Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements

"Iraq's Nuclear weapons program violated Article II's requirement 'not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' Iraq's construction of secret nuclear facilities, including its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires that safeguards be applied 'with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'" 
 

Iraq Bars Entry By American Arms Inspectors

Iraq had announced on 10/29/97 that it would no longer accept American inspectors on the UNSCOM team, and ordered the 10 to 12 Americans, out of 40 inspectors [2] already in Iraq, to leave within seven days. It also demanded a halt to the use of American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Iraq to pinpoint the remnants of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. 

Diplomats at the United Nations said Iraq may have miscalculated UN resolve to continue with UNSCOM inspections. On 10/23/97, Russia, China, and France abstained from a Security Council resolution, sponsored by the United States, threatening new sanctions against Iraq. However, Baghdad's decision to bar American inspectors prompted both France and Russia to call on Iraq to reverse its decision,[2] and Russia called the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry.[1] 

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov told US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that Iraq "cannot pick and choose who the inspectors are and the nationalities of the inspectors." Britain's Derek Fatchett, a junior official with the foreign ministry, said "We're not ruling out any option at this time. We are not going to allow Iraq to rearm itself again." 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] James Bone, The Times (London), 10/31/97 [Online] http://www.Sunday- times.co.uk/news./10/31/timfgnfgn01001.html?1074973, "Iraq Bars American Pair In Arms Row With UN." [2] Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, 10/31/97 {online] http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/world/un-iraq.html, "Iraq Bars US Arms Inspectors." 
 

Saddam In Secret UK Arms Offensive

BSA Tools chief executive Keith Bailey said that his company was approached five or six times for spare parts by companies he believed may have been acting on behalf of Iraq. The British Department of Trade and Industry said it would investigate the matter. 

Supporting Sources: [1] Reuter, 1/18/97; in Executive News Service, 1/21/97, "Iraq Trying To Buy British Arms." [2] UPI, 1/19/97; in Executive News Service, 1/21/97, "Paper Says Iraq Buying Weapons Machinery." 
 

Brazil Blocking Extradition Of Iraq's German Centrifuge Expert

Lessons From Iraq Spur Tougher Atomic Inspections

Reuter, 5/16/97, by Steve Pagani 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] AFP (Paris), 5/15/97; in FBIS-TAC-97-135, 5/15/97, "Austria: IAEA Governors Seek More Powers Of Site Inspection." 
 

Iraq Blocks Three U.N. Weapons Inspection Searches

Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said on 6/29 that, "I can and I will guarantee their access to any site that is within their mandate (but) not beyond their mandate." Aziz further said that Iraq will not grant UN weapons inspectors unrestricted access to all sites, despite threats to increase sanctions.[2] 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Waiel Faleh, Associated Press, 6/22/97, "Iraq-UN." [2] CNN, 6/30/97, "Iraqi Official: UN Inspectors Will Not Have Unlimited Access to Sites", [online] www.cnn.com/world/meast/9706/28/ap000212.ap.html 
 

France Says IAEA Should Close Nuclear File On Iraq

White House, UN Warn Iraq On Weapons 

Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf said that Iraq has implemented all UN resolutions, and will now accept nothing less then the lifting of sanctions imposed on it after the Gulf War. Al-Sahaf also said: "Iraq has not threatened anybody and does not wish to threaten anybody. But we will be forced, if the siege is not lifted soon, to look for other alternatives." Al- Sahaf did not say what the alternatives were. [1] 

[1] Reuters Ltd.,10/23/97, Iraq Says To Accept Nothing Less Than Embargo End 
 

IAEA Cannot Say If Iraq Scrapped Nuclear Program

UN Diplomats Say Baghdad Resistant

US State Department spokesman James Rubin said, "Iraqi President Saddam Hussein continues to exploit this period, to raise the prospect that he is hiding and moving weapons of mass destruction." [1] 

In the Iraqi's defense, Mohammed Said Sahaf, Iraqi Foreign Minister denied that Baghdad had obstructed UN arms monitoring. However, Sahaf said that equipment had been moved to protect it from US air strikes and that UN surveillance camera had been damaged when a short-range missile engine exploded. 

[1] Reuters Ltd., 11/06/97, "Focus-Iraq-UN Talks End Positively, Diplomat". 
 

After 7 Years Of Evasion, Iraq Has Tons Of Illicit Arms

Gary Milhollin, a private analyst of weapons proliferation, said, "Hussein's production capability has been put on hold" since the gulf war. "But his research effort has gone forward. We have to assume his scientists have progressed in understanding how to make better weapons of mass destruction." 

US Defense Secretary William Cohen said that ever since the Gulf war, Iraq "has continued to try to develop chemical and biological weapons, and possibly even acquire nuclear materials," while "playing a hide and seek game" with the United Nations inspectors. 

The Iraqis presented to the United Nations last month a declaration of "full, final and complete disclosure" of the biological warfare program. The United Nations said," the report fails to give a remotely credible account" of the program. 
 

How Arms Sleuths Battle Iraqi Deceit

Ekeus said, "The documents verified that Iraq had a crash program on nuclear weapons, a secret missile program, biological weapons testing, and a lot on chemical equipment imported for weapons purposes." 

A major concern, most experts say, is Iraq's ability to resume production of weapons of mass destruction and this dilemma suggests that UN monitors will remain in Iraq for years. 

According to an UNSCOM report, inspectors are monitoring more than 300 sites, ranging from sophisticated manufacturing plants, to pesticide factories. They also track thousands of pieces of "tagged equipment" and missile systems, tons of chemicals, and weapons related imports. 
 

Panel Reports On Iraq Arms

The Special Commission's board was not in favor of Russia's request to end surveillance on Iraq so that sanctions could be lifted. The board recommended that inspectors be given better equipment and more cooperation from Baghdad. 
 

Iraqi Spies Know UN Inspectors' Next Moves, Officials Say

There is still some speculation as to what kinds of methods the Iraqis are using when spying on the UN inspection teams. However, US officials believe that they have been doing this for over a year and a half. 
 

INC Lists Iraqi Nuclear, BW, CW, Facilities

Iraqi National Congress, 11/25/97 

Name of Facility Location Products and Specialization's 

1.Badr General Est. Al-Yusufiyah missile casings, mobile launchers, spare parts for casings 

2.Qa'qa' Gen. Est. Al-Yusufiyah missile fuel, warheads 

3.Al Wafa' Gen. Est. Jurf al-Sakhr missile research 

4.Al-Faris Gen. Est. Abu Ghurayb mechanical parts, outer structures of missiles 

5.Al-Wathig Gen. Est. Al-Taji epoxy and fiberglass for missile casings 

6.Ibn Majid Gen. Est. Al-Basrah missile structures, distilling vats, large metal parts 

7.Heavy-Industry Al-Dawrah nuclear reactor parts, high pressure equipment for reactors 

8.Al-Harith Gen. Est. Al-Tarmiyah missile research, chemical weapons containers 

9.Al-Sawari Al-Taji missile production 

10.Oxide Magnesium Khawr heavy water Al-Zubayr 

11.Metal Conversion Al-Tajiyah nuclear fuel for PWR reactors 

12.Al-Kindi Mosul UCL4 for the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons 

13.Jabir Bin Hayyan Mosul UF6 for the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons 

14.Al-Asil Al-Tuwaythah Headquarters of the Iraqi Nuclear Commission 

15.The Iraqi Factory Al-Taji houses the new engineering center for the NW program 

16.Salah-al-Din Gen. Tikrit mechanical spare parts for NW/ Est. BW programs 

17.Al-Mansur Est. Al-Muthanna equipment for laser guided weapons 

18.Al-Yawm Sakhar ramp; D for Scud missiles 

19.Al-Jazirah Skarkat chemicals for the CW program 

20.Ibn-al-Athir Jurf al-Sakhr nuclear warheads for the future 

21.Technical Salman Pak support and research for BW Baghad program 

22.Sabah Nisan Est. Jurf al-Nidaf equipment for NW program 

23.Saddam Gen. Est. Al-Yusifiyah nuclear parts, lasers and optical equipment, Tammuz missile 

24.Bilet al-Shuhada' Al-Taji ramp; D for Scud missiles 

25.Al-Muthanna Al-Tharthar biggest factory for production lake of CW 

26.Hittin Gen. Est. Al-Latifiyah different types of ammunition, missile parts 

27.Al-Faw Est. Locations digging equipment, building around Baghdad underground sites 

28.Sabi' Ashr Nisan different delicate measuring instruments locations 

29.Nasr Est. Abu Ghurayb ramp; D of missile control systems 

30.Ur Gen. Est. Al-Nasiriyah metal casings for missiles 

31.Al-Fida' Est. Al-Za'faraniyah nuclear warheads, containers for missile and nuclear fuel 

32.Al-Qadisiyah Diyala centrifuges for production of U235 

33.Al-Yarmuk Al-Yusufiyah missiles parts, ammunition with special specifications CW equipment 

34.Sa'd 16 Est. Mosul CW equipment 

35.Project 946 Al-Tarmiyah U-235 production 

36.Al-'Izz Est. Baghdad computer center for missile control systems ramp; D 

37.Al-Rafah Est. Jurf al-Sakhr permanent launchers for surface to surface missiles 

38.Al-Jihad Baghdad construction of military industrial facilities 

39.Al-Mujahid Al-Rashidiyah biological weapons facility 

40.Al-Walid South of training school for military Baghdad industrial organization 

41.Umm Al Marik Al-Yusufiyah missile fuel and warheads 

42.Project 710 under Pres- production of long-range dential Palace missiles (over 710 km) in Baghdad 

43.Project 707 as above production of short-range missiles (under 707 km) 

44.Project 505 Al-Sharqat heavy water 

45.Al-Rashid (Khanbari) moldings and technical equipment for Nasr Est. 

46.Babil Est. secret responsible for supergun locations in now NW programs Hamrin Mts. 

47.Optical Center Al-Jadiriyah lasers, headed by Saddam's nephew Dr. Nafa'al-Tikriti 

48.Sad al-Adham Project Hamrin Mts. disguising and transporting equipment associated with NW 

49.Lithium Collection Hamrin Mts. headed by Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al Project Jabbar Shanshal 

50.Heavy Water Project Hamrin Mts. See above 

51.High Pressure Project Al-Qadisiyah generators for making U-235 

52.'Uqbah Bin-Nafi' Al-Yusufiyah metal casings for Project 946 project 

53.Project 212 Jurf al-Sakhr production of chemicals used in making U235 

54.Sa'd 13 Est. unknown electronics for weapons with help from CSF Thompson France 

55.Project 2000 Jurf al-Sakhr missiles over 2,000 km range 

56.Pure Lead Project Al-Tuwaythah insulation for NW program 

57.Industrial Thermal (Falujahigh) temperature ovens (over 2,000 degrees C.) 

58.Al-Shamouq Baghdad ramp; D for Lithium Project 

59.Oxide Aluminum Al-Taji missile casings Project 
 

How Saddam Hussein Almost Built His Bomb

An unexpected discovery of the post-war IAEA inspections was the reappearance of the substantial electromagnectic isotope separation (EMIS) program. David Kay, in his testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 10/91, said that there were approximately 7,000 scientists and 20,000 workers involved with the program. UN inspectors reported that the EMIS program had enabled Iraq to obtain enough material to be within 18 to 30 months of developing a nuclear weapon. 

The UN inspectors found sophisticated European centrifuge technology. This indicated a leak from the triple-nation (Germany, the Netherlands and Britain) Uranium Enrichment Company (Urenco). 

UN inspectors also found detailed plans for building an "implosion nuclear device". This device would contain HEU at its core and have conventional explosives around the central mass that would detonate simultaneously. When the fissile material is compressed into a supercritical mass, neutrons are injected into the material to initiate a chain reaction and explosion. 

An IAEA inspector reported that Iraqi scientists were also planning to build an atom bomb, which would have been significantly smaller and lighter than the devices built by Robert Oppenheimer and his Los Alamos team in the mid-forties. These discoveries revealed major weaknesses in inspection routines, export controls and intelligence gathering and sharing. Because of these discoveries, IAEA inspection procedures have tightened considerably. 

Kay commented on evasion techniques used by the Iraqis, which enabled them to successfully hide their nuclear weapons program from US intelligence analysts. Kay said the techniques include, "construction of buildings within buildings (Tuwaitha); deliberately constructing buildings designed to the same plans and for the same purposes to look different (Ash Sharqat and Tarmiya); hiding power and water feeds that mislead the facilities use (Tarmiya); diminishing value of a facility by apparent low security and lack of defenses (Tarmiya); severely reducing off-site emissions (Tuwaitha and Tarmiya); moving critical pieces of equipment as well as dispersing and placing facilities underground." 

Paul Stokes, one of the IAEA Action Team deputy leaders reported that frequent inspections have deterred Iraq from continuing their nuclear weapons program at declared sites since the Gulf war. However, the Iraqis have often refused IAEA members entrance into sites, which has enabled the Iraqis time to remove incriminating evidence. David Kay reported on the Iraqis ability to deceive inspectors. Kay said, "What is clear is that this Arab nation has been remarkably devious throughout the inspection period." Another inspection team member said, "The Iraqis lied fluently from day one, it is common knowledge that they stalled, obfuscated, covered up or confused wherever and whomever they could bid to establish a true picture of what had been going on." 

When Saddam's son-in-law, General Hussein Kamal, former head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), defected he exposed Iraq's nuclear program. Following Kamal's defection, Iraq was forced to give the IAEA half a million pages of secreted documents. 

Beginning in the late 1980's, Iraqi scientists started working on centrifuge enrichment as a source of LEU for EMIS. The Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat complexes were designated to support industrial-scale EMIS production. If both plants had operated successfully, estimates show that Iraq would have had the capability to build up to four atomic bombs a year. 

Kay reported that Iraq used deception techniques to obtain technology for the chemical enrichment (Chemex) of uranium from France. "Iraq engaged the European company in lengthy negotiations which would soon take a familiar pattern. Each time Iraq would indicate that it needed only a little more technology on which to make a decision. The French would reveal more data. The cycle would begin again and this went on for several years. Finally, after the French had revealed essentially all the details involved with the process, Baghdad announced that it was too expensive and was abandoning all interest in pursuing it. Iraq was then able to begin the clandestine development of Chemex." 

In response to Iraq's attempts to build a nuclear bomb, David Kay said, "the failed efforts of both the IAEA safeguards inspectors and national intelligence authorities to detect prior to the Gulf war a nuclear weapons program of the magnitude and advanced character of Iraq's, should stand as a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspection and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent." 

John Deutch, former US Director of Intelligence, in Foreign Affairs in 1992 reported, "The point is not how wrong the United States was about the Iraq's timetable for acquiring a bomb, but rather how greatly the United States underestimated the magnitude of the Iraqi covert effort. As it stands, such a massive miscalculation of a nation's ability, high or low, can surely happen again." 
 

UN Agency Head Sees No Iraqi Nuclear Activity

Iraqi Nuclear Designs 'Missing'

Rolf Ekeus, former chairman of UNSCOM, reported in 06/97 that the key component needed for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon was 35 pounds of highly enriched uranium. Ekeus said, "it is clear that the Iraqi specialists managed to acquire a considerable understanding of weapons design and warhead designs." 

Iraq sent a letter to the IAEA, in 09/97, that said Iraq "had been unable to locate any additional documentation that might have indicated the extent of development of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies at the time of the program abandonment." Also, the IAEA reported in 09/97, that Iraq was, "unable to provide a verifiable explanation of the missing drawings" or a missing, "drawing register which should have recorded the title of each drawing." 

David Kay, UNSCOM's first chairman, estimates that Iraq, during the Gulf war, was six months away from building a crude nuclear weapon and two years away from a refined weapon. 

Gordon Oehler, former director of the CIA's Non-proliferation Center, said that despite UN and US intelligence efforts, some of the materials removed from Iraq's main uranium enrichment facility at Tarmiyah "have still not been found." 

In response to these allegations, Iraq insists that "all nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991, three months after the Gulf war."