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European Judas:
Germany's Proliferation of WMD Technology

by Joachim Gruber

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Contents

Introduction: Nuclear Madness without Need

I. The Role of the United States As Compared to That of Germany

II. Germany's Proliferation into Iraq

III. Germany's Proliferation of  Nuclear Technology to Brazil and Argentina

IV. Germany's Proliferaton of Nuclear Technology to the Indian Subcontinent

Further Reading

Appendix

Introduction: Nuclear Madness without Need

 German nuclear trade contributed remarkably little to Germany's economy as a whole and has had devastating impact on worldwide safety.
  1. "In the late 1970s and early 1980s West German nuclear exports made up less than one half percent of total West German exports (Atomwirtschaft, November 1981, 1984). In 1987 the West German government granted export licenses for nuclear goods valued at 2.7 billion DM (West Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/2120, p. 1). That year total West German exports came to 528.3 billion DM, which shows that relatively speaking nuclear exports have been insignificant for the western German economy as a whole." (C. Hofhansel, Commercial Competition and National Security: Comparing U.S. and German Export Control Policies, Praeger, 1996, p. 107 - in cache)
  2. "... for the higher danger fuel commodities, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the system's gatekeepers are four of the de jure nuclear states - the US, France, China, USSR/Russia - plus a single non-weapon state, West Germany/Germany." (J. Hunt Morstein and W.D. Perry WD, Commercial Nuclear Trading Networks as Indicators of Nuclear Weapons Intentions, Nonproliferation Review/ Fall- Winter 2000, pages 85, 86. - in cache)
  3. "The network for higher danger reactors in 1985 - 89 has two clusters - one supplied by West Germany and one supplied by France." (Hunt Morstein and Perry, see (2))
  4. Enrichment equipment and plants for 1985-89 is a Hub-and-Spoke split between a Supply-Hub sub-network and a Demand-Hub sub-network. The Supply-Hub cluster is centered by West Germany." [see Figure 2 below], (Hunt Morstein and Perry, see (2))

    (In terms of explanation: Uranium based nuclear weapons need enriched uranium.)

Germany at the Center of a Supplier Network of Enrichtment Equipment

Germany has chosen not to exert adequate retransfer controls in violation of the intentions of Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has thus assisted at least one non-nuclear-weapon state (Brazil) to manufacture nuclear weapons although it has been made aware of those problems by the Carter administration. (more violations)

The German government stated at the time that the "IAEA equivalent" inspections (as connected to the deal with Brazil) would suffice to preclude diversion of weapon grade material. It was known already then that in large-scale bulk handling plants even strict IAEA material accounting measures are insufficient to detect the diversion of "one significant quantity" (the amount necessary for a Hiroshima-size nuclear explosive): Measurement error exceeds one significant quantity by an order of magnitude, as has recently been experienced in the British reprocessing plant at Sellafield. Similar experience in the US weapons facilities was published in the early 1980s:

"It takes about 15 pounds of plutonium-239 or uranium-235 to fashion a crude nuclear device. The technology to enrich the isotopes is available for about one million dollars. It is clearly possible that terrorists could acquire both the isotopes and the technology needed to enrich them. This possibility has surfaced in the news since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent revelation of a thriving "black market" in such materials.

In an inventory taken between October, 1980, and March, 1981, the U.S. government could not account for about 55 pounds of plutonium and 159 pounds of uranium from its weapons facilities. The explanation given for this Missing material was "accounting error" and that the materials were "stuck in the piping" (Critical Mass Energy Journal, July, 1982)."
Source: Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy Information Service, August 31, 2004 (in cache).

Thus, contrary to German government assertions, diversion of one significant quantity of weapon grade material from such a plant might therefore escape detection, which is why 1977 US President Carter banned commercial reprocessing (President Carter announced his plutonium deferral policy).
What the United States should do about reprocessing and plutonium use, both domestically and internationally, became an election year issue in 1976. President Gerald Ford issued a nuclear policy statement that plutonium was at the root of the security problem associated with nuclear energy. Once separated from the radioactive waste contained in spent fuel, the material could rapidly be put to military use. President Ford stated that reprocessing, that is chemical separation of plutonium, "should not proceed unless there is a sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation." In perhaps his boldest step, he announced that the United States would act domestically in a way that was consistent with what we asked of others. The United States would no longer in its energy planning assume future reliance on plutonium fuel. He said that he believed that we could make use of nuclear energy, and even increase reliance on it, with this security restriction. "We must be sure," he said, "that all nations recognize that the U.S. believes that nonproliferation objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made." To this day, US policy on spent fuel assumes that it will be disposed in a repository on a "once through" basis, that is, without reprocessing, although the current reason for this probably has more to do with economics than with security. (Source: Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, Harmon Hubbard, A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, final report of NPEC's project on Light Water Reactors. (in cache, May 26, 2006)

Transatlantic relationship is about concrete issues. Proliferation of dual-use technology is a major one of these. In his address "Weapons of Mass Destruction as Challenge for German-American Relations" (in cache) to the Annual Conference of the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, February 12, 2004, Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator of German-American Cooperation at the Federal Foreign Office (Bundesaussenministerium) referred to "President [George W. Bush']s speech (in cache) yesterday as an offer to engage the world in general, and the European allies in particular, in a strategic dialogue on these important issues". He advocated transatlantic cooperation instead of conflicting disagreement. As of 2. June 2005 concrete action has not been specified on the Foreign Office website.

Are we about to leave a path that we chose in the 1970s and 1980s that disregarded the abyss our economically entirely unnecessary proliferation policy has opened up in the world?

  • Text of U.S. - EU Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 26, 2004, in cache.
  • David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel-Stricker, "Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A.Q. Khan" The Washington Quarterly 33.2:85-106 (April 2010) (in cache)
    "Iran, for example, continues to depend heavily on illicit overseas procurement for its nuclear programs. Its most visible procurement attempts center on outfitting its growing gas centrifuge program and obtaining goods that the British, French, and German intelligence services assess are being used to develop the capability to build deliverable nuclear weapons" [David Albright and Christina Walrond, "The Trials of German-Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki: The German Federal Intelligence Service Assesses That Iran Likely Has a Nuclear Weapons Program", December 15, 2009, and multiple interviews with British, French, and German officials by ISIS staff, 2008 and 2009].

    "German authorities provide companies confidential "early warning" letters that include lists of suspicious entities and strategies used by proliferant states. Companies forward suspicious enquiries to authorities on a voluntary basis. In the nuclear area, intelligence officials meet periodically with key company officials to provide tips to watch for specific illicit procurement trading companies, technical specifications, and end-users. In turn, they receive important information from the companies. Upon receiving these tips, a company may also review its recent enquiry data and report back to the authorities about any contact with these entities."

This could be a concrete German contribution to more security: In a paper in the International Herald Tribune Mahdi Obeidi, former head of Saddam's military-industrial complex, points towards a problem area - the hundreds of jobless Iraqi scientists and technicians. Germany had closely cooperated with them, knows them - but it seems still unclear as to what extent Germany will absorb them ("Relations between Iraq and Germany", German Federal Foreign Office (Aussenministerium), January 2005, in cache).

The German effort could be similar to

  • the American Nunn-Lugar program (in cache) encompassing the "Cooperative Threat Reduction" (CTR) programs (in cache) that has engaged 58,000 Soviet-era weapons scientists and workers in peaceful work on the one hand and secured nuclear materials on the other ($10 billion spent by the US since 1992, in 2002 the G-8 nations and the US pledged $ 20 billion and 10 billion, respectively, in the "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction"). See also
  • the Obama-Lugar Program (in Cache).
    The "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation," signed June 17, 1992, established the legal framework for the Defense Department's Nunn-Lugar assistance to Russia, spelling out the rights and responsibilities of both countries. It had a duration of seven years; a protocol extending the agreement for another seven years was signed in June 1999. (more in Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn, An ounce of prevention, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no 5: 28-35, March/April 2005, in cache).
    or
  • the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (in cache)
    Established by the United States Department of Energy in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency and other partners, this initiative "aims to minimize as quickly as possible the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons" and "will also seek to put into place mechanisms to ensure that nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment...are not used for malicious purposes."

I. The Role of the United States As Compared to That of Germany

after Lawrence Scheinman, "The IAEA and World Nuclear Order", Chapter 6, pp. 176-205, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1987

1. U.S. has Never Supplied Uranium Enrichment Technology

 The United States has never supplied uranium enrichment technology, although it did propose sharing it with an appropriate multinational venture in the early 1970s when confronted with the reality that some of its European allies were planning to proceed with their own enrichment plans. (This aspect of the episode is very well analyzed and documented in Edward F. Wonder, "Nuclear Fuel and American Foreign Policy", An Atlantic Council Policy Study (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1977).) When the members of the URENCO gas centrifuge enrichment consortium (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany) first began discussing a joint arrangement in the early 1960s, however, the United States had prevailed on them to place their activities under strict secrecy to avoid the risk of unnecessary dissemination of a technology bearing high risk for nuclear proliferation.

2. U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of Spent Fuel:
Safeguards, Export Limitations and Withdrawal from Commercial Reprocessing

As for reprocessing and plutonium fabrication technology, U.S. bilateral agreements for cooperation had provisions contemplating eventual reprocessing under specific terms, conditions, and limitations.
  1. It was France, not the United States, that first published basic technical information on reprocessing technology. U.S. information sharing was in a real sense provoked by the French initiative at the 1955 Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, after which the United States began to publish technical reprocessing information. It did not, however, share industrial know-how or transfer hardware or facilities. The only instance of actual sharing related to the joint EUROCHEMIC venture (a creation of the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the nuclear arm of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), which was modestly assisted in the hope that any commercial reprocessing activity that might develop on the European continent would be multi-nationalized and thereby avoid wide dispersion of nationally owned and controlled facilities.
  2. In 1972, after the NPT had come into force, but prior to the Indian test and the revelation of France's contracts with South Korea and Pakistan, The Unites States revised its internal rules to tighten the conditions under which any private U.S. individual or concern could assist in the development of reprocessing capabilities abroad. Any such assistance was made contingent on explicit authorization by the executive branch (first the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, later the administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration, and now the secretary of energy), and criteria for evaluating whether to grant such approval were established, namely the NPT status of the potential recipient and whether the facility would be under multinational auspices. (Code of Federal Regulations Part 810 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office)) The intent was to hold out the possibility for U.S. cooperation in reprocessing as leverage to encourage countries to join the NPT, and to encourage others to seriously consider joint ventures in reprocessing in lieu of establishing independent facilities, Thus, serious and substantial efforts to control the risk of proliferation while advancing the cause of peaceful atomic energy lay in the background of the unsettling events of 1974 and 1975 (the United States' restrictive managing of enrichment services to other countries).

... The Bonn government emphasized its understanding that beyond preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in no case would the provisions of the treaty "lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non nuclear weapon states." In particular it said:

... no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non nuclear weapon states merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (20).

... The United States favored a requirement that recipient countries accept full scope safeguards as a condition for any nuclear export. Although backed on this by a number of suppliers (and the condition accepted by all NPT non nuclear weapon state parties on their own activities), this failed to win French and German support (very largely because of anticipated sales to Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa). So the guidelines provide only that any export of items on an agreed "trigger list" drawn up and occasionally supplemented by the suppliers would have to be placed under IAEA safeguards (38).

  • The emphasis of this crucial group of exporting states on international safeguards confirmed that safeguards remained the core of the nonproliferation regime and the sine qua non for international civil nuclear cooperation.
  • Nonetheless, the United States also sought to reduce the pressure on safeguards by pressing for additional technological barriers; this would be accomplished by a mandatory agreement by suppliers that they would not make further transfers of reprocessing or enrichment technology or facilities. This reflected a diminished confidence that safeguards and pledges alone could sustain nonproliferation.

But the U.S. drive for mandatory prohibition on sensitive transfers was rejected by several members of the group as being too sweeping and likely to cause some countries to seek nuclear independence, thereby further diluting any influence suppliers might exercise over national nuclear development. However, the suppliers did agree to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons usable materials and to encourage recipients to accept supplier involvement or other appropriate multinational arrangements as an alternative to national facilities (39). Significantly, the two members of the group least disposed to mandatory restraints on sensitive technology transfers, France and the Federal Republic of Germany subsequently independently. announced their intention not to authorize "until further notice" the export of reprocessing facilities (40).

... The second element of post 1974 U.S. nonproliferation policy had a rather different twist, and particularly after 1977 became a source of considerable controversy between the United States and its industrial nuclear partners. Unlike

  1. the first element, which emphasized voluntary export conditions and limits to transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies,
  2. this involved reassessment of a fundamental presumption of civil nuclear power [the desirability of reprocessing spent fuel] for that had guided civil nuclear development from the inception of Atoms for Peace.
The decision to take this step came in 1976 when nonproliferation policy and the adequacy of the existing safeguards based regime became an issue in the presidential campaign. Impelled by existing congressional pressures and by candidate Carter's emphasis on the proliferation risks associated with anticipated widespread commercialization of plutonium and reprocessing, President Ford, in the waning days of his administration, announced a new nonproliferation policy:
henceforth, the United States would not regard reprocessing and plutonium recycling as necessary and inevitable steps in the nuclear fuel cycle and would defer such activities until there was good reason to conclude that the world could effectively overcome any proliferation risks associated with such activities.
President Ford declared a moratorium on exports of sensitive technologies and facilities for a minimum of three years, and called upon other suppliers to join the United States in this effort. Plutonium reprocessing issues, including safeguards effectiveness, were to be considered in the framework of a reprocessing evaluation program. Unfortunately, its precise character never was fully worked out before President Ford's term expired, but it emerged in somewhat altered form in the Carter administration in the form of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (46).

3. Is Nuclear Non-Proliferation Still Attainable?

Remarks at the United Nations Foundation, June 9, 2006
(in chache)
Andrew K. Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations

"The non-proliferation precedents we set in the coming decade are likely to determine whether the world lives in anxious uncertainty from crisis to crisis or whether we are able to construct a global coalition dedicated to preventing catastrophes and to giving people the confidence and security to pursue fulfilling lives" (Richard G. Lugar).
It is the desire of the United States to work with its partners to construct a global coalition dedicated to preventing catastrophes from WMD proliferation. If the international community fails to counter the threat of WMD proliferation, the impact on future generations will be devastating, and be felt, not just here, but in every country of the world."

  1. "... Over two years ago, President Bush announced several new nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives. That speech (in cache) marks the most ambitious recent attempt to create a strategy or game plan for coping with nuclear nonproliferation. These initiatives included efforts at the international level, such as
    • the proposal for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to criminalize WMD proliferation,
    • efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system through the creation of an IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification,
    • a proposal to universalize the tougher Additional Protocol to augment existing NPT safeguards agreements, and
    • to make implementation of the Protocol a condition that countries must meet to be eligible to receive nuclear supplies.
    • President Bush also proposed a complete ban on the export of sensitive uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology to all countries not now having such full-scale facilities, while ensuring that those countries that forego these fuel cycle programs would have access to reliable nuclear fuel at prevailing market prices.
  2. In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1540, establishing for the first time binding Chapter VII obligations on all UN member states to develop and enforce legal and national regulatory measures against the proliferation of WMD. If implemented successfully, each state's actions will significantly strengthen international standards related to the export of sensitive items, and limit access to sensitive technologies.
    Yet, a clear gap persists between the global consensus about the threat of WMD proliferation and concrete action on the ground. Full implementation of UNSCR 1540 will help close this gap. We are pleased that the UNSC adopted in late April UNSCR 1673 which extends the 1540 mandate for two more years. We'll continue to work aggressively through the 1540 Committee and its panel of experts to achieve the nonproliferation objectives articulated in resolution 1540.
  3. The United States is working on its own plan to provide assistance to other states to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We are encouraging other governments in position to do so to offer assistance to countries not yet meeting the requirements of this resolution. We also encourage outreach to those governments that have not yet submitted reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee to complete this important work. The regional seminars planned for later this year should be helpful in shaping next steps in implementation of the Resolution. Working together, we can ensure that all states fully implement this resolution and meet its aims to prevent VIN/ED proliferation.
  4. As proposed by President Bush, the IAEA Board of Governors established a new committee last June to strengthen further the international safeguards system of the IAEA. This committee is charged with examining ways to strengthen the Agency's ability to ensure that nations comply with their international treaty obligations. The Committee has met three times since last November, and has begun to outline ways to strengthen the safeguards system.
  5. We also have seen an increase in the number of NPT Parties with Additional Protocols. To date 107 NPT parties have signed Additional Protocols, and 75 are now in force. When in force, the AP permits the IAEA to inspect more facilities on shorter notice, and to seek more information about civil nuclear programs.
  6. We are working within the G-8 and the NSG to establish effective controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology to inhibit states from pursuing nuclear weapons in the guise of peaceful nuclear energy.
  7. Complementing these efforts was U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Bodman's announcement of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP is a comprehensive strategy designed to promote the expansion of emissions-free nuclear energy worldwide by demonstrating and deploying new technologies to recycle nuclear fuel, minimize waste, and prevent the spread of nuclear technologies and materials....
  8. Under the Moscow Treaty, we have agreed to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 to 2,200, about a third of their 2002 levels, and less than a quarter of the level at the end of the Cold War.
    • When this Treaty is fully implemented by 2012, the United States will have reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads it had deployed in 1990 by about 80%.
    • We also have reduced our non-strategic nuclear weapons by 90% since the end of the Cold War, dismantling over 3000 such weapons pursuant to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992.
  9. Moreover, the United States introduced a new text for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty on May 18, 2006. ...."

II. Germany's Proliferation into Iraq

Presently, during Iraq's reconstruction period under UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and World Bank surveillance (UNSCR 1483), the picture is the reverse of what it was before the first Gulf war: German contributions ($200 million as compared to $20 billion from the US) are among the nations' smallest. As of June 2005 Germany has waived repayment of 80 % of the Iraqi debt of $5.5 billion, part of which must have gone into Saddam's military-industrial complex.

Saddam has always been trying to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, according to his own statements and testimony by former high-ranking Iraqi officials (final report of the US weapons inspectors, Oct. 6, 2004, source: Siegfried Buschschlüter, foreign correspondent, Deutschandfunk, Oct. 7, 2004, US-Waffensuche im Iraq, local cache, see also U.S. Report Finds No WMD in Iraq, Associated Press, Sept. 18, 2004). After the end of UN sanctions against Iraq, Saddam would have resumed the nuclear program, according to Mahdi Obeidi. His paper (excerpt) is an account of the build-up in Iraq that mainly Germany had contributed to.

Before the first Gulf war Germany exported more into Iraq than the rest of the world taken together. Between the two Gulf wars Germany was still Iraq's major trading partner, and many of the goods were dual-use items. Some detail in chronological order:

  • "Hundreds of German firms" as opposed to "tens of US firms" traded with Iraq (Scott Ritter, UNSCOM Weapons Inspector)

  • More than half of Iraqi imports came from Germany (German-Iraqi trade, Source: Financial Times Deutschland, internal link).

  • Until 1992 Germany's manufacturers did not fully comply with UN Iraq embargo and German export laws (for details see pages 13 and 14 of Bill of Indictment by the district court in Augsburg, Germany.)

  • "Largely as a result of these recent scandals [about the involvement of German companies in supplying Iraq and Libya with chemical weapons], German export control policy has been in a state of flux for the past two years. ....

    • From December 1987 until February 1991 the foreign trade decree (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) was amended 14 times.

    • Since 1989 the German Bundestag has passed 2 major revisions of the foreign trade act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) and related legislation although both legislative packages encountered opposition in the second chamber, the Bundesrat.

    • In February 1994 the federal government introduced yet another bill to amend the foreign trade act (Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6911).

    • Beyond that, the German government decided first to reorganize the export licensing agency, the Bundesamt für Wirtschaft, and to more than triple the personnel level of its export control division.

    • In a second step, the government created a new agency, the Bundesausfuhramt, with exclusive responsibility for export licensing."
    (Claus Hofhansel, Commercial Competition and National Security: Comparing U.S. and German Export Control Policies, Praeger, 1996, p. 12 - in cache).

  • In 1992 German authorities have begun investigating possible violations of export control laws by several German firms. In April 1992, 27 supplier countries agreed to strengthen the rules for transfer of sophisticated dual-item technology (Michael Wise, The Washington Post, 5/19/92, P. A15).

  • Foreign individuals driven by a profit motive provided key know-how to Iraq. To limit such participation in the future, the FRG in 1992 approved "citizens participation" laws that make it illegal for German citizens to take part in potential proliferation countries' nuclear weapons program (David Albright, Mark Hibbs, Arms Control Today, 7-8/92, PP. 3-11).

  • An analysis presented here gives background material related to the dangers connected with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or of the corresponding technology, part of which is a compilation of German illegal activities

  • "[Year] 2001 - Attempts to acquire biotechnology and biological weapons-related technology and expertise
    The Amman, Jordan office of the Iraqi front company Winter International forwarded offers for dual-use laboratory equipment from a German firm to the Winter International office in Baghdad, in March 2001. The end-user of this equipment was purported to be the Iraqi MoI [Ministry of Industry]. The equipment offered included:

    • ...

    • A refrigerated ultracentrifuge, a microcentrifuge, a low temperature freezer (between -30 and -80 degrees Celsius), and an automatic DNA-analysis system with mono-laser. This equipment is on the UN dual-use monitoring lists and would have required verification.

    • ..."
    (Source: Ch. Duelfer, Chapter "Biological Dual-Use Related Procurement of Annex I "Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement", Chapter "Regime Finance and Procurement Transactions", Vol. 1 of "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD", 30. Sept. 2004). On Iraqi procurement between 1999 and 2003, during the UN sanctions against Iraq.


III. Germany's Proliferation of Nuclear Technology to Brazil and Argentina

This compilation is a follow-up of an activity in 1976 against the financial support provided by the German government. At that time the government had provided financial ("Hermes") securities to German companies, amongst them Interatom, a subsidiary of the Siemens AG, to enable the sale of the complete nuclear fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and reprocessing technology to Brazil when Brazil, a non-NPT state, was pursuing the path to nuclear explosives. At the same time Germany also sold nuclear equipment to Argentina, Brazil's rival. The South American continent was then -and fortunately still is today- nuclear weapons free. A New York Times editorial entitled "Nuclear Madness" denounced the deal as a "reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms race in Latin America, trigger the nuclear arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere and endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole" (Nuclear Madness, New York Times, 13. June 1975, p.36, see also p. 9 of Claus Hofhansel, Commercial Competition and National Security: Comparing U.S. and German Export Control Policies, Praeger, 1996, in cache).
 
 

In the 1970s we (physicists and chemists) were affiliated with the Hahn-Meitner-Institute in Berlin, Germany (then called HMI for Nuclear Research]. We were concerned about nuclear proliferation originating from German industry and financially backed by the German Federal Government. We sent an open letter to our foreign minister, H.-D. Genscher, asking him not to undercut the non-proliferation efforts of the US president, Jimmy Carter. About half the employees of the HMI had signed the letter (Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 22, "Dokumente zum Zeitgeschehen", Seiten 1156-1157, 1977).

At that time the Brazilian military government publicly admitted aiming at producing nuclear explosives, but declared them as peaceful. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency were not allowed, as Brazil was not a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

  • In  September 1990 Brazil's newly elected president Fernando Collor de Mello closed the nuclear test site and admitted in a speech to the UN General Assembly Brazil's secrete 15 year old nuclear bomb program (Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Weapons Programs: Brazil, Public Interest Report (PIR), 1990;5 - in cache)
H. Schmidt and H.-D. Genscher
Source: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de 		Disregarding the danger of heating up a nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina on the thus far nuclear weapons free Latin American continent, the social democratic German government under Helmut Schmidt provided German nuclear suppliers with the necessary financial security backing the sale of an entire nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil.

The German-Brazil nuclear deal grew out of a decades long cooperation between the two states. It had as a major goal the development and sale of uranium enrichment technology
(details in

in opposition to the above described nonproliferation policy of the government of the USA (see 1, 2).

German and Brazil government officials subsequently signed the sale's agreement. At the same time, Germany was also a major supplier of nuclear technology to Argentina, which had resolved to stay roughly in step with Brazil and by 1974 had acquired heavy water reactors - the type that India had used to produce its plutonium.

"[The newly elected president of the US, Jimmy] Carter had pledged himself to heading off the German deal with Brazil. And two days after his inauguration, he dispatched Vice President Walter Mondale to Europe with the new administration's message about nuclear proliferation. In Brussels, only four days later, Mondale said that one of the "central themes" would be "stopping the sales of reprocessing plants as those to Brazil an Pakistan" (W.H. Courtney, "Brazil and Argentina: Strategies for American Diplomacy", in Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. J.A. Yager (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 380, citing Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, January 25, 1977). In Bonn, he is said to have told Schmidt that Carter "was unalterably opposed to the transfer of the sensitive technologies to Brazil" (ibidem, p. 381). Schmidt stonily replied by noting his commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the suppliers' guidelines [drawn up at a series of secret meetings of the nuclear suppliers' club in London 1974], but he also restated his commitment to the agreement with Brazil. Carter's high-visibility, high-level initiative had the predictable effect of souring the atmosphere and further complicating intractable problems. Two weeks later, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State designate, was in Bonn, trying to persuade Schmidt to defer transferring the enrichment and reprocessing materials to Brazil until its reactors had been "safeguarded"

[... safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. IAEA safeguards include inspections, inventories, and regular audits of sensitive materials to ensure that nuclear technology is used for peaceful purposes only. Years later, the case of Iraq has shown that IAEA does not achieve this goal (D. Kay, Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned. D. Kay was the team leader for three IAEA inspections in Iraq)].

Schmidt again said no. A U.S. mission to Brazil drew a cold, uncompromising reception; the Brazilians made their feelings clear by canceling a military cooperation agreement.

.... He [Carter] planned to cut off American aid to any country that detonated a "peaceful nuclear explosion". He wanted a voice in decisions involving an American client-country's other nuclear exchanges. And he wanted to be able to rule on whether a client-country could develop its own plutonium separation capability (M. Nacht, "Controlling Nuclear Proliferation", in The Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, 1970), ed. K. Oye, D. Rothchild, and R. Lizber, p. 157)."

- cited from  J. Newhouse,
"War and Peace in the Nuclear Age",
A.A. Knopf, New York, 1989, p. 274 - 275.
Small print in [ ] added by J. Gruber.

"The Federal Republic of Germany-Brazil agreement prompted a strong reaction from the United States that resulted in considerable tension between the US and both of the other countries. For an in-depth review of that situation:

  • Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1976, also Foreign Policy, Issue # 23 (Summer 1976).
  • William Lowerance, "Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West-Germany", International Security, Fall 1976, pp 147-166.
  • Karl Kaiser, "The Great Nuclear Debate: German American Disagreements", Foreign Policy, Spring 1978, pp. 85-110."
--from: Lawrence Scheinman,
"The IAEA and World Nuclear Order",
Chapter 6, p. 200.
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 1987.


In Brazil, in the years that followed under democratic rule, scientific groups, citizens organizations, and newly-empowered legislators were able to lobby openly for constraints on wasteful nuclear activities. Scientists of US public interest groups e.g.

provided members of the Brazilian parliament and Physical Society with the necessary technical expertise. Many of these efforts helped to build a political climate more conducive to the implementation of bilateral and international safeguards.
Brazil's deal with West Germany gradually fell apart of its own weight. The Brazilians couldn't afford the reactors and never managed to make the German-design enrichment technology work for them. ... Brazil and Argentina still refuse to sign the NPT, and in either country an immoderate regime could doubtless acquire the weapons option.
- cited from J. Newhouse.
Finally, in September 1990, when -before the UN General Assembly- Brazil publicly revealed and revoked its nuclear weapons ambitions, the German government (under the Christian and Free Democrats, Chancellor Helmut Kohl) announced that "current and future" nuclear exports would be approved only if full-scope safeguards were in effect in the recipient country.


Internationally, Germany has been continuously blamed for proliferating weapons relevant technology (for details see Reading List).

  • The German proliferation efforts concerning uranium enrichment, not just the ones in cooperation with Brazil, were a major contribution to the world wide spread of the uranium gas centrifuge. This technology makes it easy for a state to quickly turn its peaceful nuclear power program into a nuclear weapons program. For more details see Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, Harmon Hubbard, A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, October 22, 2004, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC, USA.
    • For example, Iran might well be able to divert Light Water Reactor fuel to covert enrichment by gas centrifuges and might well be able to do so without IAEA detection.
  • The case for Iraq has been documented by

IV. Germany's Proliferation of Nuclear Technology to the Indian Subcontinent

Focus of N-probes shifts from Pakistan to Europe, The News International, Pakistan, Jan. 27, 2004.
    "... The core question that European investigators are probing is whether designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges, developed by the Dutch unit of [the Dutch-British-German] Urenco [consortium], which Tehran allegedly acquired from a middleman in 1980s, came from
    • inside Pakistan or
    • Urenco provided it to Tehran, or
    • their source were the companies that supply components to Urenco,
    the source said....

    ... IAEA inspectors and experts have concluded that

    • scientists,
    • nuclear manager[s] and
    • companies
    from
    • the Netherlands,
    • Switzerland,
    • Austria,
    • Germany,
    • the UK,
    • France and
    • other western European countries
    need to be investigated thoroughly to ascertain the truth on the basis of the evidence in possession of the IAEA ....

    ... Dutch and German intelligence agencies, according to another source, are engaged in investigating what they describe as the "crucial leads" related to some officials of the Dutch-British-German Urenco consortium.

    ... The [European] investigators expect to unravel covert activities of more than two decades through investigations launched to identify cartels of the "middle men" who had been helping in illegal transfer of nuclear technology to Iran and Libya.

    Some intelligence outfits in Europe believe that the investigation to identify the source or sources that had been supplying nuclear technology to Iran could not be completed without launching a thorough probe into the companies which had been providing Pakistan the most sophisticated nuclear components to build its nuclear programme, the source said."
     

Father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb under "microscopic scrutiny" (AFP, Islamabad, Jan 28, 2004, in cache).
"There are individuals from Pakistan, Germany, Holland, South Africa and the UAE" who had been named by Iran in its reports to the IAEA, said the official [close to the investigations following allegations raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November 2003]."


Outside Assistance to the Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programs, by Steven Dolley, Nuclear Control Institute, June 5, 1998 (in cache)

  • India
    • Norway - heavy water -  illegal transfer
    • Romania - heavy water (Norwegian origin) - illegal re-transfer
  • Pakistan
    • Netherlands - centrifuge designs - stolen from URENCO
    • Switzerland - enrichment technology - illegal transfer
    • Germany

      •  
      Supplier Items Notes
      West Germany uranium conversion plant 
      enrichment technology 
      tritium 
      tritium purification plant 
      plans for tritium production reactor 
      furnaces
      milling machines
      hot isostatic presses
      mass spectrometers
      uranium shipping containers 
      aluminum for centrifuges      		 illegal transfer
      illegal transfer
       
       
       
       
       
       

      illegal transfer
      illegal transfer

    • Iran Watch Pakistan Supplier Database

Further Reading
  • Otfried Nassauer, U-Boote für Pakistan?, Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit (BITS), 24. April 2007 (im Cache)
    Die U-Boote sind mit acht Torpedorohren des Standardkalibers 533mm ausgerüstet, von denen aus Torpedos, Flugkörper wie die amerikanischen Sub-Harpoon-Raketen und Minen eingesetzt werden können.

    Zu den Waffen, die Pakistan entwickelt, gehört ein Marschflugkörper namens Babur. Er wurde 2005 erstmals getestet und soll eine Reichweite von 500 km haben. Nach einem erneuten Test 2007 ist sogar von 700km Reichweite die Rede.

    In der pakistanischen Fachpresse und im Internet wird offen angesprochen, dass die künftigen U-Boote Pakistans mit Babur-Flugkörpern ausgestattet werden sollen.

  • U.S. Repeatedly Warned Germany on Nuclear Exports to Pakistan, Nuclear Fuel, Mar. 6, 1989. (in cache)
    "... The U.S. government has issued about 100 specific communiques to the West German government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and its affiliated organizations, according to information obtained by NuclearFuel. Documents reveal that since the early 1970s planned exports--some of which were carried out--included a range of items--from computer technology to uranium.

    Beginning in 1982, U.S. nonproliferation officials began warning Bonn that PAEC attempted to acquire technology for capture of pure tritium. In March, and again in May, 1986, the U.S. told German officials that the firm Linde AG was planning to export a tritium extraction facility to PAEC.

    In responding to U.S. requests, German officials contacted Linde, which said it `had no plans' to export such a facility.

    The U.S. sent a third warning in December 1986. `Notwithstanding Linde's assertions, we continue to believe that the information we provided you previously is correct, and that Linde submitted a proposal to PAEC for installation of a tritium recovery facility.'

    While on two previous occasions German export officials asserted that technology from Linde `could not result in a form of pure tritium,' the U.S. government replied that `our technical information indicates that such a facility could result in a pure form of tritium.'

    Western tritium experts queried by NuclearFuel said that the U.S. position was correct. Linde AG, one of a handful of firms in the world with expertise in the field of cryogenic distillation of hydrogen isotopes, could have supplied a heavy water detritiator with capability to purify the tritium gas product.

    In 1985, Germany licensed for export to Pakistan a tritium plant by the firm NTG Nukleartechnik GmbH (NTG), preferring to call it a `heavy water purifier' instead of--as the U.S. preferred--a `tritium recovery facility' in the interests of complying with German regulations on sensitive nuclear exports. While heavy water purification technology is not subject to export controls in Germany, technology for the recovery of tritium is controlled.

    The U.S. believed that Germany would control export of tritium capture technology to Pakistan according to a pledge made by German officials at a spring 1986 meeting of the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM). While German officials previously told the U.S. they `had no authority' to control tritium technology exports, the U.S. government told Bonn that Germany `should now have the legal authority to control the export of a tritium recovery facility.' Equipment especially designed for tritium production or recovery appears on Germany's Nuclear Energy List of March 25, 1988. That list of items needing an export license is an annex to Germany's Foreign Trade Ordinance.

    ... Diplomatic sources also said that the U.S. is looking for an avenue to exert `more direct influence' on officials in the Economics Ministry responsible for export control. One 1986 interoffice memo penned by an Economics Ministry official said that U.S. communiques warning of planned nuclear exports to South Asia `usually land in my wastepaper basket.'"

  • 20 years Non-Proliferation Treaty: 20 years of failure, WISE News Communique on February 22, 1991. (in cache)
    "... West Germany, too, has quite a record for aiding proliferation. Though a Non-Nuclear Weapons State, it assisted five countries into becoming NWSs [Nuclear Weapons States].
    1. In at least two cases -- South Africa and Brazil -- the German government was involved.
    2. In the other three cases (Pakistan, Iraq, and Argentina), government involvement has not yet been proven. All five countries developed their own uranium enrichment industries thanks to Germany. Often Swiss Companies, which took subcontracts from German firms, were involved as well.

    Another incredible example of German government involvement in nuclear sales consisted of simply changing the wording on a license. Pakistan had ordered a tritium production plant from a German firm. This firm asked for an export license. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the plant was on the list of forbidden exports. But, they said, if the license application was renamed, the license should be granted. The new name they proposed was "water refinery plant", because the installation was meant to clean the cooling water of a nuclear reactor. Only, the water was heavy water and tritium was to be separated out. Nevertheless, the change was made, the license granted, the plant exported, and everything was legal. But the plant remained a tritium production installation.

    ... Over the past 15 years the US has warned the Germans some hundreds of times about private nuclear deals between German firms and Pakistan, Iraq, and India. The FRG government, however, has always denied the affairs and refused to investigate. Each time, though, the warnings proved to be justified. Very rarely have the parties involved been sentenced or even taken to court."

  • Nuclear Proliferation: Germany's Contribution, Davids Medienkritik, Politically Incorrect Observations on Reporting in the German Media. By David Kaspar & Ray D., February 10, 2004. (in cache)

  • Germans Allegedly Involved in Pakistan Nuclear Scandal, Deutsche Welle, Germany - 09.02.2004. (in cache)
    According to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, three Germans acted as middlemen in the illicit transfer of nuclear secrets during the 1980s and 1990s.

  • German Trial Could Shed Light on Global Nuclear Nexus, Deutsche Welle, Germany - 17.03.2006. (in cache)
    "Wal-Mart of black-market proliferation"
    (Mohammed ElBaradei)

    The information first came to light when a German ship was intercepted in October 2003 carrying a cargo of containers filled with nuclear weapons technology headed for Libya. (more, in cache)

    Gadhafi unexpectedly spilled the beans on the nuclear mafia in 2003 The seizure prompted a nervous Gadhafi to disclose the names of all those who had supplied Tripoli with material and expertise for its nuclear program. That in turn led to the unraveling of Khan's elaborately-built global arms-dealer bazaar and to the emergence of details of how it peddled nuclear technology to regimes in Iran, North Korea and Libya.

  • German Firms Involved in Illegal Arms Exports to Iran, Report, Deutsche Welle, Germany - 22.03.2006. (in cache)
    Even as tensions simmer between Iran and the West over Teheran's nuclear program, security sources in Germany say around 100 dummy firms are illegally exporting arms to the Islamic country.

    Johannes Schmalzl, president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the state of Baden-Württemberg, told the program "Report Mainz" (im Cache) that the situation wasn't entirely new.

    "We've been devoting time to the topic since 2002," he said. "And we've concluded that an estimated 100 dummy firms in Germany are involved in it."
    Schmalzl added that the authorities could hardly keep up with the scale of illegal exports to Iran.
    "When I say, 100 dummy firms, you can imagine that when we discover one and the federal prosecutor opens a case against them, we're happy and pat ourselves on the back. But 99 others are still in business," Schmalzl said. (mehr, im Cache)

    However, German firms' involvement in illegal arms exports is not confined to Iran alone. Since the 1980s, German firms and middlemen, along with counterparts in other European countries, have been suspected of smuggling nuclear technology to regimes in Pakistan and North Korea.

  • UN Nuclear Chief in Berlin For Talks Over Iran, Deutsche Welle, Germany - 27.03.2006. (in cache)
    Mohammed el ElBaradei met with German leaders in Berlin for talks over Iran amid reports of German customs agents uncovering an Iranian procurement network in the country.

    The [state] prosecutor's office [in Potsdam] said that the deliveries went from the Berlin company run by Russians to a company near Moscow, and from there to Iran. The shipments included electronic parts and special cables. According to an ARD report, the Iranians had attempted to acquire hydraulic pumps and transformer parts in Germany. A spokesman put the value of the deliveries at between two and three million euros ($2.4 and 3.6 million) Two million euros were seized in the raid of the Berlin business.

    The export of material that could be used in a nuclear program is subject to strict regulations in Germany and must be approved by the authorities.

  • Joachim Gruber, Some Background Material on Nonproliferation
  • Brahma Chellaney, A quiet burial of a scandal that will haunt Washington, The Japan Times: Saturday, May 13, 2006 (im Chache)
    It was Libya, seeking to re-enter the international mainstream, that first disclosed the existence of the Pakistani proliferation ring, but the United States took the credit by stage-managing an event in October 2003. With the help of documents Tripoli had turned over to Washington, a German cargo ship was intercepted en route to Libya with centrifuge components routed through Dubai.
  • Seymour M. Hersh "THE DEAL: Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan's nuclear black marketers?", The New Yorker, Fact, March 7, 2004. (in cache)
    1. Pakistan: the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world
      • "For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I. (Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers."
      • "The greatest risk may be ... to the ability of the international nuclear monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khan's help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point.
      • "Once they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to get it done - the countries, people, and telephone numbers." (Husain Haqqani, who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
      • "Khan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges, and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world ..." (Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of experience in nonproliferation issues)
    2. Iran: enough enriched uranium for a bomb?
      • "The most recent revelations about the nuclear black market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the People's Mujahideen Khalq. The National Council lobbied in Washington for decades, and offered information."
      • "Iran had secretly constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of Tehran (one producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, a centrifuge facility, potentially in violation of its obligations under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty).
      • Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, he [a senior proliferation expert of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna] said, "I'm not sure."
    3. Libya: Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender.
      • [In December 2003] Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and permitted IAEA inspectors to enter his country.
      • Libya had been able to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of nuclear parts, including advanced centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made available by Khan.
      • The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in Libya had not been assembled -in most cases, in fact, the goods were still in their shipping cases.
      • "What's on the market is absolutely horrendous. It's a Mafia-type business, with corruption and secrecy." (an IAEA senior proliferation expert)
      • IAEA inspectors found in Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton nuclear weapon. "It's a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know how to assemble a weapon," an official in Vienna told me. "No question it'll work. It's too big and too heavy for a Scud, but it'll go into a family car. It's a terrorist's dream."
      • Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to international inspection. The C.I.A. man [a former operations officer] quoted Kusa as explaining that, as the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, "You are nuts if you think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender."
      • One Arab intelligence operative said, it was "the Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis", and who made the role of Khan's black market known.

    4. IAEA: If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.
      • The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the IAEA, told me, in an interview at the organization's headquarters in Vienna, is non-state actors. "I have a nightmare that the spread of enriched uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan," he said. "Who knows? It's not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated."
      • The [IAEA senior proliferation] official said, "We have to move from inspecting declared sites to 'Where does this shit come from?' If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix."

  • The Proliferation Security Initiative
    The Proliferation Security Initiative, Bureau of Nonproliferation, US Department of State, Washington, DC, July 28, 2004

  • Fact Sheet: Strengthening International Efforts Against WMD Proliferation, US White House, Feb. 11, 2004. (in cache)
    • "The President calls for swift passage of the [Security Council] resolution he proposed in September 2003, requiring all states to
    • criminalize proliferation,
    • enact strict export controls, and
    • secure sensitive materials within their borders.
    Over several years, American and British intelligence services gradually uncovered the [Pakistani] Abdul Qadeer Khan network's reach, and identified its key experts, agents, and financial network."
  • David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (Institute for Science and International Security), Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, 28::2 pp.111-128, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    "Among these steps [of the February 2004 White House initiative] were
    1. expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);
    2. strengthening the legal framework governing proliferation, in particular
      • through a UN Security Council resolution requiring states to criminalize proliferation,
      • enact strict export controls, and secure sensitive materials;
      • expanding efforts to secure nuclear material in the former Soviet Union and other states;
      • denying enrichment and reprocessing technology to any states that do not already possess them;
      • requiring countries to implement the IAEA's advanced safeguards Additional Protocol as a necessary condition for supplying equipment and materials for civilian nuclear programs;
      • and reforming the IAEA to improve its capability to enforce states' obligations.
    The international community also responded with the adoption of various measures by separate bodies including
    1. the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
    2. reforms considered by the NSG,
    3. expansion of the PSI,
    4. the G-8 Global Partnership's Action Plan on Nonproliferation, and
    5. proposed steps to strengthen IAEA investigations.

    The UN resolution has several problems, however, in terms of its implementation. Some states, particularly in the developing world, may resist its main provisions, believing that the obligations should have been established through treaty negotiations. It will also likely be applied unevenly among even the most well-intentioned states because many, without extensive assistance, will experience difficulties in enacting, implementing, and enforcing effective export control legislation."

    While pursuing these efforts, the G-8 partners agreed not to initiate any new contracts to provide reprocessing or uranium-enrichment equipment and technologies to additional states for one year [extended in April 2006 for 2 more years, in chache]. This was a weaker commitment than the one that Bush had called for and that the U.S. delegation reportedly lobbied the G-8 to adopt.

    "... The United States is working on its own plan to provide assistance to other states to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We are encouraging other governments in position to do so to offer assistance to countries not yet meeting the requirements of this resolution. We also encourage outreach to those governments that have not yet submitted reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee to complete this important work. The regional seminars planned for later this year should be helpful in shaping next steps in implementation of the Resolution. Working together, we can ensure that all states fully implement this resolution and meet its aims to prevent VIN/ED proliferation." Andrew K. Semmel (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations), "Is Nuclear Non-Proliferation Still Attainable?", Remarks at the United Nations Foundation, June 9, 2006 (in chache)

    A complete, long-term ban on providing reprocessing and enrichment technology to new states will be difficult to achieve within either the framework of the G-8 or the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group], although the United States is expected to continue to work toward achieving this important goal.

    This case [the Khan network] has also shown the need for the IAEA to receive more information from states about their exports and imports of key sensitive dual-use items.

    In January 2004, ElBaradei said that "export controls must be dramatically improved and, in contrast to the past, must be carried out within an international framework." .... A universal treaty-based system controlling nuclear export activities would be binding on states and would include a means to verify compliance. ... In addition, a treaty-based system of export controls and verification would impose new requirements on all states, even those that have not implemented the Additional Protocol."

  • Institute For Sciences and International Security, Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls: Learning from the Past
    1. Case Studies
      Illicit Procurement Infrastructure; The recruitment of key foreign players to procure both legal and illicit items, or to act as agents or trusted sources of technology.

      Such recruitment efforts may involve: Off-shore agents or companies, Partial or complete control of established companies, Middlemen, Experts, Specialized "know-how", Education and training, Logistics, Secrecy, The strengths and weaknesses of national export control regulations and laws and, False end-user statements.

    2. Quick Links to Case Studies

      Iraq

      • EMIS Procurement
      • Matrix Churchill
      • H+H Metallform -- Funnel for the Iraqi Gas Centrifuge Program
        "In 1987, Iraq partially acquired the German company H+H Metalform GmbH. It subsequently grew to play an important role in supplying Iraq's ballistic missile and gas centrifuge programs with equipment, components, and on-site expertise. H+H specialized in the production of vertical flow-forming machines, which make thin-walled, pressure resistant precision tubes useful to militaries . Such lightweight, pressure resistant tubes have been particularly useful in ballistic missile and gas centrifuge programs."
      • Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology Part I, Part II, Part III
      • Schaublin
        "Schaublin is a world-famous machine tool manufacturer in Bevilard, Switzerland that provided Iraq with parts and sophisticated machine tools for its gas centrifuge manufacturing program in the 1980s [with the help of H+H Metallform employees]. In 1990 German authorities confiscated a shipment of Schaublin equipment to Iraq, although in the end no charges were filed against the company."
      • SMB
      • Karl Otto Brauer
        • "In the fall of 1988, Iraq requested that the H+H team find a ballistic missile expert. In response, Bruno Stemmler recommended Karl Otto Brauer, a retired German engineer who he knew from a German flying club.

        In reality, the Iraqis had decided quickly that they did not want to give Brauer a contract. They viewed him as extremely frail and doubted that he could significantly help their ballistic missile program."

      • Banca Nationale de Lavoro

      Pakistan

      • Ernest Piffl/Team GmbH
        "In 1998, Ernest Piffl, managing director of the German firm Team GmbH near Stuttgart, received a three and half year prison sentence for illegally exporting thousands of preforms for gas centrifuge scoops to Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program. Preforms are partially finished cast or machined components, and the ones sent to Pakistan were made of a special aluminum alloy and looked like small thin-walled pipes. Bending and finishing these little pipes would have been done at the point of assembly of the centrifuge.

        The regional superior court of Stuttgart established that the end-user of the last consignment of preforms, which was confiscated by German authorities in 1993, would have been the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) near Islamabad. KRL is responsible for Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program and is well known for involvement in illicit procurement and the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons."

      • Pakistani Scientists' Nuclear Assistance to Terrorists

      Resources: Glossary, Glossary of Key Names, Link to Urenco.

    3. Key Elements of an Effective Export Control System
      "After the Gulf War, the UN-mandated inspection process revealed how German companies easily manipulated Germany's weak and over-burdened export control system with false and misleading end-user information. Other governments condemned Germany's illicit exports to Iraq and elsewhere, and Germany was accosted as a "black sheep" of export controls.

      The German media played an extremely important role in creating a strong political constituency demanding fundamental change. Extensive publicity about these illicit or questionable exports damaged the reputations of many German companies. They not only suffered legal consequences, but also were condemned publicly as amoral.

      In order to regain its image and international respect, the German government radically tightened its export control system twice - once in 1990, and again in 1992. The penalties for foreign trade violations were drastically increased and the range of mechanisms for effective export control was expanded.

      ... The government also provided the export classification system with the general "catch-all clause," which says that all products are subjected to approval requirements to the extent that the exporter has knowledge of an actual or intended use for weapons production.

      Under the new laws, German companies are required to create stringent internal compliance systems and senior officials are now legally responsible for the actions of their employees. The law permits the prosecution of senior company officials for the illegal exports of lower level employees, creating a powerful incentive for companies to create stringent internal controls.

      Despite the tightening of German governmental standards, a major burden still resides on the companies to act with honesty and moral integrity. The companies are recognized as playing a major role in achieving nonproliferation goals. In several cases, their internal compliance systems have become models for both other companies and governments." (more)

  • Thomas B. Cochran, Christopher E. Paine, Geoffrey Fettus, Robert S. Norris, Matthew G. McKinzie, Position paper: Commercial Nuclear Power, Issue Paper, October 2005, National Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, USA (in cache, May 26, 2006)

    "... the "separative work" required to obtain low-enriched uranium at, say, 4 percent enrichment, is about 70 to 90 percent of that required to produce the highly enriched uranium used in the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, or in the six weapons secretly stockpiled by the former white-minority government of South Africa in the 1980s."

  • Gas Centrifuges
    • Lucas Royland, Uranium Separative Work Unit Calculator, Federation of American Scientists.
    • Uranium Separative Work Unit Calculator, URENCO Deutschland
    • Wikipedia, Separative Work Unit (local definition)
    • Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment (in cache), Weapons of Mass Destruction, Global Security.
    • Uranium Enrichment, World Nuclear Association, Nov. 2006 (in Cache)
      ... to produce one kilogram of uranium enriched to 3% U-235 requires 3.8 kg SWU (abbreviated as 3.8 SWU) if the plant is operated at a tails assay 0.25%, or 5.0 SWU if the tails assay is 0.15% (thereby requiring only 5.1 kg instead of 6.0 kg of natural U feed, containing 0.72 % U-235).

      About 100-120,000 SWU is required to enrich the annual fuel loading for a typical 1000 MWe light water reactor.

      Cost Estimates:
      Capital Costs (gas centrifuge: approx. 500 USD per one SWU/yr)

      • The EUR 3 billion French plant operated by Areva is expected to start commercial operation in 2009 and ramp up to full capacity of 7.5 million SWU/yr in 2018.
      • The $1.5 billion US plant in New Mexico, USA, will use the 6th generation Urenco technology, and first production is expected in 2008, with full capacity of 3 million SWU/yr being reached in 2013.
      • USEC is building its American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, involving 1300 centrifuges as the culmination of a very major R&D program. The Lead Cascade demonstration plant is due to start operation in mid 2007. For the main centrifuge plant initial annual capacity of 3.5 million SWU from 2011 is envisaged, costing $1.7 billion, though its licence application is for 7 million SWU to allow for expansion.

      Operating Costs (gas centrifuge: 50 kWh per one SWU)
      Enrichment costs are substantially related to electrical energy used.

      • The gaseous diffusion process consumes about 2500 kWh (9000 MJ) per SWU, while
      • modern gas centrifuge plants require only about 50 kWh (180 MJ) per SWU.

    Separative Work Units as a function of feed enrichment xF

    Separative Work Units (kg) necessary to produce 1 kg uranium being 90% U-235 (weapon grade)

    1. as a function of initial enrichment ("feed enrichment", xF)
    2. when the U-235 content in the centrifuge tails cannot be depleted more than to 0.5% of total uranium (depletion limit xT = 0.005).

    When one starts with an enrichment an order of magnitude above the depletion limit, the enrichment effort SWU decreases sharply with feed enrichment, because the concommittant tails amounts are much smaller at those enrichments and thus also the size of the centrifuge array.
    Example:

    1. Enrichment of natural uranium (0.72 % U-235) to produce 1 kg of 90% enriched uranium requires 155 (kg) SWU.
    2. Enrichment of 4% enriched uranium to produce 1 kg of 90% enriched uranium requires 55 (kg) SWU.

    SWU grows proportional to the quantity of the product (see Eq.1), i.e. to produce 15 kg uranium being 90% U-235 one needs 15 times the SWU plotted in this diagram.

    "The critical mass of a sphere of U-235 metal is only 15 kg with a Beryllium reflector. See Gunter Hildenbrand, Nuclear energy, nuclear exports and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, AIF Conference on International Commerce and Safeguards for Civil Nuclear Power, March 1977. A schematic diagram of an implosion bomb.

    Because of losses during the enrichment and weaponization processes, Iran would need about 914 kg of UF6 enriched to 3.5% U-235, of which about 618 kg would be uranium, in order to achieve 16 kg of weapon-grade uranium. 618 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5% U-235 contains 21.6 kg of U-235. See the SWU calculator published by URENCO, a European uranium enrichment consortium." (Source: Iran Watch, Iran's nuclear timetable, Updated June 9, 2009, in cache, 15 June, 2009)

    For comparison: "One P1 centrifuge -a modified Pakistani version of the Dutch 4M, developed in the mid 1970s- has an annual output of about 3 SWU per year (Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, June 1, 2004, GOV/2004/34, Annex 1, p. 11)." (Source: D. Albright, C. Hinderstein, The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?, ISIS, March 27, 2006, (in cache).
    Thus production of 1 kg weapon grade uranium (90% U-235) takes

    1. 52 P1 centrifuges runnig for 1 year (i.e. 52 P1 years) when starting with natural uranium.
    2. 18 P1 centrifuges runnig for 1 year (i.e. 18 P1 years) when starting with power reactor grade uranium (4% enriched).
    Correspondingly, the production of 97 kg weapon grade uranium (90% U-235) takes 5000 P1 years when starting with natural uranium:
    (1 kg U-235) / (52 P1 years) 5000 P1 = 97 kg U-235/year.

    In relation to Iran
    • "[In Iran] By mid-May of 2007, 8 cascades of 164 centrifuges each, as well as smaller groups, are in intermittent experimental operation fed by uranium hexafluoride from Iran's ore processing plant; Iran has claimed "industrial capability." Note that the steady operation of about 5000 centrifuges of the type operated by Iran are needed to separate HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] for one nuclear weapon per year."
      Source: Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "Capability versus intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation", The Bulletin Online, 15 June 2007 - in cache))

    • "... we now know that the Iranians have 10 centrifuge cascades [each cascade consisting of 164 centrifuges], totalling 1,640 machines. However, Iran claims to have assembled at least 3000 [P-1] centrifuges, enough to make another nine or 10 cascades. As the centrifuges now operating are configured, Iran is making 4 per cent U-235, suitable for use in a power reactor: 3000 centrifuges will produce U-235 for one bomb each year.

      It is now obvious that Iran skilfully played for time until they reached a rather high level of technical mastery of the enrichment process. This is the price paid by the west and the Russians and Chinese for their reluctance to apply meaningful sanctions to Iran two and even three years ago.

      Even if Iran abandons its plans to build more than the current 3000 centrifuges, another problem remains. Part of any negotiation will have to be an iron-clad guarantee that supplies of fuel for Iranian nuclear power reactors will be available, no matter what political winds blow. In practice that will almost certainly mean that Iran will be allowed to hold at least a year's spare fresh fuel as a buffer. The danger here is that reactor fuel, enriched to 4 per cent U-235, is already more than halfway to bomb grade because enrichment becomes easier as concentration of U-235 increases. If Iran decides to throw out international inspectors and abandon the NPT, the capabilities of its "pilot plant" will be more than doubled if it taps into its stock of reactor fuel."
      Source: Peter Zimmerman, Change tack on nuclear Iran, Financial Times, London, August 16 2007. The author is professor of science & security studies at King's College London. He previously served as the chief scientist of the US Senate committee on foreign relations).

    • "Iran produced an estimated 200-250 kilograms of LEU [low enriched uranium] during this latest reporting period [May 7, 2008 to August 30, 2008], roughly doubling the amount produced prior to this period. Its rate during this current reporting period is close to an average of 2 kilograms of LEU per day,"
      ... "A key benchmark of enrichment progress is when Iran accumulates enough low enriched uranium to have a capability to produce quickly enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. In this case, Iran would use the LEU as feed into its cascades, dramatically shortening the time to produce weapon-grade uranium."
      • "ISIS estimates that under optimal conditions, Iran could use between 700 and 800 kilograms of LEU to produce in its P1 centrifuges 20-25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, enough for a crude fission weapon.
      • Other estimates are more pessimistic about Iran's ability to enrich the LEU up to weapon-grade, estimating that 1,000-1,700 kilograms of LEU would be necessary to produce 25-30 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, generally considered more than enough for one nuclear weapon.
      Whatever the actual amount of LEU, Iran is progressing toward this capability and can be expected to reach it in 6 months to 2 years."
      Source: David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues, September 15, 2008

    • "Reports by Reuters (6. February 2008), the Associated Press and the Vienna Press Agency have highlighted Iran's decision to move ahead with installation of modified P-2 centrifuges at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. Iran's name for the machine is the IR-2.

      This decision appears to reflect Iran's commitment to expanding and improving its enrichment capabilities beyond those of the P-1 centrifuge, of which 3000 are currently operating at the larger Natanz fuel enrichment plant. According to press reports, the modified P-2/IR-2 centrifuges are still being tested and no nuclear material has been introduced yet.

      The P-2 centrifuge, deployed in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, is essentially the same design as one developed by Germany in the early 1970s and stolen by A.Q. Khan from Urenco, the uranium enrichment consortium of Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands.
      Where the P-1 in Pakistan achieved an annual enrichment output of about 2 separative work units (swu) annually, the P-2 has a capacity of about 5 swu annually."

      Source: ISIS Newsletter, February 7, 2008 (in cache)

    • David Albright and Jacqueline Shire with Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel, Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable - Essential Background and Recommendations for the Obama Administration (in cache, Febr. 19, 2009).

    • Iran Watch Iran's nuclear timetable, (cached: March 1, 2009, Update June 9, 2009)
      As Iran increases the number of centrifuge machines it is operating, and increases its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, it will consolidate its status as a "virtual" nuclear weapon state.

      Iran's progress towards this status as of June 1, 2009 is estimateda below:

      • Amount of U-235 contained in Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium:
            31.7 kg b
      • Amount of this U-235 produced each month:
            2 kg         c
      • Amount of this U-235 required to fuel a first-generation implosion bombd:
            21.6 kg         e
      • Date by which Iran probably had stockpiled the above:
            December 2008         f
      • Number of additional months needed to convert this low-enriched uranium to weapon-grade g:
            Two to three         h
      • Date by which Iran may have enough U-235 to fuel a second bomb:
            October 2009 i

      Additional estimates: Moving from reactor-grade to weapon-grade uranium

      • Amount of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) enriched to 3.5 percent U-235 now on hand:
            1,339 kg j
      • Average daily production rate of this low-enriched UF6:
            2.75 kg         k
      • Amount of this low-enriched UF6 needed to produce a bomb’s worth of weapon-grade UF6:
            914 kg         l
      • Number of separative work units (SWUs)m needed to accomplish the above:
            840 n

      ENDNOTES

      (a) The following estimates are based on information in quarterly reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for nuclear inspections in Iran.

      (b) According to the IAEA, Iran had produced a total of 839 kg of low-enriched UF6 as of November 17, 2008. Since then, Iran has produced approximately 500 kg of this material for a total of 1,339 kg (see note j) (http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-iranreport-060509.pdf). Of that amount, 905 kg is uranium; 905 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5% contain 31.68 kg of U-235.

      (c) Iran is estimated to produce about 2.75 kg of low-enriched UF6 each day (see note k), for an average monthly production rate of 84 kg, 56 kg of which is uranium; enriched to 3.5%, this 56 kg contains 1.96 kg of U-235.

      (d) 16 kilograms are assumed to be sufficient for an implosion bomb. This was the amount called for in the implosion device Saddam Hussein was trying to perfect in the 1980’s, and the design for such a device has circulated on the nuclear black market, to which Iran has had access. The critical mass of a sphere of U-235 metal is only 15 kg with a Beryllium reflector. See Gunter Hildenbrand, Nuclear energy, nuclear exports and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, AIF Conference on International Commerce and Safeguards for Civil Nuclear Power, March 1977. For a schematic diagram of an implosion bomb, see: www.wisconsinproject.org/bomb-facts/images/nw-1.jpg.

      (e) Because of losses during the enrichment and weaponization processes, Iran would need about 914 kg (see note l) of UF6 enriched to 3.5% U-235, of which about 618 kg would be uranium, in order to achieve 16 kg of weapon-grade uranium. 618 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5% U-235 contains 21.6 kg of U-235. See the SWU calculator published by URENCO, a European uranium enrichment consortium: web.archive.org/web/20021226100607/www.urenco.de/trennarbeit/swucal_e.html.

      (f) Assuming 19.9 kg of U-235 on hand as of November 17, 2008, a requirement of 21.6 kg for a first bomb, and a production rate, at the time, of 1.6 kg of U-235 each month, Iran would have had enough in December 2008.

      (g) Once enriched to weapon-grade, this material would still need to be converted from gas to metal and then machined into a form suitable for a bomb.

      (h) The IAEA estimates the conversion time for low-enriched uranium to weapon-grade uranium metal to be approximately 3-12 months (www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf). However, if it would take approximately 840 SWUs to produce 16 kg of U-235 from a stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium (see note n), and if Iran is capable of producing 7,000 SWUs per year (see note s), then a conversion time at the lower end of this range is probable. Therefore, Iran could have weapon-grade UF6 within 2-3 months, even assuming a delay in processing.

      (i) If, by July 2009, Iran were to add the 2,132 centrifuges it has installed and placed under vacuum, the monthly production rate of U-235 would increase by about 43% to 2.86 kg per month. This production rate would allow Iran to accumulate the requisite 21.6 kg for a second bomb by October 2009.

      (j) According to the IAEA, Iran had an inventory of 839 kg of low-enriched UF6 as of November 17, 2008, based on production from the beginning of operations (http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/documents/iaea-iranreport-021909.pdf); Iran has estimated that it produced 171 kg of this material from November 18, 2008 through January 31, 2009 and 329 kg between February 1, 2009 and May 31, 2009, for a total of 1,339 kg of low enriched UF6 (http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-iranreport-060509.pdf).

      (k) Iran estimates that it produced 330 kg of low-enriched UF6 over 120 days, from February 1, 2009 to May 31, 2009, for an average daily production rate of 2.75 kg.

      (l) This is assuming uranium tails of 1% U-235, a feed assay of 3.5% U-235, a product assay of 93% U-235, a 5% loss of material during bomb manufacture, and that 16 kg of this product are needed for a bomb. See the SWU calculator published by URENCO, a European uranium enrichment consortium: web.archive.org/web/20021226100607/www.urenco.de/trennarbeit/swucal_e.html.

      (m) The Separative Work Unit is the standard measure of the effort required to increase the concentration of the fissionable U-235 isotope.  See www.urenco.com/Content/89/Glossary.aspx.

      (n) Based on the assumptions set forth above (see footnote l), Iran would need approximately 840 SWUs to bring 914 kg of low-enriched UF6 to weapon grade. See the SWU calculator published by URENCO, a European uranium enrichment consortium: web.archive.org/web/20021226100607/www.urenco.de/trennarbeit/swucal_e.html.

    • Nuclear Weapon Breakout Calculations

      Nuclear weapons "breakout capability" is a scenario that involves enriching low enriched uranium (LEU) up to weapon-grade uranium. This could be accomplished within 3-6 months at either the Natanz facility or a clandestine gas centrifuge facility . It provides a measure of Iran's growing nuclear weapons capabilities. Whether Iran intends to pursue this approach is unknown.

      February [2009], Iran accumulated enough LEU to be able to enrich enough weapon-grade uranium for 1 nuclear weapon.

      At Iran's current rate of 2.75 kilograms of LEU hexafluoride per day, Iran would accumulate in total enough LEU to use as feed for the production of sufficient weapon- grade uranium for 2 nuclear weapons by the end of February 2010. If Iran were to operate all of the about 7,000 centrifuges currently enriching or under vacuum, this milestone would be achieved by mid-December 2009.

      Of note, the IAEA states that given increases in the number of centrifuges operating and the rate of production of LEU, improvements to "containment and surveillance measures" at the FEP are necessary.

      If Iran diverted this safeguarded LEU for use in a clandestine enrichment plant, the IAEA should detect the missing LEU within a few weeks. If Iran were to produce the weapon- grade uranium at Natanz, it would provoke an international crisis.

      Source: David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, June 5, 2009 IAEA Report on Iran, Centrifuge and LEU increases; access to Arak reactor denied; no progress on outstanding issues (in cache, as of June 12, 2009)
      Basis: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released June 5, 2009 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran's compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803.

      March 2010: Iran's goal of a large domestic enrichment capability is driven in part by a fear of foreign suppliers cutting off LEU fuel for its nuclear power reactors. However, these very sanctions, worsened by Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA, are making it impossible for Iran to create that enrichment capability. While it struggles with its commercial goals, Iran is strengthening an enrichment capability able to produce weapon-grade uranium for nuclear weapons. The number of ways it can do so is also increasing. If Iran develops a stock of 19.75 percent LEU, it could even use Natanz's FEP to quickly [within 6 months or less] produce weapon-grade uranium before the international community could respond. ...

      Its production could even occur between visits by IAEA inspectors, a time period that Iran could easily lengthen by positing some emergency or accident that requires a delay in permitting the inspectors inside the plant.

      ... Unless IAEA safeguards inspectors are stationed at the FEP far more frequently, the international community may not even know about the weapon-grade uranium production until it already had left the site.

      Source: David Albright and Christina Walrond, Supplement to Iran's Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock, March 3, 2010.

    • May 31, 2010: IAEA Iran Report: Enrichment Increases Slightly; Lack of Adequate Safeguards (in cache)
      "The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on May 31, 2010 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran's compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. The following analysis highlights the IAEA's key findings, including
      1. modestly increased production of LEU at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant;
      2. expected levels of production of 20 percent LEU using a single cascade of 164 centrifuges at the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP);
      3. continued research and development of advanced centrifuges; and
      4. no progress toward resolving outstanding questions regarding the "military applications" of Iran's nuclear activities.

      A recurring issue throughout the report concerns Iran's minimalist application of safeguards, in particular where the IAEA seeks information

      • about new enrichment facilities that are reportedly under construction,
      • design information for the Fordow facility,
      • centrifuge production,
      • uranium mining and related activities.
      The IAEA continues to note that Iran's refusal to be bound by its 2003 safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements does not allow the Agency to build confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities."
    • June 11, 2010: David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Taking Stock of the Production of 19.75 Percent Uranium at the PFEP" (in cache)
      "The May 31 IAEA safeguards report on Iran is the first to contain any data on the production of 19.75 percent enriched uranium in IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Iran has said that it plans to eventually turn this enriched uranium into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Data in the report show that Iran's initial average production rate of 19.75 percent material is 3 kilograms per month of LEU hexafluoride, or an estimated total of about 11 kilograms of 19.75 percent LEU hexafluoride through the end of May. As ISIS has noted in previous reports, the annual fueling requirements for the TRR is quite lowÑon the order of 6 to 10 kilograms per year.

      As Iran enriches up to 19.75 percent in the PFEP, it is important to understand Iran's potential to enrich greater quantities of 19.75 percent enriched uranium by using more cascades. As the original agreement to swap LEU for 19.75 percent LEU had an eye towards both removing most of Iran's stock of 3.5 percent LEU and preventing enrichment up to 19.75%, a future renegotiated deal will also need to take into account the removal of Iran's growing stock of 19.75 percent LEU and verified commitments not to produce more. One of the serious weaknesses in the Iran, Brazil, and Turkey declaration on the removal of LEU from Iran is its silence on these critical points.

      This report illustrates different scenarios for Iran's production of 19.75 percent enriched uranium at the PFEP based on the number of cascades enriching, Iran's experience to date, and its stated goals. It is important to note that Iran's enrichment of uranium to this level is still in its early days. The recent two to three month period reported in the May 31 IAEA report does not establish a firm record of enrichment output. Nonetheless, it shows that Iran was able to quickly produce this higher enriched material in significant quantities. Iran has also demonstrated its ability to disassemble, move, and restart cascades as needed. Iran is also becoming more sophisticated in operating centrifuge cascades together to produce higher levels of enrichment. As a result, Iran has accomplished additional steps in demonstrating a capability to make weapon-grade uranium either in a parallel secret program or during a breakout."

    Germany remains Iran's largest trading partner in Europe

    • David Crawford in Berlin and Peter Fritsch in Washington, Germany Probes Iranian Bank's Dealings, Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2010.
      The Wall Street Journal reported Monday [July 19, 2010] -citing Western officials- that EIH [Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, Hamburg] has done more than $1 billion worth of business on behalf of Iranian firms currently on United Nations blacklists for their alleged work on Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

      "The banking oversight [Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin] currently has no findings about the infringements reported (by the Journal), but BaFin and the Bundesbank are investigating these accusations against this bank," [the German Finance M]inistry spokesman Michael Offer told a news conference.

      A spokesman for BaFin said the regulatory agency's responsibilities include oversight of banking institutions' compliance with U.N. and EU sanctions. He declined to comment on EIH or individual banks.

      A spokeswoman for the German Bundesbank declined to comment.

      The U.S., France and the U.K. have been pressing the German government to act against EIH.

    • David Crawford in Berlin and Peter Fritsch in Washington, Small Bank in Germany Tied to Iran Nuclear Effort", Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2010.
      EIH was founded by a group of Iranian merchants in Hamburg in 1971. It operates openly under the supervision of German bank regulators. Officials say it has become an important locus in Europe for facilitating Iranian trade in euros.

      ... A pressure campaign led by the U.S. Treasury has caused many major European banks and businesses to restrict or abandon dealings with Iran. As some of those banks have pulled back, EIH has become more important in helping Iranian firms finance trade, Western officials say.

      EIH's Iran business grew in the wake of Deutsche Bank AG's acquisition last year of Sal. Oppenheim Group, one official said. As part of that deal, Deutsche Bank acquired BHF Bank AG.

      BHF was particularly active in banking for Iranian companies, according to people familiar with the matter. But Deutsche Bank -which does substantial business in the U.S. -has sought to unwind that business. EIH has stepped into the resulting void to aid Iranian transactions, Western officials say.

      Germany's trade with Iran
      		 ... Still, Germany remains the Islamic republic's largest trading partner in Europe, a fact that is earning Berlin unwelcome scrutiny in the wake of efforts to deepen sanctions against Tehran. Though major firms such as Siemens AG have committed to wind down business ties to Iran, German trade between the countries totaled about $1.8 billion in the first four months of this year, up nearly 20% over the like period in 2009.

  • Victor Gilinsky1, Marvin Miller2, Harmon Hubbard, A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, October 22, 2004, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC, USA (in cache, May 26, 2006)
    1Senior Associate at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, also sits on NPEC's Board of Advisors. He is an independent energy consultant and was Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner under Ford, Carter and Reagan.

    A physicist, Gilinsky is an independent consultant, most recently advising Nevada on matters related to the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. His expertise spans a broad range of energy issues. From 1975 to 1984, he served on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, having been nominated by President Gerald Ford and renominated by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier in his career he worked at Rand Corporation; he was also an assistant director for policy and program review at the Atomic Energy Commission. (Source: Victor Gilinsky, A call to resist the nuclear revival, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Web Edition, 27. January 2009 (in cache, 18. February 2009)

    2Security Studies Program & Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    "Nuclear critics saw promoting LWRs without reprocessing or the further spread of enrichment plants, then, as the best path. Enrichment and reprocessing, they argued, would be difficult to hide and, therefore, could and should be discouraged. "

    "... the report makes clear that building and operating small, covert reprocessing and enrichment facilities are now far easier than they were portrayed to be 25 years ago.

    • A key reason why is the increasing availability of advanced centrifuge enrichment technology. This allows nations to make weapons-grade uranium with far less energy and in far less space than was required with older enrichment methods. It also allows them to distribute and hide their uranium enrichment facilities among a number of sites, something traditional gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment (the next most popular way to enrich uranium) does not permit.
    • Another reason why is that nations can quickly separate out the plutonium contained in spent reactor fuel in relatively affordable facilities that can be quite small (as little as 65 feet square) and therefore, be easily hidden.
    The bottom line - LWRs no longer should be given to any nation that might divert the reactor's fresh lightly enriched fuel or the plutonium-laden spent fuel to make bombs.

    The report details how fresh and spent LWR fuel can be used to accelerate a nation's illicit weapons program significantly. In the case of a state that can enrich uranium (either covertly or commercially),

    • fresh lightly enriched reactor fuel rods could be seized and the uranium oxide pellets they contain quickly crushed and fluoridated.
    • This lightly enriched uranium feed material, in turn, could enable a would-be bomb maker to produce a significant number of weapons with one-fifth the level of effort than what would otherwise be required to enrich the natural uranium to weapons grade.
    As for spent LWR fuel, the report details how
    • about a year after an LWR of the size Iran has was brought on line, as much as 60 Nagasaki bombs' worth of near-weapon grade material could be seized and
    • the first bomb made in a matter of weeks. The report also details how
    • the reliability of the bombs made of this material, moreover, is similar to that of devices made of pure weapon grade plutonium.

    The running assumption today, of course, is that any nation diverting either the fresh or spent fuel from an LWR site would be detected by IAEA inspectors. This clearly is the premise of the deal the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia are making to Iran: Russia will provide Iran with fresh reactor fuel if Iran promises to suspend activities at its known uranium enrichment facilities and surrenders spent fuel from its LWR for transit and storage in Russia. What's not fully appreciated, however, is that Iran might well be able to divert these materials to covert enrichment or reprocessing plants and might well be able to do so without detection. Lengthy exposure to spent fuel that has just left an LWR of the sort required to package and ship long distances out of the country is quite hazardous. If Iran was set on making bombs, though, it might be willing to take the risks associated with a much shorter transit for quick reprocessing. The health hazards associated with diverting fresh LWR fuel, on the other hand, are virtually nil.

    The IAEA currently

    • does not have complete, real time camera monitoring of either fresh or spent fuel storage areas in Iran and
    • only reviews camera tapes at these sites once every 90 days - a period within which Iran could divert this material to make its first nuclear weapon. Oddly, the IAEA is now considering expanding the intervals between these inspections (for nations other than Iran) from 90 days to a year as a way to rationalize its meager resources and to entice nations to allow the IAEA more intrusive inspection rights under the Additional Protocol.

    The thinking here is that since it would take a nation about a year to construct an enrichment or reprocessing plant, the IAEA can afford to extend the time between inspections. This argument, however, assumes two things:

    1. First, that the IAEA can determine in advance which nations do not have covert enrichment and reprocessing plants and,
    2. second, that IAEA inspectors could detect covert reprocessing and enrichment plant construction in a timely fashion.
    Yet, neither assumption seems warranted."

    Joshua Pollack, Deconstructing the Iranian challenge, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 September 2009 (in acamedia cache, 8 October 2009)

    ... the spread of hard-to-detect centrifuge enrichment technology, ably facilitated by the A. Q. Khan network, has undermined one of the core assumptions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT contains no restrictions on the possession of this or any other fuel-cycle technologies by non-nuclear weapons states. But once they are mastered, vacuum centrifuges can be set up at hidden sites (such as the one near Qom), enabling either an illicit weapons program or a quick and perfectly legal "breakout" from the treaty.

    The growing recognition of this dilemma lately has sparked a variety of proposals, such as trading away centrifuges for guaranteed fuel supplies; the creation of an international nuclear "fuel bank"; or the creation of regional multinational fuel centers. The United States favors a less ambitious, but still challenging, approach, pledging to "pursue vigorously the universal entry into force of the Additional Protocol" at the NPT Review Conference next May in New York. Expanded inspection rights, Washington hopes, will deter the construction of hidden fuel-cycle facilities, shoring up the NPT.

    Henry D. Sokolski, Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, A Report of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center On the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Safeguards System, Final Updated Report (September 2007) - in cache, August 30, 2007.

    This NPEC report examines the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to safeguard peaceful nuclear energy, and provides a series of recommendations to shore up the NPT-IAEA safeguards system's shortfalls.

    Timely detection for plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and uranium-233 in metal and in fresh mixed oxide fuel (MOX) is simply not possible.
    timely detection for plutonium, HEU and U233 in metal and in fresh MOX is simply not possible
    "conversion time" = time estimate for conversion of material into a bomb

  • Marvin Miller, Research Affiliate with Nuclear Engineering Department and the Science, Technology and Society (STS) Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Attempts to Reduce the Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Power: An Overview of What's Old and What's New, Draft, 2001 (in cache)
    ... "as nuclear reactors spread among nations their production will enable almost every country to acquire nuclear weapons. This statement, most unfortunately, is true. I believe that eventually nuclear proliferation is unavoidable unless we find better solutions to international problems than are now on the horizon."

    "There is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system, which relies in inspections and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting this conclusion are not merely technical, but primarily the insuperable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations each free to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use bombs. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities [i.e., production and use of weapons-useable materials such as plutonium and highly-enriched uranium] may be carried out by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of international enforcement by police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to cope with them. (from Chester I. Barnard, J. R. Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy Prepared for The Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy by a Board of Consultants ("Acheson-Lilienthal Report"), Department of State Publication 2498, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1946)."
    (see also related issue in: J. Robert Oppenheimer, Speech to the Association of Los Alamos Scientists, Los Alamos, New Mexico, November 2, 1945)

  • David Albright and Andrea Scheel, Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation, ISIS, Report November 12, 2008. (in cache)
    "Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors.

    Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030. Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons.

    To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad.

    To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a region-wide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States

    • must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel,
    • insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and
    • develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region.

    Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power."

    Michael Rietz, German Companies: Deliveries to Areas of Tension and Violations of the Foreign Trade Law (in cache), ISIS, April 1, 2001.

  • Ian Davis, The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports: Germany, Sweden and the UK, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Oxford University Press, 2002. p 266:
    "Further convergence [of the German, Swedish and British export regulations] can be expected in the period to 2010 and beyond. While this is difficult to prove, table 8.5 suggests that the arms and dual-use export controls of the three countries are likely to continue to converge in the coming years around even higher levels of intergovernmental coordination and with further examples of explicit harmonization. While the scope and pace of this convergence will be contingent on future changes in the policy environments (especially the potential for deeper political integration and the development of a Single European Defense Market) and the future actions of policy stakeholders, there are strong grounds for believing that many of the factors which led to significant convergence in the 1990s will continue to shape policy agenda in the new decade."

    related citation: Joseph Cirincione, "The European Union has crafted its own strategy that includes tying all EU trade agreements to observance of non-proliferation treaties and norms."in Nuclear Proliferation Status, 2006 (in cache), Center for American Progress, June 9, 2006

  • The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Germany tightens trade restrictions; Can it do more?, (in cache), NuclearIran News, February 2, 2009.

    The article in the German business newspaper Handelsblatt cited government and industry sources as saying that Chancellor Angela Merkel had responded to criticism from Germany's partners, including the United States and Israel, about the continued strength of German exports to Iran despite a tightening of Western sanctions over its nuclear program. (compare news coverage in German public TV, Das Erste, Panorama, December 11, 2008)

    German firms receive "Hermes cover" export credit guarantees when selling goods to markets considered risky. But according to the report, Merkel has instructed the economics ministry to put the brakes on this practice after statistics showed that exports had risen 10.5 percent on an annual basis to 3.58 billion euros ($4.63 billion) through November 2008. Some 75 percent of all medium and small businesses in Iran use German-made equipment.

    Business and banking trade elements are not specifically forbidden under UN Security Council sanctions, which only limit the sale of technology that could be used in the weapons industry.

    Merkel has repeatedly insisted that Germany is only obliged to obey the UN sanctions and said earlier this month that Germany was not planning to undertake any further unilateral action against Iran at this time. But pressure from within the Western powers working towards a nuclear-free Iran may have persuaded her otherwise.

    Germany has also come under fire from sections of the US media for its policy towards trade with Iran. A recent commentary by editorial writer Dan Schwammenthal in the Wall Street Journal was titled: "Germany loves Iran." Schwammenthal wrote that Germany was less worried about an Iranian nuclear bomb than it was about tightening sanctions that could negatively affect trade between the two countries.

    Source: Deutsche Welle, German Government to Crack Down on Business with Iran, 26.1.2009 (in cache, February 19, 2009)

  • US Trade Restrictions, Iran Watch Roundtable on Congressional Action on Iran - 6-09, June 4, 2009:
    Over the past several years, Congress has considered a variety of measures aimed at restraining Iran’s nuclear program and its support for terrorism. The 111th Congress is again weighing such measures – just as the time to halt Iran’s nuclear progress is growing shorter.

    Past bills have chosen among several tactics: encouraging divestment from companies doing business with Iran, penalizing foreign energy companies for investing in Iran, and making it more difficult for Iran to obtain U.S.-origin goods via transshipment hubs like the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia. One sanctions effort that included many of these measures, the Iran Counterproliferation Act (H.R. 1400), passed the House overwhelmingly in September 2007. More recent bills have targeted foreign companies that supply refined petroleum products to Iran.

    To discuss these proposals and gauge their prospects in the 111th Congress, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control hosted a bi-partisan roundtable discussion in Washington D.C. on April 24, 2009. The panelists were Skip Fischer, a professional staff member for the minority on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Will Huntington, legislative assistant for Representative Edward Markey (D-MA), Don MacDonald, staff director for the majority on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and Tim Morrison, national security policy advisor for Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ).

    Sanctions measures that warrant serious consideration include those

    • authorizing state divestment initiatives,
    • enforcing more strictly the U.S. trade embargo,
    • penalizing energy firms investing in Iran, and
    • targeting countries that serve as transshipment hubs for Iran.

    Several sanctions bills have been introduced already in the 111th Congress. The panelists agreed that legislation authorizing states to divest from firms that conduct business activities with Iran has the best chance of passing. A similar bill passed the House twice in the previous Congress, once on its own and once as part of a sanctions package that was ultimately defeated in the Senate. The version currently under consideration, H.R. 1327, sponsored by Rep. Barney Frank with bipartisan support, is a relatively passive bill that provides states with a legal cover if they choose to divest from certain firms because of activities in Iran. The bill also shelters asset managers from liability should they divest. More than ten states now have divestment policies related to Iran, with more likely to follow. The panelists found it likely that Congress would seek to protect these states from lawsuits attacking such policies. Another proposal would have required the federal government to list companies investing in Iran and then require state pension funds to divest from those companies. The panelists also pointed out that even a more passive bill could help publicize the issue: states are already using divestment investigations to get information from U.S. companies about the activities of their foreign subsidiaries in Iran. Such information then becomes public. As a result, it will be increasingly difficult for companies to quietly pursue trade and investment with Iran.

  • Stop the Bomb, Keine Geschäfte mit dem iranischen Regime, 19. Februar 2009.
    Wir fordern:
    • deutsche Firmen auf, alle Geschäfte zu stoppen, die das iranische Regime stützen,
    • von der Bundesregierung:
      1. den Erlass von unilateralen Sanktionen, die solche Geschäfte unterbinden
      2. die Forcierung wirksamer und umfassender Sanktionen auf EU- und UN-Ebene.

  • Joseph Cirincione, Senior Vice-President for National Security and International Affairs, Center for American Progress, "Nuclear Proliferation Status, 2006" (in cache)
    • "Six nations abandoned indigenous nuclear weapon programs under way or under consideration in the 1960s: Egypt, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and West Germany.
    • Since the late 1970s, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia have abandoned nuclear weapon programs or nuclear weapons (or both) on their territory.
    • North Korea and Iran are the only two states that began acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities in this later period and have not ceased the effort."
    • more: Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (in cache), Video Lecture, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, SERIES: The Future of Nuclear Technology, MITWorld, February 22, 2007.
    • of related interest:
      1. Graham Allison, Loose nukes: The Eight spoke loudly, and did little, June 12, 2004
      2. World should adapt to Iran atom advances (in chache) - ElBaradei, Reuters, May 16, 2007: "from a proliferation perspective, the fact of the matter is that one of the purposes of suspension -- keeping them from getting the knowledge -- has been overtaken by events. ... 'We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that's a fact."
  • John Larrabee, William Lowell, Richard Speier, Sharon Squassoni, Leonard Weiss (Panelists), Valerie Lincy, Gary Milhollin, Lora Saalman (Moderators): Iran Watch Round Tables, Round Table on the Bush Administration agreement for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, November 30, 2005, Iran Watch (in cache)
    "[Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)] Regime cohesion could erode quickly. The panelists observed that the United States has always set the standard for nonproliferation rules. Although it has usually taken a long time for countries to follow the United States when it has strengthened these rules, it has taken only an instant to follow any loosening of them. Russia, France and Britain, for example, have already expressed interest in nuclear cooperation with India. In a political climate where rules are being loosened for a proliferant country like India, the easing of exports to other proliferators such as Iran is likely to follow."
    (Source: Iran Watch Round Tables, November 30, 2005, Iran Watch, Finding 2 (in cache),

    ... "The U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped legal restraints on American exports of missile-useable equipment to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite the fact that all three are active in Indian missile development. This appears to be only the first step in a general loosening of U.S. missile controls for India.

    Once American firms begin to sell such items to India, eager companies in Russia, China and Europe may consider that it is safe to sell the same things to Iran. Iran recently announced plans to expand its infant satellite and space programs, both of which will need imports. Those imports, by their nature, may be useful for making missiles."
    (Source: Iran Watch Round Tables, November 30, 2005, Iran Watch, Finding 3 (in cache)

  • Joachim Gruber, Violations of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Consequence of a Cultural Gap between the U.S. and Germany?, 2004.
  • The Wisconsin Project, Germany, Search Results, May 15, 2006.
  • Wolfgang Hoffmann
    • Nichts sehen und nichts merken - Nuklearexporte, Transnuklear, Biblis: Die Kontrolle der Atomwirtschaft ist völlig unzureichend, Die Zeit, 6. Januar 1989, S. 6 - 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

      (see also G. Milhollin, Bonn's Proliferation Policy, The New York Times, January 4, 1989, Page A21, in cache

      "To South Africa, West German companies sent low-enriched uranium, which multiplied Pretoria's ability to make high-enriched uranium for bombs.

      To Israel went heavy water, which increased the output of Israel's bomb-making reactor at Dimona. To Argentina went heavy water that could run a secret bomb-making reactor in the future.

      To Pakistan went an entire factory to help process uranium for bombs, plus tritium and tritium-making equipment to multiply the explosive power of its first generation of nuclear bombs.

      To India went ''reflector material'' - probably beryllium for the core of the bomb itself - and enough heavy water to let India run for the first time three large bomb-making reactors outside international controls.

      Many of the nuclear exports lacked the required licenses. Companies are likely to have conspired with the recipients to move the goods across borders. The fact is, most of the exports were expressly forbidden by West German pledges under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and raise strong questions whether Bonn cares about the treaty at all.

      Outside protests have failed to stop the transfers. The United States asked Bonn in 1981 to stop the Hempel Group, in Düsseldorf, from sending enriched uranium to South Africa and heavy water to Argentina. Switzerland asked in 1985 for information about the same Hempel Group's sale of heavy water to India through Zürich.

      In 1986, Washington asked Bonn to stop Hempel from sending heavy water to India, and warned in a memo of an even larger scheme to sell heavy water "coordinated from within West Germany by Hempel Company officials". Norway asked West Germany in 1988 to investigate Hempel's sale of Norwegian heavy water to India through Basel. In every case, Bonn refused to provide information, investigate or acknowledge any gap in its laws.

      Why is West Germany so lax? To promote trade, Bonn has deliberately kept its export laws weak, and it doesn't want to think about tightening them. And the staff for policing sensitive exports is woefully inadequate, making it easy for an unscrupulous operator to evade controls.

      But it's not just a matter of Bonn overzealously promoting exports or neglecting to plug gaps in the regulations. The illegal exports have been going on for more than a decade, and Bonn has been warned repeatedly about violations.

      The truth lies deeper, and has finally exasperated American officials, leading them to the extraordinary step of publicly naming the company they think is involved in building the Libyan plant and even revealing that President Reagan asked Chancellor Helmut Kohl for help in their November meeting. They have told me privately that West German nuclear exporters are being protected by powerful political allies.

      We have no proof that West German political leaders are being paid to look the other way. But the behavior of the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, who run the country, is not encouraging. Some of them have banded together in Parliament to defend Hempel, arguing that the company has not violated German law. Moreover, they refuse to consider whether the law is so full of holes that it must be tightened.")

    • Bomben für die Welt - Wegen deutscher Nuklearexporte droht neuer Ärger mit den Vereinigten Staaten, Die Zeit 17. Februar 1989, S. 9 - 10 (engl. translation, in cache) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5
  • Nuclear Export Control Index, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
    ISIS Information about Nuclear Export Controls: April 2002--The following papers were delivered at a seminar held with the IPPE (Institute for Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk) Export Control Laboratory
  • Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.) "A review of Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks", Review by Zia Mian; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; November 24, 2007 (in cache)
    Proliferation watchers have kept track of A. Q. Khan's activities for about 30 years. In 1979, the Washington Post named him as the Pakistani engineer who had left his position at the uranium enrichment centrifuge facility at Almelo, Netherlands, four years earlier with "lists of subcontractors and probably blueprints for the plant." Khan then returned to Pakistan, where he soon became director of the country's secret uranium enrichment project at Kahuta, near Islamabad, and a key player in its nuclear weapons program.

    To evade the existing system of controls on the sale of nuclear weapons-related technology, Pakistan established a complex multinational effort to purchase components for its enrichment plant from European and U.S. companies--something the international community was aware of even in the late 1970s....

    Nuclear Black Markets also looks at Pakistan's proliferation of centrifuge technology to other countries.
    On the question of who was responsible for the network's activities, it observes, "Khan cannot be characterized strictly as either a government representative or a businessman acting independently. He was in fact both, in varying degrees according to the circumstances." It faults the Pakistani government, which it argues "should have known what key officials, such as Khan, were up to in an area so fundamental to Pakistan's national security and international reputation."

    Pakistan and Khan are only part of the problem. Nuclear Black Markets observes that the larger proliferation challenge is that "tighter controls on state-to-state technology transfers over the past four decades have resulted in the emergence of the private sector as an additional source of nuclear technology and expertise for proliferant states." It details how these "black and grey markets" in both nuclear technology and knowledge have been tapped by Iraq, Iran, India, North Korea, and Libya, and to lesser degree by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Israel, and Syria.

    The bottom line is clear: "Export controls alone are not likely to stop illicit trade in nuclear material and technology. Where there is a determined demand and the price is high enough, there is likely to be a supply." And government agencies are "often underfunded, undermanned, and undermotivated" and cannot hope to stem the tide. Capitalism will prevail over the state.

    It concludes, "The weakness of export controls and the fatalism of Western suppliers were the strongest factors abetting the network," and notes, "Many industrialists reasoned, 'If we do not do it, others will.'" The effort's scale was significant: Dutch researcher Frank Slijper has reported claims by Henk Slebos, a key Khan supplier and lifelong friend, that he worked with "maybe even 1,000" European companies. (See Project Butter Factory: Henk Slebos and the A. Q. Khan Network, TNI/Campagne tegen Wapenhandel, September 2007)

APPENDIX

 Saddam, the bomb and me: Iraq's Nuclear Program (in cache)

by Mahdi Obeidi (New York Times)

Mahdi Obeidi is the author of "The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind." Kurt Pitzer, who collaborated on the book, assisted with this article. Excerpt:

"... there is no doubt in my mind that we could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years ..."

But the nuclear weapons program "was stopped in its tracks by UN weapons inspectors after the Gulf war and was never restarted." ... "after [Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel] defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later only to be assassinated by his father-in-law's henchmen, the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter."

... Saddam "had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. ... Saddam fooled the rest of the world as well.

"Was Iraq a potential threat to the United States and the world? Threat is always a matter of perception, but our nuclear program could have been reinstituted at the snap of Saddam's fingers. The sanctions and the lucrative oil-for-food program had served as powerful deterrents, but world events - like Iran's current efforts to step up its nuclear ambitions - might well have changed the situation.

Iraqi scientists had the knowledge and the designs needed to jumpstart the program if necessary. And there is no question that we could have done so very quickly. "

"Hundreds of my former staff members and fellow scientists possess knowledge that could be useful to a rogue nation eager for a covert nuclear weapons program. The vast majority are technicians who, like the rest of us, care first about their families and their livelihoods."

Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer,
Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004.
Some details on procurement:

"... Iraq derived several billion dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil smuggling and kickbacks. One senior regime official estimated Iraq earned $4 billion from illicit oil sales from 1999 to March 2003. By levying a surcharge on Oil for Food contracts, Iraq earned billions more during the same period.

This was revenue outside UN control and provided resources the regime could spend without restriction. It channeled much of the illicitly gathered funds to rebuild Iraq's military capabilities through the Military Industrialization Commission, the MIC. MIC worked with the Iraqi Intelligence Service to establish front companies in Iraq and other countries to facilitate procurement.

The budget of MIC increased nearly 100 fold from 1996 to 2003, with the budget totaling $500 million in 2003. Most of this money came from illicit oil contracts. Iraq imported banned military weapons and technology and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts. Companies in several countries were involved in these efforts. ..."
(More on the Duelfer Testimony)

Wikipedia, The Separative Work Unit

"The uranium enrichment work necessary to separating a mass F of feed of assay xf into a mass P of product assay xp, and tails of mass T and assay xt is expressed in terms of the number of separative work units needed, given by the expression

SWU = P V(xp) + T V(xt) - F V(xf)

P, T and F are expressed in kg. The number SWU/P, the Separative Work Units per kg of product, is

(Eq. 1)     SWU/P = V(xp) + T/P V(xt) - F/P V(xf)

where V(x) is the Value Function, defined as

V(x) = (1 - 2x)*\ln(\frac{1 - x}{x})

The feed to product ratio is given by the expression

\frac{F}{P} = \frac{x_{p} - x_{t}}{x_{f} - x_{t}}

wheras the tails to product ratio is given by the expression

\frac{T}{P} = \frac{x_{p} - x_{f}}{x_{f} - x_{t}}

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