Panelists: |
Moderators: |
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John Larrabee |
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Valerie Lincy |
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William Lowell |
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Gary Milhollin |
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Richard Speier |
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Lora Saalman |
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Sharon Squassoni |
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Leonard Weiss |
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Introduction
In July 2005, the Bush administration announced an agreement for full civil
nuclear cooperation with India, which would have the effect of recognizing
India as
a de facto nuclear weapon state. The deal, which would also include sharing
U.S. space technology with India, is perceived by some as harmful to the battle
against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and long-range missiles.
Critics of the deal see it as rewarding a country that developed nuclear weapons
secretly by using its civilian energy program as a cover. They worry that the
world’s ongoing effort to prevent Iran from doing the same will suffer
as a result. The timing of the agreement—which comes as the U.N. Security
Council prepares to act on Iran’s nuclear violations—naturally
raises questions about consequences for Iran.
To judge the impact of the U.S.-India agreement on Iran, the Wisconsin Project
on Nuclear Arms Control hosted a roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C.
on November 30, 2005. Five panelists took up the following questions:
- Could
U.S. cooperation with India, a state that has rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), undermine efforts to restrain Iran’s
nuclear program through diplomacy? Could it influence the way Iran perceives
the West’s commitment to enforcing nonproliferation rules?
- Will
U.S. efforts to exempt India from international export controls weaken
those controls?
- If so, will Iran have an easier time procuring what
it needs to make mass destruction weapons?
- Could the U.S.-India deal be
altered so as to mitigate damage to the world’s
nonproliferation efforts?
The panelists judged that U.S. willingness to change longstanding policy in
order to allow nuclear and space cooperation with India weakens nonproliferation
norms and export controls at a critical time—as the world attempts to
reinforce both vis-à-vis Iran. Such a change in policy is likely to
make it easier for Iran to resist international pressure to limit its nuclear
effort, and easier for it to import what it needs to improve both its missile
and nuclear programs. The risk is high that bending international rules in
order to make an exception for India will prompt other countries to seek their
own exceptions for countries like Iran. In order to avoid these negative consequences,
the panelists judged that the United States should shelve the India deal, at
least for now. The panelists also found that there are many ways in which the
United States can deepen its relationship with India without sharing sensitive
nuclear and space technology.
The five panelists were chosen on the basis of
their long experience with export controls and nonproliferation policy. They
are John Larrabee, who led
missile inspections in Iraq and is a specialist on ballistic missile technology,
William Lowell, former director of the U.S. State Department’s Office
of Defense Trade Controls, who currently works on nonproliferation and export
controls for the House International Relations Committee, Richard Speier,
an expert in missile technology controls who served more than 20 years in
the
U.S. government, Sharon Squassoni, a specialist in national defense at the
Congressional Research Service, who worked previously as an expert in nuclear
proliferation at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Leonard Weiss,
former Democratic staff director of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, who was the principal architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act of 1978.
The following findings are the moderators’ summary of the discussion.
The findings are a composite of the panelists’ individual views; no finding
should be attributed to any single panelist, or be seen as an official statement
of policy of any government.
Finding 1: The U.S.-India deal makes
it more difficult to restrain Iran through diplomacy: it weakens the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthens
the
hand of those
in Iran who support nuclear weapons, and hurts U.S. efforts to punish Iran
for its nuclear transgressions.
The panelists found that by granting India “full nuclear cooperation,” the
United States will undermine the basic bargain offered to non-weapon states
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: only states that sign the Treaty,
agree to forgo nuclear weapons and accept international inspection receive
nuclear assistance. Under the India deal, however, the United States will be
treating a country outside the NPT—India—as if it had joined
the Treaty. India has developed nuclear weapons secretly and is one of only
three
states, along with Israel and Pakistan, never to have signed the NPT. Despite
this rejectionist posture, India will be allowed to maintain, and even to
expand its nuclear arsenal, while receiving nuclear cooperation, lucrative
trade deals
and military assistance from the United States.
The lesson will not be lost
on Iran. Indeed, India is a natural model for Iran. Both are large, culturally
significant countries with resources important
to the world; both have felt ostracized by the international community; both
see themselves as victims of political discrimination; and both have major
geostrategic rivals. For these reasons, Iran can look to India as a model
for its own behavior.
If the India deal goes through, that model will teach
an unfortunate lesson. It is that the United States will eventually tire
of punishment and seek engagement,
even with a determined proliferator. Once a country succeeds in getting the
bomb, the United States will give up on diplomatic isolation and sanctions
and instead pursue its interest in trade. This preference for trade over
punishment is precisely the preference that Russia and China are showing with
respect
to Iran, and the preference the United States is trying to get these countries
to change. The U.S. posture on India makes this task more difficult.
The U.S.-India
deal also bolsters hardliners in Iran who favor nuclear weapons. This group
believes that such weapons are in the country’s interest,
and that developing them would have only limited, short-term penalties. They
can argue that the India deal proves them right.
The deal will also stir Iranian
nationalism. In rewarding one proliferant country (India) while seeking
to punish another (Iran), the United States is
reinforcing the conviction in Iran that the United States is seeking to punish
the Iranian regime selectively, and not simply trying to enforce global nonproliferation
rules. This claim of being the victim of discrimination increases popular
support for the expansion of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, if not
for nuclear weapons.
The timing of the deal’s announcement, in July 2005, has further increased
its negative impact. The announcement came just as debate was escalating in
the IAEA over referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council. With the United
States blessing India’s nuclear conduct, other countries are less inclined
to view Iran’s behavior as grounds for punishment. In particular, countries
in the non-aligned movement, already sympathetic to Iran’s call not to
be discriminated against, will be more willing to support Iran’s claim
that it has a right to produce its own nuclear fuel.
The loosening of U.S.
export controls toward India also comes as the United States is asking
the rest of the world to strengthen its own controls in order
to combat proliferation. Giving India a free pass for proliferation is bound
to dilute the impact of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, which requires
states to enact and enforce effective export control laws. It could also
weaken the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, aimed at interdicting
shipments
of mass destruction weapon technology. With the United States busily trading
with India, a country that has declined to join the Initiative, other countries
will be less likely to cooperate in thwarting Iran’s nuclear and missile
procurement.
Finding 2: The U.S.-India deal will weaken international
restraints on the sale of sensitive technology to countries like Iran.
The
panelists found that U.S.-India nuclear and space cooperation will undermine
the relevant nonproliferation regimes—at a time when strong regimes are
needed to slow Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Countries that participate
in these regimes are likely to follow the U.S. example and loosen their own
export controls.
The primary international restraint on Iran’s missile effort has been—and
still is—the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The regime is
a voluntary pact among supplier countries to restrict the sale of missiles,
their components, and the equipment needed to make them. Similarly, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) is a pact in which supplier countries agree to control
nuclear exports—an arrangement that has helped prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear technology. Unfortunately, the U.S.-India deal may weaken both of
these regimes.
A cardinal principle of both the MTCR and the NSG is that they
are non-discriminatory,
or “country neutral.” The MTCR uses objective criteria to target “projects
of concern,” rather than specific countries. The NSG requires all countries
importing items that it designates “especially designed or prepared for
nuclear use” to accept comprehensive inspections. Under such inspections,
all critical nuclear material must be accounted for. In this way, the regimes
have avoided making politically-motivated decisions. However, in seeking a
specific NSG exception for India, which has not accepted such comprehensive
inspections, and in selectively lifting trade restrictions on Indian entities
involved in missile work, the United States is overturning this principle.
The United States will be easing restraints for a “friend,” and
doing so only for subjective, political reasons. If the United States is
willing to put aside the rules for its friend, countries that supply Iran
will want
a similar exception. The India deal will thus function as a template for
carving out exceptions within multilateral regimes that have long sought
to operate
beyond the political agendas of member countries.
International regimes also
rely on coordination and consensus for effective operation. The United
States, however, acted unilaterally in making its deal
with India. There was no reported notification or coordination with members
of the MTCR or the NSG before the deal was concluded. This affront will be
made more grievous if the United States goes forward with the India deal
without NSG approval. By violating the consensus norm of these regimes, the
United
States will invite other supplier countries to act unilaterally as well,
and to make deals with Iran without first consulting the United States or other
regime members.
Another strength of the regimes has been enforcement. Countries
that belong to the regimes go to considerable lengths to investigate and
shut down unauthorized
exports by their own companies. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States has been asking many countries to do even more. After the
U.S.-India
deal, however, regime members are going to question whether they should continue
to expend their resources to thwart illicit exports to Iran if those exports
cannot be distinguished from licit exports to India. The same kind of technology
will be going to the same kind of projects. In light of Iran’s able
use of illicit supplier networks to fuel nuclear and missile efforts, this
possibility
is particularly worrisome.
Regime cohesion could erode quickly. The panelists
observed that the United States has always set the standard for nonproliferation
rules. Although it
has usually taken a long time for countries to follow the United States when
it has strengthened these rules, it has taken only an instant to follow any
loosening of them. Russia, France and Britain, for example, have already
expressed interest in nuclear cooperation with India. In a political climate
where rules
are being loosened for a proliferant country like India, the easing of exports
to other proliferators such as Iran is likely to follow.
Finally, the U.S.-India
deal ignores the lesson of India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear
explosion: that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes can
easily be used for weapons in the absence of comprehensive inspections. Ironically,
the United States has long championed the necessity of such inspections.
By
allowing India to separate its civilian and military facilities, with only
the former submitting to inspection, the deal gives credence to the false
notion that partial inspections are sufficient to prevent proliferation.
The
panelists believe that such a separation, whether in India or elsewhere,
is essentially meaningless, because infrastructure, materials and expertise
used in peaceful nuclear and space work can also help make warheads and missiles.
History teaches that it will be impossible to verify that U.S. nuclear and
space technology will not be used in India’s nuclear weapon or missile
programs. The availability of new fuel imports for India’s civil nuclear
sector, for example, could allow India to turn more of its indigenous productive
capacity to making fuel for bombs—an outcome that is particularly troubling
in the absence of any Indian commitment to stop producing such fuel. In fact,
it will be easier to detect a diversion of nuclear material in Iran than in
India, for the simple reason that all of Iran’s nuclear material is subject
to inspection, while only some of India’s will be. Countries wishing
to sell to Iran may cite this difference in defense of their sales.
Finding
3: The weakening of export controls will make it easier for
Iran to acquire the means to make mass destruction weapons, particularly
missiles.
In July, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh agreed to cooperate in “space exploration,” including “satellite
navigation and launch.” This language, unfortunately, is broad enough
to allow missile-useable components and related technical assistance to be
exported to India under the label of space cooperation. The United States,
in fact, appears ready to authorize such sales. The U.S. Commerce Department
recently dropped legal restraints on American exports of missile-useable equipment
to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite the
fact that all three are active in Indian missile development. This appears
to be only the first step in a general loosening of U.S. missile controls for
India.
Once American firms begin to sell such items to India, eager companies
in Russia, China and Europe may consider that it is safe to sell the same
things to Iran. Iran recently announced plans to expand its infant satellite
and space
programs, both of which will need imports. Those imports, by their nature,
may be useful for making missiles.
Iran is now trying to boost the range and
refine the accuracy of its Shahab-3 missile, which flies approximately 1,300
km and is big enough to carry
a nuclear warhead. To do so, Iran needs high-technology materials such
as carbon
composites and specialty steels, as well as high-performance machine
tools for component manufacture. Iran’s missile effort would also benefit
from help with rocket guidance, weight efficient engineering, radiation
hardening, ruggedizing, tracking and telemetry, and thrust vectoring
and flight simulation
software. All of these items, and the technical know-how that goes with
them, can be obtained under the guise of space exploration and all of
them will
be easier for Iran to acquire in the wake of the U.S.-India deal. Iran
could also use its increased access to satellite technology to improve
its response
to Israeli and U.S. missile defenses.
Once space cooperation begins, and
aerospace suppliers enter a country, there is a natural tendency to make
expensive satellite and space projects succeed,
even if that means supplying information, advice, or assistance officially
banned from the original deal. It is difficult to erect a wall between the
civilian and military benefits of a single export project. And it is difficult
to separate civilian from military facilities. For example, India can use
the same sites, equipment and personnel to track both satellite and ballistic
missile
launches. India, ironically, was the first country to develop a ballistic
missile from a civilian space-launch program. The Agni missile tested in 1989
was adapted
from U.S. and German space launch technology. It will not be possible for
the United States to help India improve its space launch vehicles without helping
it improve its missiles. The same will be true when other countries help
Iran.
The scope of space cooperation being discussed for India is particularly
worrisome given the history of U.S.-China space cooperation in the 1990s.
The panelists
note that China was able to obtain crucial technical assistance and data
from the United States under the rubric of satellite launch cooperation, which
helped
China resolve problems of missile design, guidance, launch operations and
payload integration. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have freely helped Iran’s missile
effort—and the United States has sanctioned them repeatedly for doing
so.
The India deal will also make it more difficult to convince countries
like Russia not to sell nuclear items to Iran. This will be especially
true of dual-use
equipment and of items imported for nuclear safety. Neither will be caught
by an NSG export ban triggered by Iran’s failure to comply with inspections.
However, the panelists found it likely that such an export ban would prevent
Iran from receiving other new nuclear assistance until it has answered the
IAEA’s outstanding questions.
It is also reasonable to worry that U.S.
technology sent to India might ultimately make its way to Iran. Such technology,
delivered today, may be impossible to
control or recall in the future. Although India has enacted export control
laws, implementation has been poor because of the lack of corresponding regulations.
Though India recently passed a new law to implement U.N. Security Council
resolution 1540, assertions that its national export control system is stringent—even
after these reforms—are dubious. In September 2004, two Indian nuclear
scientists, both former senior officials of the Indian government’s
Nuclear Power Corporation, were caught helping Iran and sanctioned by the
U.S. government
under the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And as recently as December 30, 2005,
the United States sanctioned two Indian chemical firms for dangerous transfers
to Iran.
Iran and India continue to have friendly relations. In 2003 they
signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. India is also
proceeding
with a $7 billion gas pipeline project with Iran—despite strong U.S.
objections—which will give Iran hard currency that could help fuel its
nuclear and missile programs. And although India voted in favor of the February
2006 IAEA resolution reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council, India publicly
supports Iran’s claim that it has a right to conduct peaceful nuclear
work.
Finding 4: The proposal in its current form should not be pursued.
There are ways for the United States to deepen relations with India that
do not have
negative consequences for proliferation to Iran.
Although the India
deal could be improved, the panelists judged that it is not in the United
States’ best interest to pursue it. The deal could
be improved if India agreed to stop producing fuel for nuclear weapons, agreed
to a stronger nuclear test moratorium, agreed to place all its civilian nuclear
plants under inspection, and agreed to strengthen its enforcement of export
controls. But such changes would only reduce rather than eliminate the damage
to global nonproliferation efforts. India would still be exempt from rules
that NPT members like Iran are being asked to obey.
The panelists see no reason
to provide India with nuclear technology for the production of electricity,
when it would be more economical and safer to help
India generate electricity in other ways. Helping India build nuclear reactors
only reinforces the perceived prestige of nuclear technology for developing
countries—a point of view that the world is currently trying to persuade
Iran to abandon.
The panelists also believe that there are better ways than
the proposed deal to support India’s space effort—ways that would
not boost its missile work. For instance, the United States could offer to
launch Indian astronauts
and satellites and to share satellite observation data with Indian analysts.
It is both unnecessary and dangerous to provide India with technology that
can be converted to missilery.
At a minimum, the United States should not
pursue the deal with India at the present time, just as the U.N. Security
Council prepares to debate Iran's nuclear
violations. If the deal moves forward now, it will undermine the credibility
of the U.S. position on Iran. The deal is often cited by Iran and by those
sympathetic to Iran’s position when arguing that the United States cares
less about proliferation than about using proliferation rules to support its
friends and punish its adversaries. Shelving the deal would send a message
to Iran, and to the world, that this is not so.
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