von Joachim Gruber

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  • Proliferation
  • Die Überwachung in Deutschland
  • Israel
  • Proposals for TV-Productions
  • Benjamin Spock
    Excerpts of a Talk given at Stanford University, Nov. 20, 1984
  • Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Weiterverbreitung von Technologie für Massenvernichtungswaffen aus Deutschland

    Germany at the Center of a Supplier Network of Enrichtment Equipment
    "... for the higher danger fuel commodities, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the system's gatekeepers are four of the de jure nuclear states - the US, France, China, USSR/Russia - plus a single non-weapon state, West Germany/Germany."

    "The network for higher danger reactors in 1985 - 89 has two clusters - one supplied by West Germany and one supplied by France."

    "Enrichment equipment and plants for 1985-89 is a Hub-and-Spoke split between a Supply-Hub sub-network and a Demand-Hub sub-network. The Supply-Hub cluster is centered by West Germany." (see above figure. Uranium based nuclear weapons need enriched uranium.) 

    Excerpts from: Hunt Morstein J and Perry WD, Commercial Nuclear Trading Networks as Indicators of Nuclear Weapons Intentions, Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, pages 85, 86.

    There have been traditionally strong industrial ties between Germany and Iraq (see also: Deutsche Hilfe für Schurkenstaaten). Since the beginning of the UN Oil-For-Food program, Germany has been one of the most significant representatives of the big industrialized countries in Iraq, leading before France, Denmark, Belgium and Italy (source: Internationaler Messe- und Ausstellungsdienst, Messe München, Germany, Baghdad International Fair, Germany's contribution in 2001).

    Before the first Gulf War, 109 German companies have contributed to Iraq's armament (example). 

    (ARD-Magazin "Report München", January 27, 2003, Iraq Watch Bulletin 2, Issue 2, 2003).
    "... [W]e have found people, technical information and illicit procurement networks that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could accelerate global proliferation."
    (Statement by David Kay On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group (Isg) Before The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, The House  Committee On Appropriations, Subcommittee On Defense, And The Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, October 2, 2003)

    "... German and French companies will be mainly to blame. In the 1980's, the German firm Karl Kolb and the French firm Protec combined to furnish millions of dollars' worth of sensitive equipment to six separate plants for making mustard gas and nerve agents, with a capacity of hundreds of tons of nerve agent per year. These companies had to know what the specialized glass-lined vessels they peddled were to be used for. It is insufferable that, like Pontius Pilate, Germany and France now wash their hands of the whole affair, and even chastise others for cleaning up the mess their companies helped create. 
    The Germans were only too happy to provide what was needed to make the missiles more lethal. From the German firm Thyssen came 35 turbopumps to enhance their rocket engines; from the firms BP, Carl Zeiss, Degussa and Tesa came training in wind tunnels and missile electronics; and from the electronics giant Siemens came switching devices and electrical systems to control missile fuel production. Not to be left out, Britain's Matrix Churchill Ltd. (in which the Iraqis had a controlling interest) supplied sensitive machine tools, Britain's TMG Engineering served as a front company for missile procurement, and U.S. defense contractor Litton Industries bankrolled the German firm that built Iraq's main missile production complex." 
    (G. Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, DC 20006, U.S.A., and K. Motz, Associate Director, Wisconsin Project, A Vile Business, Iraq Watch Bulletin, Volume 2, Issue 2, March-April 2003 and The Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2003, pp. A16).

    Of related interest: CNN DIPLOMATIC LICENSE, Antiiwar Animation

    In order for that to become the past, the German public, research and politics have to enter into a candid and informed discussion with German industry. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Angela Merkel must have been informed during her visit to the U.S. about what we could do here. Her recent appeal to us comes late and must -unfortunately for Germany- be called courageous. But she as well as her party critics remain silent on this issue.

    Until 1992, Germany's manufacturers did not fully comply with UN Iraq embargo and German export laws. For details regarding Iraqi procurement for nuclear, missile, and chemical weapon programs see 

    In 1992, German authorities have begun investigating possible violations of export control laws by several German firms. In 4/92, 27 supplier countries agreed to strengthen the rules for transfer of sophisticated dual-use technology (Michael Wise, The Washington Post, 5/19/92, P. A15). ... Foreign individuals driven by a profit motive provided key know-how to Iraq. To limit such participation in the future, the FRG in 1992 approved "citizens participation" laws that make it illegal for German citizens to take part in potential proliferation countries' nuclear weapons program (David Albright, Mark Hibbs, Arms Control Today, 7-8/92, PP. 3-11).
    The Problem of Proliferation
    Techniques for targeting breaches of nonproliferation treaties exist.

    Source of the compilation of German illegal activities is the CNS Database of the CNS SPECIAL COLLECTION ON THE IRAQ CRISIS, as excerpted in their "Iraqi Nuclear Abstracts" and "Iraqi Missile Abstracts", published by The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, USA.

    The analysis presented here gives background material related to the dangers connected with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or of the corresponding technology.

    This compilation is a follow-up of an activity in 1977 against the financial support provided by the German government. At that time the government had provided financial securities to German companies, amongst them Interatom, a subsidiary of the Siemens AG, to enable the sale of the complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil when Brazil was pursuing the path to nuclear explosives. At the same time Germany also sold nuclear equipment to Argentina, Brazil's rival. The South American continent was then -and still is today- nuclear weapons free. 

    Some of my Links on The Iraq Problem (more)
    • American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Iraq Page
    • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Reconstructing Iraq 
    • Center For Nonproliferation Studies 

    • "The CNS Database is the most comprehensive open-source, nonproprietary database related to proliferation issues" 
    • Fresh Air 
      • "Jane Mayer on Halliburton and Dick Cheney", Febr. 19, 2004
        • M"ayer is a staff writer for The New Yorker. She talks about Vice President Dick Cheney and Halliburton, the company where Cheney served as chief executive for five years. Halliburton is the world's largest oil-and-gas-services company, and is now the biggest private contractor for American forces in Iraq. Mayer's article "Contract Sport: What Did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?" is in the current issue of the magazine" (Feb. 16 and Feb. 23 issues).
      • Former White House Adviser Richard Clarke 
        • with National Public Radio, March 24, 2004.

        • "Clarke is the former national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counterterrorism. He held the position in President Clinton's administration and continued for President Bush. He resigned in March 2003. His new book is "Against All Enemies: Inside Americaâs War on Terror". In the book he criticizes the Bush administration for failing to heed warnings about al Qaeda before Sept. 11, and for invading Iraq without evidence of a connection to al Qaeda. Clarke also worked for the Reagan Administration and the first Bush administration." (Of related interest: "TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. CLARKE Before The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, March 24, 2004")
    • Newsweek
      • Michael Isikoff and Evan Thomas "Storm Warnings", Newsweek, March 25, 2004:
        • "... Clarke portrays the Bush White House as indifferent to the Qaeda threat before 9/11, then obsessed with punishing Iraq, regardless of what the evidence showed about Saddam's Qaeda ties, or lack of them. ..."
      • Evan Thomas,  Michael Isikoff and Tamara Lipper "The Insider", Newsweek, April 1, 2004: 
        • "...  In the freewheeling Clinton White House, he was everywhere. Wary of the CIA, Clinton often skipped the president's morning intelligence briefing. He got his intelligence instead from Clarke, who collected it from the various spy agencies. Clarke was not a "principal" on the National Security Council, but he might as well have been, wandering into top-level meetings and even the Oval Office..."

          As for the assassination of Osama ben Laden: "Both Tenet and Berger are cautious, bureaucratic creatures, well versed in the perils of the Washington scandal machine. Bureaucrats, especially those in insular places like the CIA, have long institutional memories. "For many years," Clarke testified last week, the top officials of the CIA's Directorate of Operations "were roundly criticized by the Congress and the media for various covert actions that they carried out at the request of people like me in the White House -not me, but people like me." Covert actions -äespecially anything as drastic as assassinationä -was likely to "blow up in their face," said Clarke."

    • Seymoure M. Hersh "THE DEAL: Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan's nuclear black marketers?", The New Yorker, Fact, March 7, 2004
      1. Pakistan: the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world  (see also: Khan's Bomb Offer to Saddam's Iraq: Document Showing Iraq's Interest in Nuclear Weapon Design, April 1, 2010, Project AB (in cache, more in David Albright, "Peddling Peril", chapter 4, Free Press, 2010))
      2. Iran: enough enriched uranium for a bomb? 
      3. Libya as the war on Iraq drew near: Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender. 
      4. IAEA: If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix. 
    • Institute for Policy Studies
    • Iraq Watch 
    • Search for "Germany" in the Suppliers Database Table to find 118 entries relating to Germany's trade with Iraq. 
      Enter keyword(s) and choose a category to search. 
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      "... If Western powers sell the means to make horrific weapons, war is going to be the price we pay. Without a change in our export behavior, we will have to send our soldiers somewhere else to disarm another tyrant. Wouldn't it be cheaper - and more humane - not to create the problem in the first place? " (G. Milhollin, K. Motz, A Vile Business, Iraq Watch Bulletin 2, Issue 2, March-April 2003 and The Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2003, pp. A16)

      " ... Before the Iraq war, chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said Iraq might still possess 10,000 liters of anthrax and 15 times the amount of gaseous gangrene-causing agent that it had declared to the inspectors. Both these deadly items would still be viable today if properly stored. Blix also pointed to new evidence that Iraq could have 6,500 more chemical weapon warheads than previously thought. 

      And let's not forget that when U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998, they had compiled a frightening catalog of Iraq's undeclared poison gas, including almost four tons of missing VX, the deadliest form of nerve gas, and at least 600 tons of ingredients to make more of it. Also unaccounted for were up to 3,000 tons of other agents like tabun, sarin and mustard gas, about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas and about 31,000 chemical munitions, both filled and empty. "(V. Lincy and K. Motz, We Still Face the Menace of Iraq's Hidden Horrors, The Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2003, p. A13)


  • New York Review of Books
  • Public Broadcasting System - Transcript: David Brancaccio interviews George Soros, 9.12.03
    George Soros: ... with all my experience, Iraq would have been the last place on earth that I would have chosen for introducing democracy. I mean, democracy has to be built painstakingly and very slowly. And, you know, I've been engaged in that now for the last 15 years.

    Brancaccio: This is a place with bitter religious rivalries, with even recent history as terrible animosity between groups in society.

    Soros: Right. So, it was a horrendous naivetÚ, actually, to think that you can go into Iraq and you can introduce democracy by military force. ... And I think the moment of truth has come in Iraq. Because we really got into a terrible, terrible mess, into a quagmire. And our soldiers are at risk. But it's worse. Because our armed forces, the Army is at risk. In other words, our capacity to project power that it has greatly diminished because we have misused our power. And I think that people will wake up.

  • Scott Ritter "No more Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq" in "Iraq: Just Solutions?" Lectures, Einstein Forum Potsdam, 6. May 2003.
  • SCOOP - H. Blix: Probe for Iraqi weapons should have continued, 19. March, 2003
  • "So there is a fair amount of scepticism about armed action [against Iraq]. That scepticism would turn immediately around if they [Iraq] used chemical weapons or biological weapons. My guess is they would not." Asked if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's government would care if it was about to be overthrown, he said: "Some people care about their reputation even after death." (H. Blix, 19.3.2002).
  • Jonathan B. Tucker. In 1998 Dr. Jonathan Tucker was Project Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Montery, California, USA.
    • "Lessons for the Future
      1. Intrusive on-site access is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining evidence of noncompliance.
      2. A multilateral inspection regime can be effective only to the extent that it is coupled with accurate and timely intelligence.
      3. Short-notice inspections can increase the likelihood that a violator will make mistakes and leave behind telltale indicators of illicit activity.
      4. The combined use of various monitoring tools (e.g. overhead surveillance, monitoring trade flows, visual inspection, and sampling and analysis) can yield valuable synergies.
      5. An effective way to investigate clandestine WMD programs is to identify and interrogate key managerial and technical personnel.
      6. Only one agency should be asigned all aspects of an international inspection regime.
      7. Effective verification cannot be based on periodic on-site inspections alone, but requires the integration of data from a wide variety of sources to monitor patterns of host-country activity over an extended period of time.
      8. In the future, the task of verifying nonproliferation treaties and drawing compliance judgments will grow more difficult as technologies capable of supporting deception and denial efforts become more widely available."
      from "Monitoring And Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons From the U.N. Experience in Iraq", Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Nonproliferation Review: Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3 - Number 3.
  • "... important differences between chemical and biological weapons limit the applicability of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification measures to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
    1. The fact that certain microbial and toxin agents are highly potent per unit weight means that a militarily significant quantity is measured in kilograms, compared with tons for chemical nerve agents.
    2. Moreover, whereas production of a chemical arsenal requires a fairly large industrial plant, a stockpile of biological or toxin agents could be produced to order in a pilot-scale factory over a period of weeks.
    For theses reasons, the threshold for militarily significant cheating, or "treaty breakout", is considerably lower for the BWC than for the CWC.

    Finally, the ambiguities between offensive and defensive research on infectious agents and the lack of well-defined indicators of biological or toxin production make it more difficult to distinguish between "treaty-prohibited" and "treaty-permitted" activities at dual-capable biological facilities. For this reason, assessing intent is as important as physical evidence in determining BWC compliance. Table 3 describes the differences between chemical and biological weapons and shows where these differences complicate BWC compliannce monitoring."

    from "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention, an analysis of the applicability of the CWC verification measures to a prospective BWC protocol" by Dr. Jonathan Tucker of the Monterey Institute.

  • US Agency for International Develpment
  • US Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, October 2002.
  • US Council on Foreign Relations - Iraq
  • US State Department - International Affairs Program - Iraq Update
  • H. Blix:
  • Many Questions, 12. September 2002.
  • Blix Says U.N. Weapons Inspections "Produced Little" Prior to War, 3 June 2003.
  • R. Butler: Saddam's Continuing Deceit, 5. September 2002.
  • British Dossier: Iraq's Military Plans for Use of WMD. October 4, 2004.
  • Washington File: U.S. Has $154 Million in Aid Ready for Iraqi People, 19. March 2003.

  • Version: January 20, 2011
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