multinationalized and thereby avoid wide dispersion of nationally owned and controlled facilities.

In 1972, after the NPT had come into force, but prior to the Indian test and the revelation of France's contracts with South Korea and Pakistan, the United States revised its internal rules to tighten the conditions under which any private U.S. individual or concern could assist in the development of reprocessing capability abroad. Any such assistance was made contingent on explicit authorization by the executive branch (at first the chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, later the administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration, and now, 1987, the secretary of energy), and criteria for evaluating whether to grant such approval were established, namely the NPT status of the potential recipient and whether the facility would be under multinational auspices (19). The intent was to hold out the possibility for U.S. cooperation in reprocessing as leverage to encourage countries to join the NPT, and to encourage others to seriously consider joint ventures in reprocessing in lieu of establishing independent facilities. Thus, serious and sustained efforts to control the risk of proliferation while advancing the cause of peaceful atomic energy lay in the background of the unsettling events. of 1974 and 1975.
 

THE DILEMMA OF DEFINING PROLIFERATION

1. the meaning of proliferation and
2. the extent to which it is prudent to rely on pledges verified by international safeguards for achieving the objective of nonproliferation.

The NPT, which is the juridical and political centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime, defines proliferation in terms of possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and obliges its signatories to neither transfer nor receive, manufacture, or acquire such devices. The scope of the undertaking that non nuclear weapon state parties understood themselves to be adopting is reflected in a note transmitted to the United States by the Federal Republic of Germany when the latter signed the NPT.

The Bonn government emphasized its understanding that beyond preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in no case would the provisions of the treaty "lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non nuclear weapon states."

In particular it said:
 

... no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of  information, materials and equipment be denied to non nuclear weapon states merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be  used for the  manufacture  of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (20).

There is nothing in the record to indicate a contrary understanding on the part of the United States at the time.

Nevertheless, the meaning of proliferation has been changing in the public debate ever since 1974. Critics concerned about the implications of the trend of spreading nuclear technology have sought to focus public attention on the risk that under safeguards, increasing numbers of countries with nuclear power programs would come close to nuclear explosives without actually violating their commitments not to produce them, especially if they legitimately could have separated plutonium or the facilities to produce it. They have argued that traditional assumptions of Atoms for Peace needed to be reconsidered if a situation described by Albert Wohlstetter as "a legitimate but Damoclean  'overhang' " was to be avoided. Failure to do so, it was argued, would lead to living in a "nuclear armed crowd."(21)

Such analyses, which already had the sympathetic ear of some officials in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, gave a new argument to public interest groups already wary of nuclear power to urge a thorough review of the United States' nuclear cooperation and control policies, These pressures, coupled with the shock  of the Indian nuclear test and the other events of the mid 1970s, provoked Congress into a series of  hearings aimed at evaluating the soundness of the rules and arrangements for nuclear cooperation  then in effect and at tightening related policies and procedures. This evoked the second theme of the  post1974 era, the extent to which international nuclear cooperation  consistent with the avoidance of  proliferation  could reasonably depend on a safeguards based nonproliferation regime to provide  adequate nonproliferation assurance, or whether other measures  including more restrictions on trade  and cooperation  were needed.
 

The Legislative Response

In 1976, the Symington amendment (22) provided for a cutoff of economic and military assistance to any country that imported or exported reprocessing or enrichment materials, equipment, or technology unless it agreed to place all such items under multilateral auspices and management when available, and the recipient accepted IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear fuel and facilities, that is, fullscope safeguards.

The Glenn amendment of 1977 (23) reaffirmed the provisions of the Symington amendment with regard to uranium enrichment, but treated reprocessing differently.

• Any country that delivered or received reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology was subject to a cutoff of economic and military assistance regardless of whether or not it accepted full scope safeguards and placed the relevant items under available multilateral auspices. By implication, the very act of engaging in any reprocessing related activity was considered so nefarious as to be tantamount to proliferation, although the Glenn amendment did not go quite that far.
• Implicitly, international safeguards were considered to be inadequate to deal with this technology and its product.

Both amendments provided for presidential waiver of the cutoff.

1. Under the tougher Symington amendment, the president could waive cutoff if he certified in writing to the speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the termination of aid "would have serious adverse effect on vital United States interests" and that "he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. . . ."
2. Waiver under the Glenn amendment only requires that the president determine and certify in writing that termination "would be seriously prejudicial to achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or would otherwise seriously jeopardize the common defense and security."

U.S. assistance to Pakistan was suspended in September 1977, under the terms of the Glenn amendment because of Pakistan's continued effort to acquire a reprocessing plant under its agreement with France. French suspension of cooperation on reprocessing with Pakistan in the summer of 1978 resulted in restoration of U.S. aid. In the spring of 1979, the United States once again terminated assistance, this time formally under the Symington amendment because of Pakistan's persistence in seeking to complete an indigenous enrichment facility at Kahuta.

The subsequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 led President Jimmy Carter to offer to resume and even increase military assistance to Pakistan as a demonstration of U.S. commitment to Pakistan's national security and its opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan even though Pakistani nuclear activity made it difficult, if not impossible, to exercise a presidential waiver. The question of the scope and magnitude of assistance dragged on into the early months of the Reagan administration and finally was settled in the form of a proposed $3.2 billion aid package, including state of the art F 16 aircraft, over a period of five years. In arguing for the proposed aid package before Congress, administration spokesmen indicated that Pakistan had pledged not to develop nuclear weapons (24)  and that the administration had made unequivocally clear to Pakistan that aid would be terminated should that country conduct a nuclear test (25). In authorizing implementation of the aid program, Congress further tightened the Symington' and Glenn amendments by inserting a provision requiring termination of aid if Pakistan received or transferred a nuclear explosive device or conducted a nuclear test, and by adding a congressional veto by concurrent resolution of a presidential decision to continue aid in the context of a violation of nonproliferation conditions (26).

The Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) is the most comprehensive and important legislation on peaceful nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which initially opened the door to cooperation and exports under Atoms for Peace.

1. It contains many of the conditions and criteria that govern U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation and exports and establishes the statutory framework for executive branch policies.
2. The NNPA reaffirmed U.S. commitment "to a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency," and
3. called for international efforts to provide the necessary funds, technical resources, and other support necessary for effective implementation of a strengthened safeguards program (27).
4. But it also reflected a congressional view that a safeguards based nonproliferation regime alone was not sufficient to prevent proliferation, even with respect to NPT parties. To avoid deterioration of the integrity of the regime, additional measures were needed to avert the risk that sensitive nuclear materials (such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium) and the technologies for their production would come into widespread use.

The Congress finds

... that the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or  otherwise  acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security of the United States and to  continued international progress  toward world peace ... [and therefore adopts a policy to establish] more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology .... (28)

The NNPA thus continued the trend started with the Symington and Glenn amendments

• of expanding the definition of proliferation and
• of implicitly questioning the effectiveness of safeguards in cases involving sensitive nuclear materials and the facilities to produce them,
• even while recognizing the general importance of safeguards to nonproliferation.

Pursuant to these concerns, the NNPA stipulated a number of additional measures aimed at constraining the spread of sensitive nuclear capabilities.

For one thing, the act created a new category of information, "sensitive nuclear technology", defined as information not available to the public and "important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance" of enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production facilities (29).

1. Cooperation with respect to, and transfer or export of, such technology can take place only under rigorous conditions established for nuclear exports and cooperation in general (30). These include
   1. a requirement that IAEA safeguards will apply to all activities in the country (at least after two years);
   2. guarantees that items will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose whatsoever, including research, and
   3. that they will be afforded adequate physical protection; and
   4. that no retransfer of supplied technology or transfer or alteration (that is, reprocessing) of material produced as a result of its use will take place without prior U.S. approval.
2. Beyond this, the act discourages cooperation or transfers involving sensitive nuclear technology, although in a less than forceful manner.
   • For example, the president is enjoined to seek international agreement that enrichment, reprocessing, and fabrication of fuels using weapons usable material should be carried out only in facilities "under international auspices" with strict limits on non nuclear weapon state access to sensitive nuclear technology, although a half dozen existing facilities were grandfathered (31).
   • The president is also mandated to seek to develop effective fuel assurance arrangements. However, the legislation stipulates (32). that the president should seek to ensure that fuel assurance benefits are available only to non nuclear weapon states that "do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection". (This provision related to efforts to establish an International Nuclear Fuel Authority, which never materialized.)
3. In addition to the preceding provisions, the NNPA broadened the definition of circumstances that could result in termination of U.S. nuclear supply.
   • Included were actions that would be expected to evoke sanctions
     • such as detonating a nuclear device or
     • terminating, abrogating, or materially violating IAEA safeguards as well as
     • activities having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices (even if not intended for that purpose).
   • Also, countries became vulnerable to sanctions if they entered into an agreement to transfer reprocessing equipment, material, or technology to the sovereign control of a non nuclear weapon state unless the agreement were pursuant to an arrangement to which the United States subscribed (33).

Upping the Ante for Reprocessing

Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing ... will take place under conditions  that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non nuclear weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device (34). [emphasis added]

The criterion of timely warning generated considerable debate. Some members of Congress argued that it should be the only criterion for approving a request. But this was rejected in favor of the language finally adopted. In implementing this provision, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations in practice assessed the risk of proliferation not only in terms of the timeliness of warning of diversion that safeguards could provide, but also by the NPT status and nonproliferation commitment of the state or states making the request, the technical and institutional arrangements associated with the reprocessing facility (including safeguards and multinational participation), the adequacy of physical protection and safeguards arrangements for separated plutonium, and the right of the United States to approve the return or retransfer of such plutonium.

The Carter administration established additional guidelines for approving the reprocessing of U.S. origin fuel that were based on the principle of case by case review. Initially, requests were to be considered for approval only if they involved a clear need (for example, resulting from congestion in spent fuel storage facilities).

However, in order to be politically responsive, particularly to Japan's new concerns, another criterion was introduced at a very early stage: the possibility of approving reprocessing transfers to permit the fulfillment of contractual arrangements antedating the new U.S. policy toward processing. Japan had a number of such contracts with France. As a general rule, all approvals were to be subject to the condition that the requesting state was cooperating in exploring alternative methods of spent fuel disposal and that the approval would further U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Japan's operation of the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant to support both experimental work and safeguards development fulfilled this requirement (35). The Carter administration generally exercised its prerogatives in pragmatic fashion, thereby minimizing controversy that might otherwise have surfaced; but the administration's general posture was to try to discourage reprocessing to the extent feasible. Whether Congress regarded this pragmatism as fulfilling its objectives is another question.

The Reagan administration altered the policy of case by case review to allow for programmatic (that is, long term) reprocessing approvals in cases involving countries with advanced nuclear programs that do not pose any proliferation threat. The proposed arrangement, intended to be limited to Japan and the EURATOM countries, but more recently enlarged to include Switzerland, was to be implemented in the context of renegotiated agreements for cooperation and a broad understanding on enhanced international cooperation to improve the nonproliferation regime and international safeguards (36). To a large extent, this policy remains on paper; the relevant negotiations have not been consummated. Nevertheless, announcement of the Reagan approach evoked congressional reaction that took the form of proposed new legislation designed to further amend and tighten U.S. nuclear export and cooperation policy. For many reasons, none of this has come to pass. But the very fact that new legislation has been considered gives evidence of continued congressional interest in nonproliferation policy and strongly suggests that Congress would be quick to take up nonproliferation policy questions if in its view the objectives of U.S. policy as reflected in legislation (assuming Congress has not chosen to amend it) were put at risk (37).

This brief review of legislative activism shows that during the past decade Congress has been aggressive in the nonproliferation arena. The principal effort has been to tighten export controls, constrain dissemination of certain technologies and facilities, and (through the pressure of legislative oversight) protect against what some felt might be a too liberal administration approach to international nuclear cooperation and exports. Individually and collectively, these reflect a congressional uneasiness about the effectiveness of international safeguards as a means of preventing further ptoliferation.. What is striking in all of this is the scant attention given by some legislators to the legitimate aspirations, expectations, and concern of recipient nations both in the realm of energy security and nuclear development. Moreover, there is little evidence that they appreciate that the stability of the nonproliferation regime would be seriously undermined if nuclear recipients lose confidence in its basic principles.

There is in all of this, of course, an element of action and reaction. The promotion of nuclear commerce generates a certain instability if technology is perceived as getting ahead of social controls that enjoy public confidence. Thoughtful people raised legitimate questions about whether the course and pace of nuclear development were consistent with the level of control perceived to be needed. Fearing not, corrective measures were sought and introduced in an effort to redress the balance and to bring things back to equilibrium. The strong legislative pressures to curtail old patterns in the nuclear community served notice of what could happen if confidence in effective controls waned. However, these measures sometimes ran roughshod over legitimate peaceful interests and somewhat undermined the very institution created to serve the interest of the safe development of the peaceful atom, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Executive Response

Nuclear Supplier Guidelines

1. The first was to mobilize the principal exporters (as the United States had done for nonproliferation reasons on other occasions) into a Nuclear Suppliers Group to achieve agreement on common conditions and rules of the game for nuclear exports.
2. The second was to challenge conventional wisdom regarding the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel.

A principal objective of the first element was to ensure that safeguards did not become bargaining chips in commercial nuclear competition. The United States favored a requirement that recipient countries accept full scope safeguards as a condition for any nuclear export. Although backed on this by a number of suppliers (and the condition accepted by all NPT non nuclear weapon state parties on their own activities), this failed to win French and German support (very largely because of anticipated sales to Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa). So the guidelines provide only that any export of items on an agreed "trigger list" drawn up and occasionally supplemented by the suppliers would have to be placed under IAEA safeguards (38).

• The emphasis of this crucial group of exporting states on international safeguards confirmed that safeguards remained the core of the nonproliferation regime and the sine qua non for international civil nuclear cooperation.
• Nonetheless, the United States also sought to reduce the pressure on safeguards by pressing for additional technological barriers; this would be accomplished by a mandatory agreement by suppliers that they would not make further transfers of reprocessing or enrichment technology or facilities. This reflected a diminished confidence that safeguards and pledges alone could sustain nonproliferation.

But the U.S. drive for mandatory prohibition on sensitive transfers was rejected by several members of the group as being too sweeping and likely to cause some countries to seek nuclear independence, thereby further diluting any influence suppliers might exercise over national nuclear development. However, the suppliers did agree to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons usable materials and to encourage recipients to accept supplier involvement or other appropriate multinational arrangements as an alternative to national facilities (39). Significantly, the two members of the group least disposed to mandatory restraints on sensitive technology transfers, France and the Federal Republic of Germany subsequently independently. announced their intention not to authorize "until further notice" the export of reprocessing facilities (40).

Additionally, the guidelines eventually agreed upon contained an important provision adapted from French and German transfer agreements with Pakistan and Brazil, respectively, that transferred technology itself would come under safeguards and that any similar facility constructed by a recipient within a designated period of time would be presumed to involve replicated technology and thus be obliged to be placed under IAEA safeguards (41).

The process of elaborating these guidelines produced lively (if secret) discussion among the suppliers over preferred strategies to reinforce the nonproliferation regime notably whether to rely on safeguards and national undertakings, or also to develop and deploy additive restraints (such as technology denial or specially conditioned technology transfers). The arguments did not cause any breaks in the supplier ranks. Rather, they led to a renewed and reinforced consensus on the terms and conditions of doing international nuclear business. Although not fully satisfactory to all of the parties, especially to those like the United States who were concerned about the general effectiveness of a regime dependent on voluntary national undertakings and international verification, the guidelines did reflect an elevated consensus and a sound basis upon which to build a strengthened safeguards system (42).

Secrecy had surrounded the meetings in London that resulted in the supplier guidelines, and Third World countries were excluded from participation or consultation. Resentment resulted, coupled with charges of cartelism and undercutting of commitments accepted by the advanced nuclear states in Article IV of the NPT. Perceptions and reactions such as these were felt in different ways in important international forums. A Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology convened by Third World nations at Persepolis, Iran, just days after President Carter announced new U.S. nuclear policy, revealed a substantial degree of frustration and disappointment with progress in international peaceful nuclear development and with efforts to curtail technology transfer to developing nations (43). Similar reactions were to be heard at the second NPT review conference (1980) where the unilateral imposition of conditions that went beyond the safeguards required by the NPT was sharply challenged and general complaints were heard about restricted cooperation (44). In the same year, the United Nations, at the urging of the nonaligned states, voted to sponsor a conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (45). Finally, these reactions gave added substance and even a richer agenda to the Group of 77, which has represented Third World and nonaligned views on North-South issues, technology transfer, economic development, and other matters since the mid 1960s and that made its formal debut in the IAEA at the 1976 general conference held in Brazil. The relevance of this for the IAEA is discussed in chapter 7.

Challenging the Plutonium Presumption

1. the first element, which emphasized voluntary export conditions and limits to transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies,
2. this involved reassessment of a fundamental presumption of civil nuclear power that had guided civil nuclear development from the inception of Atoms for Peace.

henceforth, the United States would not regard reprocessing and plutonium recycling as necessary and inevitable steps in the nuclear fuel cycle and would defer such activities until there was good reason to conclude that the world could effectively overcome any proliferation risks associated with such activities.

This anti-plutonium thrust conformed closely to the views expressed at the time in an influential private study co sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power, Issues and Choices which provided an important intellectual input to President Carter's nuclear policy. Concluding

• that accessible and economic uranium resources, adequate to support the needs of any power reactors that might be built in the twentieth century were available, and
• that safeguards on sensitive fuel cycle facilities posed enough problems to make their diversion detection ability suspect, the Ford-Mitre report
• recommended against commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium and in favor both of an indefinite deferral of reprocessing and postponement of breeder reactor commercialization.
• It urged a ban on the export of reprocessing facilities and
• called for establishment of sufficient uranium enrichment capacity to meet global needs.

U.S. Nonprofiferation Policy under President Carter

The greatest proportion of nuclear fuel then being used in reactors in the free world originated in the United States. For reasons discussed earlier, this American predominance in nuclear fuel was undergoing change, and within a few years of the time that President Carter announced his plutonium deferral policy, the proportion of U.S. origin fuel going into free world reactors would drop significantly. Ironically, U.S. policymakers implicitly relied on fuel supply to help leverage nuclear policies elsewhere, although other means of influence also were available.

In 1977, however, the United States still could control what happened to much of the fuel then in use outside the communist states. In most instances (EURATOM was the exception), U.S. bilateral agreements for cooperation contained a provision requiring prior U.S. consent to the transfer of U.S. origin fuels for reprocessing or any other purpose. This meant that for all practical purposes other nations were ineluctably caught up in the process and dynamics of the U.S. nonproliferation policy.

• Many of these states had made large scale commitments to nuclear energy and to a fuel cycle development strategy that assumed the eventual use of plutonium as a fuel. Most felt vulnerable because of still smarting from the effects of the 1974 oil crisis, which had made, them all the more determined to reduce their external energy dependence and to use nuclear fuel cycle development (particularly the recovery and use of plutonium) as one important means to that end.
• None wished to see domestic opposition to nuclear power fed by official doubts in a leading nuclear nation.
• And some were concerned that their nuclear industries might suffer as a consequence of the convergence of a restrained external market (due to the provisions agreed in the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines) and a shrinking domestic market (occasioned by the impact of policies projected from the United States).

If these considerations alone were not enough to provoke confrontation between the United States and its advanced nuclear state partners, an additional feature of U.S. policy was sure to be the catalyst. Carter administration policy emphasized universality in nuclear policy and sought to avoid discrimination in the implementation of its principles. There were several reasons for this, including the desire to avoid further antagonizing the Third World, which was recognized as important to the future of nonproliferation, and the notion that unless the technological leaders themselves practiced some form of abstention there would be little chance to persuade others of the possible merits of the approach being advocated. The underlying philosophy of this strategy can be found in the Ford-Mitre report, which made the following important argument:

A United States proposal for international reexamination of the economics of plutonium recycle and breeders will hardly be credible unless the United States is itself prepared to defer its own plutonium recycle and breeder commercialization programs on valid economic and energy supply grounds. Such action will not necessarily convince all countries but will certainly influence their thinking and will preempt charges of discrimination or of failure to honor NPT commitments (48).[emphasis added]

1. One was that while advocating universality in principle, in practice, by employing a case by case approach, the United States did distinguish between states with specific requests for reprocessing U.S.origin fuel on the basis of such criteria as their nonproliferation credentials, their adherence to the NPT, and the nature and scope of their existing civil nuclear energy programs. This served to accommodate states that otherwise would have suffered a genuine hardship.
2. Another was the effort of the administration to bring flexibility into the legislation that was then being considered by the Congress so that it could be responsive to legitimate claims of cooperating partners.

One of the most important ameliorating measures was the initiation of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) (50). INFCE was not intended as a negotiation process (in the sense of resulting in a definitive agreement on the nuclear fuel cycle) but rather as a techno-diplomatic exercise in international technology assessment.

• It was aimed at addressing the interrelated problems of implementing nuclear power programs while minimizing the risk of further proliferation.
• On balance, it is generally acknowledged that its main values were
  1. to defuse the international nuclear atmosphere;
  2. to enable the United States to clarify the nature, scope, and intent of its evolving nuclear policy and
  3. to focus attention on the legitimacy and importance of taking nuclear proliferation into account along with economic and technical considerations in making national nuclear fuel cycle decisions (51).
• It provided a forum in which to narrow factual differences and to establish a common analytic base regarding proliferation risk assessment.
• INFCE also set in motion a process to establish some consensus on a number of significant issues, including alternative management options for spent fuel.
• And, it contributed to sensitizing the international community to the fact that there are proliferation risks associated with certain fuel cycle decisions as well as to the collective nature of the responsibility for avoiding proliferation by whatever path (52).
• INFCE also was relevant to the IAEA and safeguards. There was wide acknowledgment in the working groups and in the final plenary report of the importance of effective international safeguards for cooperation and development in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
  • INFCE strongly endorsed IAEA safeguards and their general adequacy for dealing with existing operating plants (primarily light water power reactors and small scale reprocessing facilities);
  • it also stressed the value and importance of further development and improvement of safeguards, especially in connection with sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The central role of safeguards in the nonproliferation regime was seen as justification for continued safeguards research and development to improve methods of materials accountability and enhance means of containment and surveillance.

1. All the issues raised were the right ones. The conceptual strategy for dealing with them embraced all of the critical elements, and the effort to engage all interested parties in the assessment process made, an international enterprise of American policy.
2. But the approach also suffered from a failure to recognize adequately the depth of interdependence that had developed in the nuclear world since Atoms for Peace (or it recognized the interdependence but misjudged the implications and latitude for action it involved). Actions nominally defined as domestic had immediate, far reaching and disruptive effects on many of the United States' traditional nuclear partners and provoked a loss of confidence.
3. They also weakened confidence in the very international institutions (the IAEA and the international safeguards) that they were intended to strengthen. In some respects, it was a case of the best being the enemy of the good.

Reagan Administration Policy and Safeguards

An important change in nonproliferation policy under President Reagan is the distinction made between states that are and that are not perceived to be reliable vis a vis nonproliferation. The Reagan administration has adopted a policy of "continuing to inhibit sensitive transfers of nuclear technology, equipment, and materials, particularly where the dangers of proliferation demand", but not to "inhibit or set back civil reprocessing or breeder development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk" (53).

• This policy signals a break with President Carter's inclination to deal with nuclear issues on the basis of universal principles applicable to all states regardless of nonproliferation status and credentials.
• It also diverges from his disposition to question the legitimacy of reprocessing and plutonium use even in existing reprocessing facilities by mature nuclear nations, and with the implicit assumption that effective international safeguards for certain activities (such as reprocessing) are inherently unattainable.

1. This policy orientation inevitably focuses attention on international safeguards and emphasizes their central role and importance to nonproliferation - a point that was given prominent attention by President Reagan in announcing U.S. policy in July 1981, as well as in urging all supplier states to require full scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. Indeed, a shift from denial to support, or at least tolerance, of certain kinds of activities involving U.S. origin fuels is predicated on the existence and application of the most effective safeguards possible.
2. Furthermore, it assumes that not only the United States, but its cooperating partners as well, will provide whatever support is needed to facilitate development and implementation of effective international safeguards in general and of measures to compensate for limitations and weaknesses in current IAEA safeguards in respect to sensitive activities and bulk handling facilities.

This clearly necessitates adequate funding for the IAEA, agency access to national laboratory research and development and expertise on improved safeguards, and maximum cooperation in implementing IAEA safeguards smoothly, efficiently, and in a timely manner. And as the earlier discussion of legislative activism demonstrated, Congress is disposed to scrutinize closely executive branch policy for nuclear cooperation with a view to ensuring that nonproliferation objectives are fulfilled. Altogether, this adds up to a substantial degree of support and high level attention being given to IAEA safeguards by the United States.

Critical judgments may be appropriately passed on some aspects of Reagan administration nuclear policy:

1. its seemingly acute emphasis on reestablishing the United States as a reliable supplier;
2. its liberal attitude toward plutonium use;
3. its concept of "bridge building" to NPT holdouts (which has turned out to be more of a one way street and has not yielded significant results);
4. or its efforts to minimize congressional oversight in the nonproliferation area (for example, with respect to subsequent arrangements incorporated in programmatic arrangements on reprocessing).

In September 1982, when the IAEA general conference voted to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation, the U.S. delegation walked out of the meeting, announcing that the United States would have to reassess its continued participation in the agency. The Senate Appropriations Committee, during the course of the administration's reassessment, voted to delete from an appropriation bill the $14.5 million voluntary contribution intended for the IAEA in 1983, an action that was partially remedied by subsequent legislative action. At the same time, the administration suspended payments of the remainder of its 1982 dues to the IAEA pending the outcome of its reassessment. U.S. support for Israel clearly had clashed head on with the U.S. commitment to the IAEA (56).

In this instance, the United States concluded that the IAEA was critical to its nonproliferation and national security interests essentially because of the indispensable role played by IAEA safeguards in the global nonproliferation regime. As a result, the United States resumed participation in the agency. This outcome is one instance when nonproliferation concerns were sustained against other values and interests. But it is not a foregone conclusion that this result will always obtain or that the depth of U.S. nonproliferation interest can be held hostage to U.S. acquiescence in actions of others that it regards as fundamentally detrimental to or incompatible with its own national interests. This issue will be revisited in the next chapter.

• Bertrand Goldschmidt and Myron B. Kratzer, "Peaceful Nuclear Relations: A Study of the Creation and Erosion of Confidence," in Ian Smart, ed., World Nuclear Energy: Toward a Bargain of Confidence (Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) pp. 19-48;
• Onkar Marwah and Ann SchuIz, eds.,Nuclear Proliferation and the Near Nuclear Countries (Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1985);
• Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, "The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research," Orbis (Summer 1976) pp. 497 524;
• Albert Wolilstetter, "Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules," Foreign Policy no. 25 (Winter 1976 1977) pp. 88 96.

2. China, of course, was assisted in its nuclear activities by the Soviet Union, but far less is known about the purpose of that assistance and what Soviet expectations were at the time it was rendered. Thus, India still stands as the only case where clear statements of expectation were made for several years before the actual event, statements that erased any earlier ambiguities in the bilateral agreement between India and Canada.

3. Insofar as the regime consists also of agreements for cooperation, it may be argued that India did in fact violate a regime rule. This argument might be strengthened by the fact that at the time of the Indian explosion the question of the legitimacy of peaceful nuclear explosions under the agreement with Canada was under active discussion, at least making India guilty of unilaterally interpreting a bilateral agreement whose meaning was in dispute.

4. Of course, it would have been possible that a customary rule of international law had emerged with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions. If that were the case, the Indian action would have been more arguably a violation of a regime norm. As suggested here, however, the situation at the time is fraught with too many ambiguities to permit an unambiguous conclusion.

5. For a discussion of Canadian views and policies, see Mark J. Moher, "Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: A Canadian Perspective," in Rodney Jones and coauthors, eds., The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1985).

6. See Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York, Vintage Books, 1984) pp. 342 343; Rodney Jones, "Nuclear Supply Policy and South Asia," in Rodney Jones and coauthors, ibid., p. 166.

7. For some, it was a question of misunderstanding just what purpose safeguards were to serve, a misunderstanding that was encouraged by the term itself, which implies some form of hands on control or the ability to stop an action from occurring. For others, it was less misunderstanding than their having concluded that safeguards were not sufficient to provide adequate protection against diversion and that new and different measures were required. These two views converged in the aftermath of the Indian test to create the situation discussed herein. The problem is reflected in the U.S. concept of "timely warning" as distinguished from "timely detection" that is called for in the IAEA NPT safeguards document INFCIRC/153.

• Timely detection is detection within a given time specified by the IAEA and is related to material accountancy - it is detection of an event that has occurred.
• Timely warning, on the other hand, is detection of an event before it has been completed or so quickly afterward that the diverter has no time to convert the material diverted into a nuclear explosive. If one were to use timely warning as the criterion for safeguards adequacy, it is dear that in some cases timeliness could never be achieved. This issue is discussed in chapters 7 and 8, below.

8. French suspension did not occur until most of the plans already had been delivered. Thus, technology transfer had taken place and may have been sufficient to be of real value to Pakistan.

9. The Federal Republic of Germany-Brasil agreement prompted a strong reaction from the United States that resulted in considerable tension between the United States and both of the other countries. For an in depth review of that situation, consult

• Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1976, also Foreign Policy, Issue 23 (Summer 1976).
• William Lowerance, "Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West-Germany", International Security, Fall 1976, pp 147-166.
• Karl Kaiser, "The Great Nuclear Debate: German American Disagreements", Foreign Policy, Issue 30 (Spring 1978), pp. 85-110."

10. Official U.S. statements on this matter can be found in Department of State Bulletin vol. 71 no. 1832 (August 5, 1974) pp. 248-254 and vol. 7 1, no. 1841 (October 7, 1974) pp. 484-486. For a discussion, see Michael A. Guffin, Nuckar Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atoms (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976) p. 3 1 ff.

11. P.L. 93-485, October 26, 1974. Previously, agreements for cooperation were submitted to the congressional joint Committee on Atomic Energy thirty days before coming into force, but without any provision for disapproval except by legislative enactment.

12. Others included the use of legislative vetoes to check action by the administration that Congress felt to be inconsistent with its policy intent, as well as the growth of congressional commmittees with interests in nuclear matters whether from economic, technological, political, security, or environmental perspectives. The legislative veto was struck down by the United States Supreme Court on June 13, 1983, in the case of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service vs. Chada.

13. Note should be taken of the fact that in 1974, with the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act, the Atomic Energy Commission was divided into a regulatory body, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and a broader energy agency that consolidated all federal energy development programs, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). What was significant was that the independent NRC was legally free to reach decisions on nuclear exports that were binding on the government. At the same time, other government branches, such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of State, and ERDA, were involved in such decisions. The resulting diffusion of responsibilities and authorities in nudear matters had a very negative impact on U.S. international nuclear stature. This was in addition to the proliferation of congressional committees that concerned themselves with nuclear matters that resulted from the demise of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

14. See O.B. Falls, Jr., "A Survey of Nuclear Power in Developing Countries IAEA Bulletin vol. 15 no. 5 (August 1973) pp. 27 38. Among the countries included in the survey were Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia.

15. See in particular, Richard D. Barber Associates, LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-1990: Commercial, Economic and Security Implications, A Report Prepared for the Division of International Security Affairs, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (Washington, D.C., ERDA, February 1975).

16. On the character and implications of the decline of U.S. predominance, see Williarn B. Walker and Mans Lonnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proqeration Control (London and Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1983).

17. This subject is well treated by Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non Proliferation: The Remaking of U.S. Policy (Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1981).

18. This aspect of the episode is very well analyzed and documented in Edward F. Wonder, Nuclear Fuel and American Foreign Policy, An Atlantic Council Policy Study (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1977).

19. 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 810 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office).

20. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament (Washington, D.C., U.S. ACDA, 1969) pp. 609 610.

21. See Albert WohIstetter, The Spread of Military and Civilian Nuclear Energy Predictions, Premises and Politics (Los Angeles, Pan Heuristics, 1976). See also Wohistetter, Swords from Ploughshares (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979).

22. P.L. 94-329, The International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, June 30, 1976 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

23. P.L. 95-92, The International Security Assistance Act of 1977, August 4, 1977 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

24. How reliable this pledge was deemed to be by the U.S. administration is unclear given the fact that the president did not seek to exercise the waiver under the Symington amendment.

25. On this issue generally, see Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York, Vintage Books, 1984) pp. 70-110.

26. P.L. 97-113, The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. This type of congressional veto, however, was struck down in 1983 by the Supreme Court in the Chada decision referred to in note 27. P.L. 95 242, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, section 2.

28. Ibid., section 2a.

29. Ibid., section 4(a)(6).

30. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, section 123 (amended and restated by section 401 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978) deals with Cooperation with other Nations; section 127 (added by section 305 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978), Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports.

31. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978, section 403(b)(I).

32. Ibid., section 104(d).

33. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, section 129(2)(c) (added by section 307 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978), Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports.

34. Ibid., section 131(b) (added by section 303(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), Subsequent Arrangements.

35. On the subject of Japanese reprocessing, U.S. policy and the Tokai-Mura facility, see Lawrence Scheinman and Ryukichi Imai contributions in Michael Blaker, ed., Oil and the Atom: Issues in U.S.Japanese Energy Relations (New York, Columbia University Press, 1980).

36. Programmatic transfers also have been agreed to for Sweden, Norway, and Finland, but unlike the other approvals mentioned, these do not involve the return of separated plutonium. On this issue generally, see "Reprocessing and Plutonium Use," Department of State Bulletin (September 1982) p. 52.

37. This includes the proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act (NNPA) of 1982, which in addition to all of the requirements of the NNPA would have required concurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a determination that a proposed subsequent arrangement for reprocessing would not result in a significant increase in proliferation risk; and the Nuclear Explosive Control Act of 1983, cosponsored by Senators Gary Hart and Alan Cranston and Representative Richard Ottinger, which would have prohibited reprocessing U.S. origin fuel until Congress made a finding that effective international safeguards could be applied, and that appropriate sanctions existed to deter any violations.

38. The guidelines eventually were published as INFCIRC/256 as a result of each of the fifteen participants' informing the IAEA by separate letter of their intent to follow the guidelines with respect to their nuclear exports. They include not only a requirement for safeguards, but also a nonexplosive pledge, provision for adequate physical security, and agreement not to retransfer supplied items or their products without approval of the original supplier, and then only under the same conditions as the original supply.

39. INFCIRC/254, paragraph 7, states, "Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons usable materials. If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international [including IAEA] activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres."

40. France made this announcement in December 1976; the Federal Republic of Germany in June 1977. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is discussed in Charles N. Van Doren, "Nuclear Supply and Non-Proliferation: The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply," Report No. 83 202 S (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, October 1983) pp. 60 65.

41. This is a potentially important provision, but a number of people have raised questions about its enforceability.

42. The division of views among the suppliers is discussed in Bertrand Goldschmidt, "A Historical Survey of Non Proliferation Policies," International Security (Summer 1977).

43. The shrillest voices were those of states that had rejected the NPT. States genuinely interested in peaceful nuclear development would not be hurt by these policies and would have access to all of the nuclear technology, materials, and equipment relevant to their level of nuclear development as long as they accepted full scope safeguards. But these considerations are less important than the fact that this reflected the perception of developing states across the political and nonproliferation spectrum. It is also noteworthy that U.S. industrial representatives participating in the Persepolis conference assisted in drafting the condemnatory resolutions that emerged. ("New Trends and Safeguards," speech delivered by Myron B. Kratzer, vice president, International Energy Associates Limited, to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Albuquerque, N.M., July 1985)

44. For a discussion of the second review conference, see "The Second NPT Review Conference," in SIPRI, Worid Armament and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (London, Taylor and Francis, 1981) pp. 297 338.

45. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/112. By this resolution, the assembly decided to convene a United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE) and to establish a Preparatory Committee of seventy members to that end. The resolution invited the IAEA to contribute to all phases affecting matters within the scope of its responsibilities. PUNE was to have taken place in 1983, but only was convened in 1987.

46. Office of the President, Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) pp. 2763-2778.

47. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1977.

48. Ibid., p. 37.

49. Timely warning is discussed in note 7 above. See also, Leonard Weiss, "Nuclear Safeguards: a Congressional Perspective," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1978) pp. 27 33.

50. In announcing his nuclear policy on April 17, 1977, President Carter stated that pursuant to the objective of continuing discussions with suppliers and consumers over ways to achieve energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear explosive capability, the United States wished to explore establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. The complete statement can be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1977 (Washington, D.C., United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977) pp.219 220.

51. For a good post facto review of U.S. perceptions of INFCE as expressed in congressional hearings on the subject, see Warren H. Donnelly, "Analysis of Hearings on New Directions for Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, Post INFCE," a report prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97 Cong. 1 sess. May 1981.

52. In the final analysis, it is at least as important that a country that decides to pursue a plutonium use option for peaceful nuclear purposes understand and take all necessary measures to minimize the risks associated with that decision in the first place. The fact that some countries continue to pursue plans involving the use of plutonium does not necessarily support the argument made by some that U.S. policy failed.

53. "Statement on United States Nuclear Non Proliferation Policy," July 16, 198 1, in Public Paers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982) p. 631. This was later supplemented by a decision to end the policy of indefinite deferral of reprocessing. and plutonium use in the United States and to endorse those activities. This occurred in October 1981, but industry has not chosen to pursue reprocessing primarily because its economics are unfavorable but also out of a lingering concern about the stability of U.S. national policy on this issue.

54. Ford-Mitre, Nuckar Power: Issues and Choices (see note 47 above) p. 23.

55. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, "Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy Security," speech to the Uranium Institute, London, July 12, 1978 (unpubd.).

56. The attack on Israel in the IAEA was not an isolated problem, but part of a larger issue of Third World challenges to the United States as well as to Israel and other U.S. allies in the forums of the UN General Assembly and counterpart institutions in other international organizations including the IAEA challenges to which the United States had determined to respond with toughness as demonstrated by its subsequent withdrawal from UNESCO. These broader issues, while of undoubted importance, go beyond our immediate concern and are not dealt with here.

As the IAEA's nonproliferation role has increased, so has its political visibility, which has made it a more attractive arena for political activism. Once able to function in comparative isolation from the dramas of international politics, in recent years the IAEA has become yet another stage for political struggles unrelated to its substantive mandate.

The political campaigns that have been waged against Israel and South Africa in other UN organizations have spilled over into the IAEA, although admittedly helped by such agency-relevant events as the discovery in 1977 of an alleged nuclear test site in South Africa's Kalahari desert and by the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi research reactor m June 1981. Consequently, not only the annual IAEA General Conference, which although largely devoted to routine statements about nuclear programs and experience always has had political overtones, but also the board of governors, which over time has developed rather efficient and businesslike qualities, are being progressively transformed into forums for political debate and confrontation reminiscent of the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

The character of the IAEA has changed over the past fifteen years. As a result of its exceptional authority to implement international safeguards, it has come to occupy a central and indispensable role in the global nonproliferation regime. But this in turn has made the agency an important political prize in the international arena. Groups of states that see the political importance of the agency to other states seek to trade on those interests and to dominate the agency to bend it toward their own preferred goals. In such struggles, the higher purposes of the agency can be lost from sight (2).

Success inevitably brings its own problems. As the importance of the agency has increased, so have issues of representation, resource development, budgetary allocation, and staffing for IAEA members. In this respect, the IAEA is no different from other international organizations or institutions. However, the IAEA's central role in the nonproliferation regime, which itself is directly linked to questions of international stability and national security, makes all the more significant any changes of behavior within the organization or in how it is perceived by others. As noted above, the IAEA is currently beset by problems that, if unresolved, could fatally undermine the confidence of many states in its ability to carry out its responsibilities. The more important problems are briefly summarized below.

1. Politicization. One of the most urgent problems is the introduction into agency deliberations and activities of political issues irrelevant to the IAEA's mission, purpose, and objectives. This tends to erode confidence in the organization's ability to carry out effectively its mandated, technically based responsibilities.
2. Credibility of safeguards. A second, equally important issue is the effectiveness and credibility of IAEA safeguards. This issue involves not only an assessment of how well the agency implements safeguards, but also what purposes and objectives the safequards should serve.
3. Tensions between NPT and non-NPT members. Third, IAEA actions suggesting that NPT-related activities are somehow more legitimate than non-NPT-related activities are viewed by non-treaty member states as distortions of the statute and as a threat to the legitimacy of their programs and policies. This has had a corrosive effect on the agency, with non-NPT members resisting actions they regard as attempts to make the agency an arm of the NPT.
4. The balance between technical assistance and safeguards. The balance between the IAEA's technical assistance program and its safeguards functions, including the question of safeguards financing, is a fourth important issue area. Members from the developing countries and the industrialized nations disagree not so much on whether a balance should exist, but on what sort of balance it should be and how it can best be achieved. This is the issue that most clearly threaten to polarize the agency over the next decade along North-South lines, as has occurred in a number of other international organizations, and already has made some impact on the IAEA itself.

POLITICIZATION

Extraneous and Intrinsic Issues

Intrinsic issues are those that relate directly to an organization's purposes, activities, or structure. These include the allocation of resources among different activities and the distribution of administrative or management posts among different nationalities, or their representation on decision- making bodies of the organization. Intrinsic politicization is an inevitable feature of international organizations. It rarely threatens organizational viability because of the normally strong commitment of the overall membership to the purpose of the organization or to the interests that the organization is effectively serving. If this commitment should weaken, the adverse effects of intrinsic politicization increase. At some point, their corrosive effect could rival the impact of extraneous politicization. There. are reasons to be concerned that such trends are operating in the IAEA today.

A Technical or Political Institution?

Politicization over South Africa

In June 1977, the board voted 19 to 12, With two abstentions, to replace South Africa with Egypt, although Egypt clearly was not the most advanced African nation in terms of nuclear capability. This confirmed that a new form of politics had taken root. In later years, South African credentials were rejected by the general conference (6), and still later the board prohibited South African participation in the IAEA's Committee on Assurance of Supply, despite the clear relevance of South Africa to that objective (7). Subsequently, the general conference foreclosed South African participation in any of the committees or working groups of the agency, thus effectively severing all agency cooperation with the government of South Africa. In 1985, the general conference adopted a resolution urging all member states to cease nuclear cooperation of any kind with South Africa (8), but, as in the past, stopped short of seeking South African expulsion, apparently because the perceived benefits of keeping South African facilities under agency safeguards and extending the scope of those safeguards exceed political antipathy to the South African regime. The United States, while condemning apartheid, has opposed all of the actions described above on the basis of the principle of universality and the practical importance of South Africa to nuclear matters

Politicization Over Israel

The Israeli attack was strongly condemned in the United Nations as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon Israel to refrain from further such attacks or threats of attack and to place its nuclear facilities under agency safeguards (10). The matter also was placed on the agenda of the IAEA board of governors meeting that took place in the immediate aftermath of the incident. There, Iraq unsuccessfully sought expulsion of Israel from the agency."

The board did, however, adopt a condemnatory resolution urging the forthcoming general conference to consider the implications of the attack for the agency and the possible suspension of Israel from the rights and privileges of membership. This was strongly opposed by the United States and several others for reasons that would frequently be invoked in the ensuing four years in response to efforts to suspend Israel or to impose sanctions against her. One was the importance of the principle of universality to the integrity of international organizations in general (as confirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions) and to the IAEA in particular (given its exceptional responsibility for verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy). The other was the absence of appropriate statutory grounds for taking proposed measures against Israel. Article XIX of the Statute of the IAEA, which deals with suspension of rights and privileges of member states, can be invoked only if there has been persistent violation of the statute or of an agreement entered into pursuant to the statute, for example, a safeguards agreement. Neither the attack on the Iraqi facility nor Israel's failure to accept safeguards on all of its nuclear activities constituted a violation of a statutory provision or of an agreement entered into pursuant to the statute. The statute contains no provision regarding the use of force against nuclear facilities whether or not under safeguards; nor does membership require acceptance of safeguards. Hence, Article, XIX did, not provide any legal bash. for suspension or for other punitive measures against Israel (12).

Iraqi-led efforts to achieve suspension of Israel at the 1981 and 1982 general conferences failed, but lesser measures did receive support, confirming that a majority of the membership believed that the incident was an appropriate one for agency consideration. In 1981, the general conference adopted by a vote of 51 to 8 (which included the United States) with 27 abstentions (mainly European states) a resolution condemning the Israeli attack. The resolution urged that at its next session the conference consider suspending Israel from its rights and privileges of membership if by then it had not withdrawn its threat to attack Iraqi or other nuclear facilities, and placed its own nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. It also called for immediate suspension of technical assistance to Israel (13). Technical assistance was suspended. The action, although largely symbolic given the modest level of support involved-about $40,000 - was nevertheless important insofar as it affected the principle of full participation of member states. That would become an issue at the 1985 general conference in the context of an Iraqi resolution seeking to invoke sanctions as discussed below.

The Israeli issue came to a head at the following general conference in September 1982. Renewed efforts to suspend Israel were once again unsuccessful. A resolution sponsored by the Moslem states and Cuba received a majority of the votes cast but was defeated because a vote to suspend required a "yes" vote by two-thirds of those voting (excluding abstentions), and the draft resolution in question fell short of that mark (14). The supporting statements of the sponsors and the language of the draft resolution itself reflected the degree to which political considerations unrelated to the agency or the Iraqi incident had entered the debate. As expressed in preambular paragraph (f) of the proposed resolution, the sponsors were "deeply concerned about Israel's escalation of aggression against other countries of the region and occupation and annexation of territories, particularly the occupation of Lebanon and the genocide perpetrated against the Palestinian people. . . ." They called for suspension of Israel's privileges and rights of membership (15). Israeli relations with South Africa also were invoked as a reason to take the recommended action against Israel.

Following the defeat of the effort to suspend Israel, Iraq moved to seek rejection of the credentials of the Israeli delegation. Once again, political considerations irrelevant to the mandate of the agency or to the question at hand were introduced. One claim was that the credentials were issued by a government that purported to represent people over whom it exercised jurisdiction by virtue of illegal annexation (referring to Jerusalem) and therefore were deficient. With the assistance of an erroneous legal ruling by the secretariat's chief legal officer, which permitted the casting of a questionable vote, they succeeded (16). When first put to a vote, this resolution did not succeed. The vote was 40 "yes," 40 "no," plus a number of abstentions. After the vote was announced, a ruling permitted a member state, Madagascar, to reopen the voting and cast a late vote, which altered the outcome. Cases involving credentials only require a simple majority to pass. Coming as it did in the final hours of the conference, the practical effect of the vote was to deprive Israel of participation in only a few remaining activities; but while Israel remained a member of the IAEA, the symbolic impact was not that far from what would have been achieved by a vote of suspension, and it was ominous for the future.

This action against Israel precipitated U.S. withdrawal from the conference that was joined by some others. Altogether, fifteen states withdrew from the conference in protest against the incident, among them France, Belgium, japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the United States announced that it would halt general participation in agency activities, including payments of its contributions, and undertake a major reassessment of its support for and participation in the IAEA. This reassessment was completed four months later with the conclusion, endorsed by the president, that the IAEA serves critical U.S. security and nonproliferation interests. Participation was resumed in February 1983 following certification by the director general, on the authority of the board of governors, that Israel remain a fully participating member of the agency (17).

The intensity of the U.S. reaction had a somewhat sobering effect on the membership of the agency, but it did not put in end to politicization or to bickering over the Israeli issue. Iraq and its supporters shifted emphasis from seeking suspension of Israel to threatening to impose sanctions if Israel failed to take certain measures. In 1983, the general conference voted a resolution (49-24 with 17 abstentions) that called upon Israel to "withdraw forthwith its threat to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other countries," and further "decided" certain sanctions (withholding research contracts, not purchasing equipment and material, and not holding scientific seminars in Israel) if Israel did not comply and remove its threat by the time of the 1984 general conference.` The United States voted against this resolution (RES/409).

In May 1984, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, singling out the IAEA, publically stated that "Israel supports those international arrangements which would ensure the status and inviolability of nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes". Shortly afterward the head of the Israeli AEC wrote to Director General Blix that "Israel holds that nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes be inviolable from military attack," and that Israel "has no policy of attacking nuclear facilities dedicated for peaceful purposes anywhere." (19)

The United States and several others viewed these statements as sufficiently responsive to RES/409 to be able to put the issue to rest, but a number of others, including some who considered the statements to constitute a positive step, disagreed, noting the ambiguous nature of the Israeli statements regarding future behavior, the lack of specific reference to Iraq, and the absence of any mention of the role of IAEA safeguards in providing assurances about peaceful uses. The 1984 general conference voted a somewhat milder but still condemnatory resolution (RES/425) demanding that "Israel undertake forthwith not to carry out any further attacks on nuclear facilities in Iraq or on similar facilities in other countries, devoted to peaceful purposes," and mandating the director general "to seek personally from the Government of Israel" the undertakings in question and to report back to the 1985 general conference (20). This resolution effectively deferred implementation of any punitive measures against Israel and left intact Israel's privileges and rights of membership while still not bringing the issue to term.

The director general's efforts resulted in a letter from the government of Israel in September 1985 reiterating the stated policy of Israel that peaceful nuclear facilities be inviolable from military attack and Israel's respect for how the IAEA fulfilled its safeguards mission. It also included the following key statements:

Israel holds that all states must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and that the safeguards systems operated by IAEA brings evidence of the peaceful operation of a facility.

It is within this context that Israel reconfirms that under its stated policy it will not attack or threaten to attack any nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes either in the Middle East or anywhere else.

Israel will support any subsequent action in competent form to work out binding agreements protecting nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes from attack and threat of attack (21).

This important statement went further than previous Israeli statements in two respects: first, it was more direct and precise; and second, it emphasized the role of agency safeguards in evaluating the peaceful nature of nuclear activities, thus taking a major step toward meeting earlier complaints that Israel was putting itself above, and discounting, international safeguards.

Iraq nevertheless remained dissatisfied and introduced a resolution once again demanding that Israel withdraw its threat to repeat its military attack against Iraqi nuclear installations and invoking the punitive measures called for in paragraph 3 of RES/409 (22). The conference president, supported by the legal adviser to the conference (both from African states), ruled that since the resolution in question would have the effect of depriving a member state of some of its rights of membership, its adoption required a two-thirds majority. Iraq's challenge to this ruling was defeated and the resolution, when put to a vote, failed to achieve the required two-thirds. (The vote was 41 to 30, with 19 abstaining.) Instead, the conference adopted (by a vote of 30 to 21, with 36 abstaining) a Nordic-sponsored resolution that, taking note of the Israeli letter and subsequent confirmatory statements before the general conference, "considered" them to contain undertakings meeting the objectives of RES/425, "noting" that thereby Israel has "committed itself not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq, elsewhere in the Middle East, or anywhere else." (23) Ironically, the United States did not vote in favor of this resolution because it contained other provisions, involving questions the United States regarded as beyond the purview of the IAEA.

With the defeat of the Iraqi draft resolution and adoption of the Nordic alternative, a majority of the members of the agency appeared to be saying enough is enough and that the corrosive five-year debate should go no further. Important national interests served by the agency were being threatened, and steps had to be taken to avoid further deterioration. Thus, the Israeli issue seems at last to have been put to rest in the IAEA, at least insofar as it was based on the Iraqi incident. This does not, however, signal the end of politics, or of the continued risk of politicization in general in the agency any more than it suggests that Israel will now be able to overcome the more subtle limitations imposed on her by political considerations. There are, as we shall see, other issues from which political tension and controversy may arise. Nevertheless, one of the most distressing periods in the life of the agency had passed (24).

In concluding this discussion of the Israeli issue, a final point is in order. The outcome could be viewed as confirmation that the U.S. withdrawal from the agency in 1982 (and its subsequent threats to do so again if Israel. were denied the rights and privileges of membership or otherwise dealt with punitively) was a success and a victory against politicization. However, to reach such a judgment would be to indulge in some measure of self-delusion. First, there was a good deal of resentment toward the United States among its friends and allies for the continued threat of withdrawal. In the view of many, U.S. behavior in this regard contributed to the very politics the U.S. professed to want to end. The threat to withdraw was seen as unnecessarily painting the United States into a corner, as for example expressed in a letter from the Department of State to Director General Blix in 1984:

Should the General Conference adopt a resolution that directs the Board ... to withhold research contracts to Israel, discontinue the purchase of equipment and materials from Israel or refrain from holding seminars, scientific: and technical meetings in Israel, the United States Delegation will leave the Conference and announce the suspension of U.S. participation in and support for the Agency. This is a firm and non-negotiable policy (25).

Efforts by others to avoid passage of resolutions that entailed any punitive measures were mounted less because of convictions that any such action constituted an unacceptable degree of politicization than because of recognition that the United States might just walk out a second time (having already demonstrated in 1982 that it would do so) and that if it did it might be much more difficult, if not impossible, to climb back on board again. That would mean the demise of the agency, which was not in anyone's interest. In this view, rather than eliminating politicization, U.S. behavior might demonstrate that going to the mat is the best way to achieve one's goals, and that could intensify rather than diminish the risk of politicization.

Second, the Damoclean threat of withdrawal raised questions about U.S. priorities. If the United States were prepared to withdraw if any punitive measures were levied against its Israeli ally, then what was one to think about all the U.S. protestations about the importance of maintaining a strong and vigorous nonproliferation regime and an effective international safeguards system? In the Israeli episode, U.S. behavior showed that the importance it attached to nonproliferation policy was distinctly in second place when it came to supporting Israel. The well-known fact that this policy was in no small measure driven by a Congress extremely sensitive to questions relating to Israel, and that the pro-Israeli congressional constituency was larger and more effectively organized than that for nonproliferation, explained but did not resolve the issue for America's allies. Clearly, if the United States could set certain national interests above the IAEA, other members could do so as well.

Finally, many of those who agreed with the United States that it was not for the IAEA to apply sanctions or to suspend Israel in response to the attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility nevertheless disagreed with the view that the incident did not constitute an attack on the agency or on its safeguards system, that it had not done damage to that regime, or that it was inappropriate for the agency to discuss the issue of armed attacks on nuclear facilities (26). Quite the contrary, many nations that supported U.S. efforts to foreclose punitive action against Israel nevertheless saw the incident as a "grave challenge to the Agency's safeguards system" (27); causing "serious harm to the Agency's safeguards system" (28); and as an incident that "could seriously undermine respect for the safeguards system." (29) These and other states share interest in building legal and political barriers against attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities and in pursuing such issues in the framework of the IAEA as well as elsewhere. At the very least, they are not prepared to foreclose discussion of the issue in the agency.

Other Controversies

The Behavior and the Group of 77

Far more important for the future of the IAEA is the Group of 77. The G-77 was formed in 1964 at the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Its purpose is to formulate and aggregate the views of the less-developed countries on matters of economic development and to press for their achievement in the UN system. The G-77 states seek to project their international political agenda, which since the late 1970s has included establishment of the New International Economic Order, in the organizations to which they belong.

The effect of G-77 on the IAEA has been (and continues to be) twofold.

1. First, wherever this caucus has become active it has tended to result in group voting. The G-77 threatens to disrupt the tradition of the agency's functioning largely by consensus and without formal voting, except as provided for in the statute or on rare occasions when demanded by one or more states. It may well alter a style of cooperation that has worked well over the years for the IAEA, one that so far has successfully avoided this kind of group politics. (Of course, G-77 spokesmen may retort that there is nothing sacred about the consensus process if all it does is perpetuate political, economic, or technological arrangements that one seeks to alter.)
2. Second, while the G-77 agenda contains legitimate concerns that merit serious attention by the full IAEA membership (the intrinsic issues), its activity also has been focused on extraneous issues that generate controversies that can threaten the integrity of the IAEA. Unfortunately, IAEA membership includes countries that do not place a priority on the agency's nonproliferation objectives, at least as they have been interpreted by the majority in recent years.

The G-77 can have a constructive voice in the agency if its leadership is drawn from those moderate states with serious nuclear interests and a strong commitment to the principle of nonproliferation and effective international safeguards. However, its leadership currently rests with a few countries-mainly those not party to the NPT - that have opposed the trend toward increased attention to safeguards. These nations are supported by others whose priorities lie less in nuclear advancement per se than in furthering the general objective of establishing a new international economic order, including access to a spectrum of advanced technologies and a redistribution of global wealth.

This is reinforced by the proximity of the IAEA to the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which shares the Vienna International Center complex with the IAEA, and whose secretariat views its mission as one of advancing the cause of a new economic order. Often, the same individual will represent his country in both organizations, with priority of interest and balance of expertise favoring UNIDO. There is a resulting tendency to carry over into the IAEA some of the practices and attitudes characteristic of UNIDO: a more confrontational approach to issues; greater attention to symbolic than to substantive aspects of problems; and a greater focus on altering the structure of representation on the board of governors and in the secretariat staff. Establishing majorities sometimes appears to be a more important goal than advancing the technical purposes of the agency.

Effects by the Group of 77 to Increase Influence on the Board

Pressures have been mounting since 1977 to expand the board even more generally to reflect the IAEA's regional membership, especially in Africa and the Middle East, the two areas from which many former colonial states have emerged with powerful incentives to achieve advanced technological standing to match their new independent status. This has been resisted by the United States and other developed states, including the Soviet Union, on the grounds that the board, as structured at present, is large enough to be representative of the cross-section of its membership while being small enough to operate efficiently, a quality essential to the nature of its tasks and its consensus mode of operation. A further increase in size is seen as potentially jeopardizing the ability of the industrialized countries to prevent decisions inimical to them on matters that require a two-thirds majority (the so-called blocking third) such as approval of the budget and selection of the director general. In a highly politicized atmosphere, the possibility that major agency members would lose their veto takes on even greater significance. Some de