IAEA To Transfer Batch Of Enriched Iraqi Uranium To Russia
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| JPRS-TND-94-003, 1/31/94, p. 40
AFP (Paris), 1/9/94 |
| In accordance with an UN Gulf War ceasefire resolution to liquidate
Iraq's nuclear weapons, the IAEA reached an agreement with Iraq
in 4/93 to transfer "around 35 kilograms" of enriched uranium from Iraq
to Russia, according to the IAEA's Maurizio Zifferero [1]. A first shipment
of 33 kilograms left for Russia in 12/93. The IAEA is now preparing for
a second shipment to leave in 1/94, which will complete the transfer. Twelve
kilograms of unenriched uranium were shipped from Iraq to Russia in 11/93.
Supporting sources:
[1] "First Consignment of Iraqi
Irradiated Fuel Flown to Russia," AFP (Paris), 12/6/93, in JPRS-TND-93-001,
1/6/94, p. 41.
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All Nuclear-Weapons-Usuable [sic] Material Now Removed From Iraq
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| IAEA Press Release (PR 94/3), 2/15/94 |
| On 2/12/94, the IAEA, with the help of the UN Special Commission on
Iraq, removed the last of two consignments
of HEU in the form of irradiated nuclear fuel from Iraq. This last shipment
of HEU completes the removal of all of Iraq's declared stocks of nuclear-weapons-grade
material in accordance with Resolution 687. The first shipment of HEU was
removed from Iraq on 12/4/93. Both shipments of irradiated fuel were removed
from Iraq under contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and
a US subcontractor which provided crash-proof casks. The irradiated fuel
was removed from the Iraqi Nuclear Centre at Tuwaitha and transported by
road to Habbaniya airfield west of Baghdad. From the Habbaniya airfield
the nuclear material was flown to Yekatinburg, Russia where it will be
further transported to a reprocessing facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia.
It is expected to take six months to dilute the HEU at the Chelyabinsk
facility; the residual material will then be sold under IAEA supervision
for use in peaceful nuclear activities.
In 1991, kilogram quantities of HEU in the form of fresh nuclear reactor
fuel were removed to Russia from Iraq.
Also in 1991, during inspections under Resolution 687, IAEA inspectors
discovered gram quantities of separated plutonium which were subsequently
removed from Iraq in the same year.
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'Most Complex' Weapons Inspection Uncovers No Violations
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| UN Chronicle, 3/94, p. 70 |
From 11/1/93 to 11/15/93, the IAEA's twenty-second nuclear inspection
team conducted monitoring inspections at eight former "core" Iraqi
nuclear facilities. Water samples were taken from the watersheds of Tigris
and Euphrates rivers for a radiometric survey, and inspectors verified
equipment inventories and data concerning Iraq's centrifuge program. The
17-member inspection team also conducted "detailed microscopic examinations"
of nuclear material in Iraq that is believed to be of Brazilian origin.
An UNSCOM report stated that, "further corroboration will be sought with
the assistance of the Brazilian government," regarding these materials.
On 11/8/93 UNSCOM reported that no weapons banned under UN Security Council
resolution 687 were found in Iraq during recent inspections.
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Iraqi Nuclear Development and the Future Threat
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| Security Affairs, 4/94-5/94, pp. 4-5, by Amatzia Baram |
| Iraq's secret nuclear program began in 1971 when Iraq
and France concluded a secret agreement to construct an atomic military
research facility at Tuwaitha. From 1972 to 1974, Iraq spent roughly $10
to $25 million per year on its nuclear program, a figure which soared to
$300 million per year by 1976. After the destruction of Iraq's French-built
Osiraq reactor by Israel in 6/81, Iraq intensified its quest for nuclear
weapons, spending an average of $1.5 billion per year, from 1982 to 1990,
on nuclear development.
Iraq pursued three different methods
of uranium enrichment, including electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS),
gas centrifuge, and chemical enrichment. Iraq also experimented with plutonium
separation and laser enrichment in the laboratory.
Equipment for the EMIS (Electromagnetic Isotope Enrichment)
(calutron) enrichment program, Iraq's most successful, was almost entirely
developed by the Iraqis, while the centrifuge program largely utilized
technology, material, and experts from Germany.
The Israeli government
was reportedly aware of Iraq's gas centrifuge program and notified the
US government prior to the Gulf War. Both the calutron and centrifuge programs
in Iraq have been disassembled. However, nearly 2,000 machine tools and
a number of the blueprints drawn up by either Iraqis or Europeans for equipment
and facilities are still missing or unaccounted for. With a workforce of
between 18,000 to 20,000 technicians, engineers, and scientists who had
worked on the program, Iraq has retained the ability to revive a nuclear
weapons program. Since these workers have now finished the task of reconstructing
the electricity and other technical systems in Iraq, many of them are once
again conducting nuclear research. Construction of an Iraqi atomic bomb
could be completed in five to seven years once UN sanctions are lifted
and monitoring becomes ineffective.
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U.N. Nuclear Team Heads For Baghdad
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| Executive News Service, 6/21/94
Reuter, 6/21/94 |
| On 6/21/94, according to UN spokesman Roald Osphal, a 14-member UN
nuclear team led by Garry Dillon went to Baghdad to install video cameras
at the most important Iraqi sites in
order to prevent Iraq from restarting its nuclear weapons program. The
team's work was part of continuing preparations for future monitoring of
Iraqi nuclear sites. On 6/28/94, Dillon said the team had installed a "camera
installation in Um al- Ma'rik...and a bigger camera installation in Nasr"
to monitor the machines at the facilities. The camera network consists
of 13 remote-control video cameras and four film cameras [1].
Supporting Source:
[1] Reuter, 6/28/94; in Executive News Service, 6/28/94, "U.N. Installs
Cameras At Iraqi Nuclear Sites."
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Permanent IAEA Monitors Now On The Job In Iraq
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| Nucleonics Week, 9/1/94, pp. 16-17, by Mark Hibbs |
| On 8/30/94, the IAEA informed US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright
that during the week of 8/21/94 the IAEA posted resident inspectors in
Iraq who will carry out routine and
ad hoc inspections of Iraqi nuclear sites under the ongoing monitoring
program. Inspection activities will include the collection of environmental
samples to measure isotopes that will indicate nuclear activity is taking
place and the checking of dual-use machine tools to ensure they are not
employed for nuclear use. The IAEA has installed video cameras at a number
of sites for further monitoring activities. The IAEA will monitor 24 sites
that housed nuclear activities or activities supporting or related to Iraq's
nuclear program before the Gulf War.
According to Western officials, the IAEA has "no information" showing
any continuing Iraqi nuclear development
activities.
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IAEA Clean Chit On N. Weapons
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| Asian Recorder, 8/27/94-9/2/94, pp. 24196-97
Telegraph, Statesman, and Times (London) |
On 9/2/94 it was reported that the UNSCOM and the IAEA have issued
statements noting that all Iraqi nuclear
and chemical weapons sites are out of commission. In 7/94 UNSCOM, the IAEA,
and Iraq issued a joint statement recognizing Iraq's "constructive cooperation."
The joint statement said that the long-term monitoring system will be in
operation in 9/94 and will include over "20 tonnes of sensors and hundreds
of electronic gadgets."
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Nuclear Bomb Is Within Iraq's Reach
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| Defense News, 9/12/94-9/18/94, pp. 3, 24 by Philip Finnegan,
Theresa Hitchens, and Barbara Opall |
| In mid-9/94, it was reported that senior US officials indicate that
Iraq could have a nuclear device in
three to six months if it obtained the needed enriched uranium or plutonium
from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Although Iraq would need longer to
develop a nuclear weapon deliverable by a missile or plane, it could easily
load a device on a truck to be driven to a detonation site in a nearby
county, according to one of the officials. On 9/8/94, US military expert
Michael Eisenstadt said that Iraq had already been involved in attempts
to acquire nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union. Eisenstadt added
that Iraq's ability to obtain fissile material will increase as soon as
the UN embargo is lifted and Iraq has the oil revenue needed to buy nuclear
materials. Both the PRC and Russia are seeking to end the UN Security Council's
economic embargo against Iraq. The strong ties between the Russian and
Iraqi militaries also increase the possibilities that Iraq could obtain
Russian nuclear materials.
Much of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure remains viable, leading the US
government to estimate that Iraq could
produce enough plutonium or uranium indigenously to develop nuclear warheads,
along with ballistic missile to deliver them, within five to seven years,
or more simplistic nuclear devices deliverable by truck or plane within
two years. US officials expect Iraq will now concentrate on enriching uranium
by using gas centrifuge technology, which would be easily concealed and
could be spread among several sites, and one US official has said that
Iraq may still have much of the necessary equipment. According to Israeli
intelligence officials, Iraq still has a nuclear procurement network in
place.
On 6/29/94, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that Iraq's nuclear
development capability has not yet been destroyed by international inspections.
Science Applications International Corp. (US) Assistant Vice President
David Kay said on 9/2/94 that the team of Iraqi
nuclear scientists involved in the weapons program is still intact.
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Plutonium Traffic Boosts Israeli Fears Over Saddam
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| Times (London), 10/4/94, by Michael Evans and Michael
Theodoulou |
On 10/4/94, it was reported that after a number of German, nuclear
smuggling-related arrests in 1994, Iraqi
officials are "known" to have met with Russian businessmen and a former
high-ranking employee of a Russian nuclear facility "to assess the damage
and find alternative routes for the fissile material." Although intelligence
organizations have no information suggesting that Iraq or other "nuclear
ambitious" countries have acquired weapons grade nuclear material from
Russia, there is concern within the intelligence community that the German
arrests may lead the Iraqis to try to smuggle nuclear materials using "established"
Far Eastern contacts. Israel and Western intelligence organizations are
concerned that a relaxation of sanctions against Iraq could lead to a generally
"softer approach" towards that country.
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CIA: Iraq Dodges U.N. Monitoring
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| Washington Times, 10/7/94, p. A19 |
| The UN is developing one of the world's most advanced weapons-monitoring
systems, ranging from an advanced network of cameras and sensors to overflights,
in order to monitor Iraq's ability to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons. On 9/23/94, CIA Director R. James Woolsey warned that despite
this highly advanced monitoring system, Iraq
"is accelerating construction of deep underground shelters and tunnels
to produce and store weapons of mass destruction." Military analyst Paul
Beaver added that reports indicate that there are 7,000 Iraqi scientists
working at hidden sites in the mountains. Beaver also said that the highly
advanced monitoring system is short of personnel, and that the entire country
could not be monitored by utilizing monitors and surveillance flights.
However, on 11/15/94, Charles Duelfer, deputy executive chairman of
UNSCOM, said that Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission head General
Amer Rasheed pledged to give UN inspectors the data needed to fulfill their
information requirements [1].
Supporting Sources:
[1] Lean Barkho, Reuter, 11/15/94; in Executive News Service, 11/15/94,
"Iraq Pledges To Give U.N. Missing
Arms Data."
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Iraq Banked On Lifting Of Sanctions
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| Washington Times, 10/11/94, p. A1, by Arnaud de Borchgrave |
| On 10/11/94, it was reported that during a recent conference in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 17 Russian General Officers stated that it was "highly likely"
that Russian nuclear weapons designers had been lured to Iraq's
weapons program by offers of high-paying jobs.
On 9/23/94, CIA Director James Woolsey stated that Iraq
has been able to avoid UN detection of its weapons of mass destruction
program by siting production facilities inside mountains. According to
Woolsey, "Iraq is accelerating construction of deep underground shelters
and tunnels to produce and store weapons of mass destruction." The CIA
estimates that about 7,000 Iraqi specialists are employed in Iraq's nuclear
weapons program. Before the 1990 Gulf War, Western intelligence services
failed to detect Iraq's nuclear weapons program, in which 18,000 Iraqi
specialists were engaged.
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Iraq Nuclear Drive Halted, Monitoring Now In Place
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| Financial Times, 10/14/94, p. 5, by Mark Nicholson |
| On 10/3/94, UN envoy Rolf Ekeus came to Baghdad to evaluate the monitoring
system installed to observe Iraqi weapons
programs [1]. According to Ekeus the "commission's ongoing monitoring and
verification system is provisionally operational." In a report given to
the UN Security Council on 10/13/94, Ekeus said that the monitoring system
seeks to prevent Iraq from ever attaining nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, "in accordance with the Gulf war ceasefire resolution 687."
According to Jaako Ylitako, the chief field officer for the UN Special
Commission, approximately 12,000 employees were once working in Iraq's
nuclear program. UNSCOM was involved in the dismantling of at least 82
sites which were known to be part of Iraq's efforts to build nuclear weapons.
Inspectors from the IAEA will stay permanently in Iraq
to monitor its major rivers for unusually high levels of radiation, which
would be indicative of attempts to circumvent UN supervision. However,
on 10/10/94, Ekeus said that, "we are confident Iraq is not capable of
threatening Kuwait or elsewhere" with weapons of mass destruction [2].
Supporting Sources:
[1] Mark Nicholson, Financial Times, 10/8/94, p. 6, "UN Report Ready
On Iraqi Arms." [2] Evelyn Leopold,
Reuter, 10/11/94; in Executive News Service, 10/12/94, "Iraq
Said Unable To Use Weapons Of Mass Destruction." [3] Leon Barkho, Reuter,
10/6/94; in Executive News Service, 10/6/94, "U.N. Says Iraq's Arms Monitoring
Operational." [4] Evelyn Leopold, Reuter, 10/10/94; in Executive News Service,
10/10/94, "Ekeus Report Starts Testing For Iraqi
Monitoring."
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U.N. Sends Nuclear Inspectors Team To Iraq
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| Executive News Service, 10/15/94
Reuter, 10/15/94, by Abbas Salman |
| On 10/15/94, UN spokesman Roald Osphal said that a seven-member UN
nuclear inspection team went to Baghdad on 10/14/94 to monitor Iraq's nuclear
weapons. Osphal said that the team, led by IAEA official Garry Dillon,
would spend some ten days in Iraq.
Dillon, who returned to Bahrain after taking water samples from 16 sites,
said that the IAEA was keeping two team members in Baghdad in order to
conduct undeclared inspections [1].
Supporting Source:
[1] Reuter, 10/21/94; in Executive News Service, 10/21/94, "U.N. Team
Finds Iraqis Cooperative."
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U.N. Arms Control In Iraq Lacks Funds
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| Executive News Service, 11/9/94
UPI, 11/9/94 |
| On 11/9/94, UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus said that the UN Special Commission
on Iraq may cease to function by 2/95
because of critical financial difficulties. The statement was made in a
letter from Ekeus to the President of the Security Council on 11/3/93 [1].
UNSCOM's monitoring system, which is considered to be the most sophisticated
arms verification system ever created, began functioning in 10/94. UNSCOM
requires $25 million to continue its operations in 1995, which includes
$5 million needed for 12/94 [1].
Supporting Sources:
[1] UN Weekly, 11/15/94,"Special Commission On Iraq
Begins Plan To Close Operation For Lack Of Funds."
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Baghdad Steered Dedicated Effort To Enrich Using MLIS, AVLIS
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| NuclearFuel, 11/21/94, pp. 7-8, by Mark Hibbs |
| Recent revelations regarding Iraqi
efforts to enrich uranium using the laser isotope separation method have
cast doubts on Iraq's claim to have fully disclosed all information on
its nuclear weapons program to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).
On 10/22/94, the IAEA stated in a report to the UN Security Council that
Iraq admitted that it had pursued laser enrichment from 1981 until 1987
[1]. UNSCOM executive chairman Rolf Ekeus said that Iraq "had really worked
at laser isotope separation, something they had denied or kept withholding
and so they'd been lying about it for quite a while." In 10/91, Iraq categorically
denied that it had pursued laser enrichment. Ekeus said that the information
about the laser program "gives you a feeling of insecurity again that there
was no openness."
Based on intelligence information acquired in 5/94, IAEA inspectors
visited the Baghdad Technical University Laser Department, Baghdad University
College of Science, and facilities at the former uranium plant at Tarmiya
to look for possible evidence of a laser enrichment program.
In 9/94, five specialists in laser enrichment assisted in the investigation.
The experts were initially informed by Iraqi
officials that Iraq had worked only on established techniques for uranium
enrichment, including centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, and electromagnetic
isotope separation (EMIS). However, after five days of discussion between
the IAEA and the Iraqi officials, one Iraqi expert told the IAEA that the
Laser Section of the Physics Department at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research
Center (Department 6240), was directed by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
to work on laser isotope enrichment in 1981. Department 6240 was established
in 1977 in Buildings 9 and 10 at Tuwaitha. The Iraqi expert said, "We started
in two lines, one looking after molecular (MLIS) and the other the atomic
direction advanced vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS)."
The laser enrichment project was cut back in 1987, and important staff
members were relocated to the Tuwaitha EMIS project. So far, the IAEA has
not found any proof that Iraq had enriched
UF6 or uranium and it does not believe that Iraq had acquired the basic
technology needed in the development of either AVLIS or MLIS capabilities.
Iraqi experts, however, said that during the mid-80s they were able to
excite, "with difficulty," less than one gram of UF6 during MLIS experiments
in Tuwaitha. During the experiments, Iraqi experts tracked the reduction
in cell internal pressure, and they claimed to have used X-ray diffusion
to ascertain that UF5 and UF4 were present. Iraqi AVLIS experiments in
Tuwaitha were also disclosed by IAEA, and inspectors discovered coating
devices confirming intelligence information. Smears taken on the inside
of the coating equipment's vacuum chambers revealed no alpha contamination,
indicating that they had not been employed in uranium enrichment.
Iraq's Department 6240 tried to develop a 10-watt copper vapor laser,
but it could not establish a stable process. Iraq's disclosure that it
was unable to produce uranium metal vapor for the AVLIS project surprised
IAEA inspectors as earlier inspections had revealed that Iraq
had metallic uranium at its disposal by late 1986. Lately Iraq has maintained
that laser activities were revamped in 1986, and that specialists "still
did not have the means for high-temperature evaporation (over 2,000 degrees
C) nor...the suitable laser power density" needed for the use of uranium
vapor in lasers.
Supporting Source:
[1] UN Weekly, 8/11/94, "Iraq Admits
Exploring Feasibility Of Producing Enriched Uranium."
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